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”Crisis tend to cast long shadows upon the political systems in which they occur. It is only 
when we study these longer-term processes that we are able to assess their full impact”(Boin, 

















The aim of this master thesis is to answer the following research question, ‘how have previous 
large-scale pandemic or epidemic outbreaks contributed to shaping the current crisis 
management and pandemic preparedness plans in Norway?’ In order to answer this question, 
a qualitative approach have been utilised in order to carry out a result-explanatory process-
tracing case study. Both political sources – such as white papers, NOUs, and government 
reports – and other publicly available sources – such as websites, historical and academic 
research and publications, news articles, or articles published by independent organisations 
and actors – are used in this thesis. The theoretical framework is built on path dependency, 
crisis typologies, and crisis management perspectives, which informs how the preparedness 
plans were created, and the events that partook in shaping the content of the plans. The 
timeframe for this thesis is mainly between 2000 and 2019, but documents prior to this have 
also been included in order to demonstrate the path dependence. Three preparedness plans and 
two strategies are analysed in the empiric chapter, in order to analyse the overall pandemic 
preparedness. These documents were selected based on their importance in the framework of 
crisis management in the health and care sector of Norway.  
The Norwegian crisis management is based on four contextual principles – the 
principle of liability, the principle of proximity, the principle of conformity, and the principle 
of collaboration – that are being utilised in all areas and sectors in the Norwegian 
preparedness. The first three principles are based on the findings from the 1999 “Willoch 
Committee”, and the last principle came after the 2011 terrorist attack in Norway. However, 
some of these principles have been present in the Norwegian management strategies since the 
introduction of the Public Health Act of 1860, and have been a central part of the Norwegian 
ideal of egalitarianism, local government, and focus on de-centralisation.  
The main findings of this thesis indicate that, previous pandemic events such as the 
1918/19 H1N1 pandemic, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the Ebola patient in 2014 have 
influenced the pandemic preparedness management strategies. Additionally, it finds that it is 
not only previous pandemic events that have shaped the pandemic preparedness in Norway, 
but also other crises, disasters, and complex emergencies, such as the 2004 Sumatra–
Andaman earthquake and the 2011 terrorist attack on Norway have created critical junctures 





The Sars-CoV-2 pandemic have ravaged throughout the world for more than a year now, 
including the entire duration of writing this thesis. Now, as the process has come to an end, so 
does it seem like the pandemic has as well.  
 
This thesis marks the end of my time as a student, and is the culmination of nearly seven years 
of learning and inspiration. This last year has been challenging in more than one way: being 
isolated, unable to partake fully in the academic and social environment at the faculty, and the 
missed opportunity to have a spontaneous face-to-face conversation over a cup of coffee.  
 
Firstly, I would like to extend a great amount of gratitude to my supervisor, Kari Tove 
Elvbakken, who has been helpful, supportive, and understanding throughout this year. Thank 
you for believing in this project, the many read-throughs, and your feedback and comments 
on my work.  
 
Secondly, a small thanks to my cat Tony for always staying positive, and providing me with 
hugs and funny sleeping positions.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank my partner in life and fellow master student, Eirik Hauso, for 
being a person that has provided invaluable feedback throughout this process, being a good 
conversation partner, and your willingness to discuss my thesis whenever I wanted to.  
 
 






1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY ...................................................................................... 2 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION ............................................................................................ 3 
 
2. CONTEXT ....................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 PANDEMICS IN HISTORY ....................................................................................... 6 
2.2 THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT OF 1860 ...................................................................... 9 
2.3 LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ...................................................... 12 
2.4 CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTACT WITH NATURE, AND  
  HUMAN ACTIVITIES .............................................................................................. 13 
2.5 THE NORWEGIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND  
  PREPAREDNESS STRATEGIES ............................................................................. 14 
 
3. THEORY ....................................................................................................................... 14 
3.1 PATH DEPENDENCY .............................................................................................. 17 
3.2 CRISIS TYPOLOGIES – WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRISIS? ............................... 23 
3.3 CRISIS MANAGEMENT .......................................................................................... 30 
3.4 EXPECTATIONS ...................................................................................................... 36 
 
4. METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION .................................................................... 38 
4.1 PROCESS-TRACING CASE STUDY ...................................................................... 38 
4.2 DATA AVAILABILITY AND SELECTION ........................................................... 43 
4.3 QUALITATIVE DOCUMENT ANALYSIS ............................................................. 47 
4.4 DATA QUALITY ...................................................................................................... 48 
4.5 ON THE METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES IN THIS THESIS ............................... 51 
 
5. PREPARING FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC ........................................................... 52 
5.1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT, PREPAREDNESS PLANS, AND REGULATIONS .... 53 
5.2 THE CREATION AND REVISION OF THE PLANS ............................................. 53 
5.3 NATIONAL HEALTH PREPAREDNESS PLAN (NHPP) ...................................... 55 
5.4 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CBRNE-PREPAREDNESS  
  2016-2020 (CBRNE) .................................................................................................. 59 
VII 
 
5.5 NATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPARATION PLAN AGAINST  
  OUTBREAKS OF SEVERE INFECTIOUS DISEASES (OSID) ............................. 63 
5.6 NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PLAN FOR PANDEMIC  
  INFLUENZA (PPI) .................................................................................................... 66 
5.7 CRISIS SCENARIO ANALYSIS OF 2019 (AKS) ................................................... 69 
5.8 REFLECTION FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS ........................................................... 70 
 
6 ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................................... 74 
6.1 CRISIS TYPOLOGIES .............................................................................................. 75 
6.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE OVERALL PREPAREDNESS .................... 80 
6.3 INFLUENCE FROM PREVIOUS PANDEMICS ..................................................... 86 
 
7 CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS ................................................................................. 94 
7.1 MAIN FIDINGS ......................................................................................................... 95 
7.2 ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION ....................................................... 97 
7.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................ 100 
7.4 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................... 101 
7.5 FURTHER RESEARCH .......................................................................................... 103 
 














LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Illustration of contingency in self-reinforcing sequence (Mahoney, 2000, p. 514) ... 18 
Figure 2 "The constitution of an organizational path (Sydow et al., 2009, p.692, modified)” 
collected from Schreyögg and Sydow (2011, p. 323) .............................................................. 20 
Figure 3 The preparedness plans are ranked hierarchically, and establish a level of authority 
between the plans. The figure is influenced by the figure provided by HOD (Helse- og 
omsorgsdepartementet, 2019, p. 5) .......................................................................................... 45 
Figure 4 Changes in the preparedness plans and four critical health and care related junctures 
that have influenced the pandemic preparedness. .................................................................... 88 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1 Overview of the preparedness plans included for analysis in this thesis. ................... 38 
Table 2 The process behind the creation of the newest edition of the five plans. .................... 54 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS  
ABB. ENGLISH NORWEGIAN 
1918/19 
H1N1 
Spanish Flu Spanskesyken 
1957 
A/H2N2 
Asian Flu  Asiasyken 
1968 
A/H3N2 
Hong-Kong Flu  Hong-Kong Influensaen 
1977 H1N1 Russian Flu Russerinfluensaen 
2009 H1N1 Swine Flu Svineinfluensa 
AKS Crisis Scenario Analysis of 2019 Analyser av Krisescenarioer 2019 
BBH The Mandate for the Emergency 
Preparedness Committee Against 
Biological Incidents with Counselling 
and Coordination at a Regional Level 
Mandat for Beredskapsutvalget 
mot Biologiske Hendelser med 
Rådgivere samt Koordinering på 
Regionalt Nivå 
CBRNE National Strategy for CBRNE-
Preparedness 
Nasjonal Strategi For CBRNE- 
Beredskap 2016-2020 
CCD Act Relating to Control of 
Communicable Diseases (Act Of 5 
August 1994, No. 55)  
Lov 5. August 1994 Nr. 55 om 
Vern mot Smittsomme 
Sykdommer (Smittevernloven) 
DSB The Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection 
Direktoratet for 
Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap 
FFI Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment 
Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt  
HCSA Act Relating to Health and Care 
Services (Act Of 24 June 2011, No. 30) 
Lov 24. Juni 2011 Nr. 30 om 
Kommunale Helse- og 
Omsorgstjenester M.M. (Helse- 
og Omsorgstjenesteloven)  
HDIR The Directorate of Health Helsedirektoratet 
HOD Ministry of Health and Care Services 
  
Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet 
X 
 
HSP Health Preparedness Act (Act Of 23 
June 2000, No. 56 Relating to Health 
and Social Preparedness)  
Lov 23. Juni 2000 Nr. 56 om 
Helsemessig og Sosial Beredskap 
Lov (Helseberedskapsloven)  
JBD Ministry of Justice And Public Security Justis- og 
Beredskapsdepartementet 
KPI Continuity Planning – Pandemic 
Influenza  
Kontinuitetsplanlegging- 
Pandemisk Influensa  
LM Leadership Ministry Lederdepartement  
MCE Ministry of Climate And Environment Klima og Miljødepartementet 
MD Ministry of Defence  Forsvarsdepartementet 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Utenriksdepartementet 
MHS Act Relating to the Municipal Health 
Services (Act of 19 November 1982, 
No. 66) 
Lov 19 November 1982 Nr. 66 
om Helsetjenesten i Kommunene 
(Kommunehelsetjenesteloven) 
NHPP National Health Preparedness Plan Nasjonal Helseberedskapsplan 
NIPH Norwegian Institute of Public Health  Folkehelseinstituttet 
NOU Official Norwegian Reports Norsk Offentlig Utredning 
ORV The Overall Risk and Vulnerability 
Assessments for National Preparedness 
in the Health and Care Sector 
Overordnede Risiko- og 
Sårbarhetsvurderinger for 
Nasjonal Beredskap i Helse- og 
Omsorgssektoren 2019 
OSID National Emergency Preparation Plan 
Against Outbreaks of Severe Infectious 
Diseases 
Nasjonal Beredskapsplan mot 
Utbrudd av Alvorlige 
Smittsomme Sykdommer 
PHA The Public Health Act of 1860 Sunnhetsloven 1860 
PPI National Preparedness Plan for 
Pandemic Influenza 
  
Nasjonal Plan mot Pandemisk 
Influensa 
SHSA Specialist Health Services Act (Act Of 
2 July 1999, No. 61 Regarding Health 
and Care Services)  






 Instructions for the Ministries' Work 
with Civil Protection and Emergency 
Preparedness (Instruction On Societal 
Security) 
Instruks for Departementenes 
Arbeid med Samfunnssikkerhet 
(Samfunnssikkerhetsinstruksen) 
 Ministry of Transport Samferdselsdepartementet 
 National Health Preparedness Exercise Nasjonal Helseberedskapsøvelse 
 Norwegian Healthnet - Public 
Enterprise 
Norsk Helsenett  
 Principle of Liability  Ansvarsprinsipet 
 Principle of Conformity  Likhetsprinsippet 
 Principle of Subsidiarity / Proximity Nærhetsprinsippet 
 Principle of Collaboration  Samvirkeprinsippet  
 The Norwegian Coastal Administration Kystverket 
 The Office of the Auditor General of 
Norway 
Riksrevisjonen 
 The Standing Committee on Scrutiny 
and Constitutional Affairs 
Kontroll- og 
Konstitusjonskommiteen 































1. INTRODUCTION  
The topic of this thesis is preparedness and crisis management on the area of pandemic 
preparedness in Norway. It analyses three preparedness plans and two preparedness 
strategies1 in order to create an image of the Norwegian pandemic preparedness prior to the 
Sars-CoV-22  pandemic, and determine whether it was sufficient to manage future pandemics. 
By examining crisis management and path dependencies, it is possible to observe the 
connections between the plans, the reasons for why the plans were established, and the factors 
that influenced the content. Consequently, the pandemic preparedness can be traced back to 
previous crisis, and a causal relationship can be established between new and previously 
implemented measures, which then would have been ‘locked-in’ the path of health and care 
preparedness.  
It is important to notice how previous crisis have shaped the Norwegian preparedness, 
especially the pandemic preparedness, because it reveals ways in which the governing bodies 
might be grossly unprepared. If the conclusion is that the pandemic preparedness have been 
trapped in a self-reinforcing positive feedback loops, and only reproduce measures that have 
worked in the past, the government of Norway might not be prepared to manage future 
pandemics containing unknown pathogens.  
There is an assumption that it is impossible to prepare fully for a crisis, and that any 
attempts to do so would be futile when the actual crisis emerge. However, the plan itself 
might not be useful during a situation of unknowns, but the planning and processes that have 
led to the plan might have contributed to creating a greater understanding of the overall 
situation and available measures and strategies. As a result, the planning and preparation 
process could be viewed as a crucial part of the overall preparedness, as the preparation of the 
plans might have provided invaluable learning experiences and a possibility to reflect on 
possible paths ahead.  
This thesis is relevant for those who seeks to understand how the Norwegian pandemic 
preparedness came to be, and for those who wish to conduct further research on pandemics 
and how such crisis have influenced the Norwegian crisis management. The intention of this 
thesis is to make a contribution on the field of societal security, preparedness planning, and 
                                                 
1 I will refer to the three preparedness plans and the two strategies as preparedness plans or the plans in this 
thesis. 




crisis management, by analysing the Norwegian pandemic preparedness before the outbreak 
of the Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
1.1. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
As the end of the Covid-19 pandemic is within reach, new studies and research on the 
preparedness and crisis management will increasingly become more relevant. In order to 
conduct such an analysis, understanding how a selection of the most important pandemic 
preparedness plans in Norway came to be, can be of great help in order to improve the level of 
future research. It might also contribute to an increased understanding of how the Norwegian 
preparedness is structured, and in what ways the pandemic preparedness could improve. I 
hope that this thesis is able to shed light on the strategies that guide the management and 
preparedness, in addition to the structures that limits or promotes various measures.  
The fields of societal security, preparedness, and crisis management are improved and 
revised on a regular basis, and specific focus is dedicated to the area in the aftermath of a 
crisis or a complex emergency. These unwanted events partially shape our understanding of 
crises and complex emergencies, and this understanding influence and generate structures in 
order to be better prepared should a similar event be encountered in the future. However, in 
the case of pandemic crises, the expectations of the next pandemic is based on previous 
experiences with pandemic influenza, which have influenced the Norwegian preparedness 
strategies on how to manage future outbreaks. As witnessed during the Covid-19 pandemic, 
specified plans that manage pandemic influenza is not always possible to translate onto 
different pathogens or communicable infections. Therefore, the preparedness plans would 
need to be general, so that they can cover as many scenarios as possible, while at the same 
time not being too general, so that the plan remains operational.  
This fine line between the plans being too specified or too general, in addition to the 
understanding of the term ‘crisis’ and the building blocks of the Norwegian pandemic 
preparedness, are areas that remains intriguing for further research on the Norwegian 





1.2  RESEARCH QUESTION  
The selected management strategies in a crisis can greatly affect people or societies, and have 
an impact on the trust of the capabilities of the government or elected officials. If the crisis 
management is poor or insufficient, it could result in changes to the societal structures, 
particularly if the crisis is of some magnitude, which would greatly affect the every-day life of 
people. As witnessed throughout the Corona pandemic, some countries have had better 
success at managing the pandemic crisis than others. In some European countries, the faulty 
crisis management strategies have resulted in a lack of trust in the governments’ capabilities, 
large demonstrations against the implementation of preventative measures, and increased 
right-wing extremism, xenophobia, and racism (The Norwegian Police Security Service, 
2021).  
This thesis seeks to analyse five pandemic preparedness plans, which have all 
contributed in shaping the current Norwegian pandemic preparedness. The timeframe in this 
thesis mainly focus on the period between the year 2000 and 2019, and excludes all changes 
and newly implemented measures that came as a response to the outbreak of the Covid-19 
pandemic in the beginning of 2020. By using process tracing as a methodological choice, it is 
possible to find some documents that are traced back to the 1990s or earlier, and will therefore 
have to be included in the analysis if they are relevant for further analysis or explanation. By 
tracing the path dependencies of the measures in each of these plans, it will become possible 
to establish how the plan came to be, and what factors influenced them. Some of the events 
that took place within the selected timeframe was the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) (World Health Organization, 2003), and the 2012 Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome (MERS) (World Health Organization, n.d.) epidemics, the Ebola virus outbreaks in 
2014 and 2018, the emergence of the Zika virus in 2015/16 (Suthar, Allen, Cifuentes, Dye, & 
Nagata, 2017) , the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, and finally, the first recorded outbreak of 
the Corona virus pandemic at the end of 2019. The evaluation process after the terrorist attack 
on the 22nd July 2011 in Norway would also uncover major flaws in the Norwegian 
preparedness planning and crisis management (Meld. St. 21 (2012–2013)), which have 
affected the entirety of the Norwegian preparedness and crisis management strategies.  
Have new strategies on societal security, preparedness, and crisis management come 
as a response to previous pandemic crises, or have other events equally contributed to shaping 
the preparedness plans? Have the pandemic preparedness developed as a separate field of 
preparedness, or is the principles of general preparedness guiding the creation of the 
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pandemic preparedness plans? In light of these enquiries, the research question is how have 
previous large-scale pandemic or epidemic outbreaks contributed to shaping the current 
crisis management and pandemic preparedness plans in Norway?  
In addition to the research question, three sub-questions have been included in order to 
further a comparison and analysis of the content in the preparedness plans. These questions 
will help guide the data collection process, the analysis of the content in the five preparedness 
plans, and serve as a point for further comparison between the plans.  
1 ‘What were the main reason for the implementation or revision of the current Norwegian 
pandemic preparedness plans?’ 
2 ‘Is it possible to detect a path dependent decision making in the creation of the pandemic 
preparedness plans? ‘ 
3 ‘How do the pandemic preparedness plans allow for autonomy or deviation from the 




Are we the architects behind our own misery? Have we put ourselves in a situation where we 
have to construct solutions to problems that we have created with our recklessness and 
thoughtlessness? Perhaps not, but in the case of pandemics, we as humans have contributed to 
the increased threat of new emerging communicable diseases, which have the ability to spread 
faster around the world than before. There are measures and strategies in place to combat 
familiar pathogens – which often occur as seasonal flus – like vaccines, sanitary measures, 
quarantine and isolation of the sick, and treatments should someone be infected by the 
pathogen. However, if there were to be an encounter an unfamiliar pathogenic strain, some of 
the core prevention measures may not be enough to control the spread of the disease. As the 
nature of the next pandemic remains unknown, the best current strategy is to learn from 
previous encounters with communicable infections, and to analyse which measures worked, 
and which did not. These learning experiences would then need to be transferred into 
preparedness plans, so that the government would be more prepared when faced with the next 
pandemic. These plans would also need to be highly flexible and encourage improvisation, as 
no crises are alike.   
This chapter focus on the events that have contributed to shaping the current preparedness 
plans and crisis management in Norway. It examines the ground-breaking Norwegian law 
introduced in 1860, the ‘The Public Health Act of 1860’ (PHA), and how it have left its mark 
on todays’ crisis management. Additionally, this chapter will include a perspective on how 
environmental factors and human-activities have influenced the spread, severity, and reach of 
possible future pandemics. Lastly, this chapter will introduce the current crisis management 
strategies in Norway.  
First, I would like to clarify the difference between a pandemic and epidemic, as this 
separation would prove to be fruitful for the rest of this essay. Simply put, an epidemic is a 
communicable disease that affects a disproportionately large number of individuals within a 
community, region, or area, at the same time. The number of cases in the given areas varies in 
accordance with the size, biological agent, and the groups of people in the population exposed 
to the pathogen (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2019, p. 65; ReliefWeb 
Project, 2008). A pandemic is an epidemic that spreads over several continents, countries or 
areas, and that affects a larger number of people.  
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Increased globalisation have led to more intercontinental travel activities, and a growing 
number of people have gained the means and freedom to travel across the world at their own 
leisure. Humans are to a larger degree living in bigger and closer groups (i.e. in growing 
cities), expanding their social networks, which entails that the number of people that each 
person meet on any given day has grown. Food production has been industrialised and 
streamlined in order to increase output, whilst at the same time reduced the cost of production. 
In order to meet the demands of an ever-growing international food marked, previously 
untouched natural areas and its adhering wildlife is reduced and turned into farmlands at an 
alarming rate. Humans and wildlife are unwillingly living closer to each other in vulnerable 
parts of the world, and in addition to the growing amount of domesticated animals used for 
food production, wildlife have to compete for many of the same natural resources. This way 
of life comes at a cost – one of them is the increased exposure, and risk of contracting and 
spreading infectious diseases.   
 
2.1 PANDEMICS IN HISTORY  
It is not a new phenomenon in history that communicable diseases are transmitted across 
national borders. Throughout known and prehistoric human history, several cases of disease 
have effected both humans and animals, and some have even threatened the very existence of 
societies. Hence, it becomes feasible to suppose that fighting pandemics and the subsequent 
crisis management, is not a new phenomenon.  
Infectious diseases have for millions of years’ threatened very existence of humans 
and societies, and presented new challenges that would have to be overcome in order to 
survive. As hunters and gatherers – or foragers – the spread of infectious diseases were 
minimal, as band or tribe societies were relatively small in size, and separated by vast 
distances that restricted contact with other band societies or tribes (Pauls, 2008; The 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). With the introduction of the agricultural revolution, 
communicable diseases, in turn, had better conditions to spread from one person to another, as 
humans started living closer to each other and increased their interactions within larger 
societal groups, in addition to being closer to various kinds of wild and domesticated animals. 
As a result, new diseases emerged. When people started living closer to one another, and the 
number of people in societal groups grew, the number of people that encountered ‘new’ 
people grew accordingly. Some societies also started having increased contact with other 
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societal groups through inter and cross-continental trade routes, such as the silk road, or with 
the European crusaders in the 11th and 12th century (Eyler, 2003).  
An expansion of trade, effective colonisation efforts, and increasing globalisation gave 
communicable diseases an ideal chance to spread more easily and effectively across 
continents. New trade and travel routes, in addition to new lines of communications between 
different continents, allowed infectious diseases to spread to areas where it had not previously 
been recorded. Some communicable diseases have had its origin from the globalisation period 
between 1870 and 1914 (Piketty, 2014), whereas other diseases would later transform and 
spread across larger parts of the world, giving them the status of a pandemic. Diseases such as 
malaria (Cox, 2010), tuberculosis (Daniel, 2006), influenza (Caius & Hecker, 1859), smallpox 
(Eyler, 2003; Henderson, 2011) different plagues, and leprosy (Lastória & Abreu, 2014) are 
examples of this. These diseases all spread at a large scale throughout this period, and several 
of these diseases still devastate societies to this day. Historians disagree about when the first 
influenza pandemics occurred, though the first certain description of an outbreak originated in 
1510 (Mamelund & Iversen, 2000). Some of the most prominent influenza pandemics that 
have affected Norway in the last 100 years, was the 1918/19 H1N1 (Spanish flu), 1957 
A/H2N2 (Asian flu), 1968 A/HN2 (Hong-Kong flu), and the 1977 H1N1 (Russian Flu) 
pandemics (Mamelund & Iversen, 2000), which is also reflected in the Norwegian 
preparedness against infectious diseases. The World Health Organisation (WHO) have since 
1997 facilitated pandemic preparedness (Baekkeskov, 2016, p. 299; World Health 
Organization, 1999, 2005), and Member States are free to choose their own management 
strategies and preparedness to combat communicable diseases.  
Encounters with the 1918/19 H1N1 and 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, and the 
2014-2015 West African Ebola epidemic have contributed to shaping the Norwegian 
preparedness plans that are used today. The 1918/H1N1 pandemic is used as a worst-case 
scenario in the pandemic preparedness (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 
2019, p. 19 ; Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2014a, p. 8; Helsedirektoratet et al., 2015, p. 
127), even though the plans view the chance of such a devastating pandemic to occur as slim, 
due to medical advances in the last decades. Likewise, the more recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
have led to changes in the Norwegian preparedness against communicable diseases, and is 
regarded as a more plausible future pandemic scenario than the 1918/19 H1N1 pandemic. 
Even though the Ebola virus did not infect anyone within the geographical Norwegian border, 
new interim preparedness plans were created, and previous preparedness strategies were 
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revised in order to manage a potential future outbreak, as one import-case of the disease was 
reported (Folkehelseinstituttet, 2014; Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2019; 
Helsedirektoratet, 2015; Helsedirektoratet & Folkehelseinstituttet, 2014).  
The H1N1 outbreak of 1918/19 had a lasting impact on the world, as it is estimated 
that one third to more than half of the world’s population was infected, and the mortality rate 
is estimated at between 20-100 million people globally (Mamelund, 2021; Mamelund & 
Iversen, 2000), though the exact number is somewhat disputed. It has by some been described 
as the worst pandemic “in modern times” (Doherty, 2016) due to its ability to spread so 
extensively during the first World War. It is estimated that around 15.000 people died from 
the influenza in Norway, and the pandemic came in three to four waves – the majority of 
fatalities in Norway happened in the third wave (Mamelund, 2021).  
The 2009 H1N1 pandemic that lasted between the spring of 2009 until the summer of 
2010 was the first pandemic in the 21 century, which triggered a massive response in the 
Norwegian health and care sector. The evaluation and examination process that took place a 
year after the pandemic shows that hundreds of people were examined and treated, 
approximately 1300 of those people were treated in hospitals, and around 200 of these were 
treated in the intensive care unit. Research showed that in the beginning of 2010, 
approximately 60 percent of the population had a measurable amount of antibodies, either 
from being previously infected by the virus or due to the comprehensive vaccination strategy. 
Around 45 percent of the population received the vaccine in the initial vaccination phase, and 
this effort have later been labelled the largest vaccination campaign in the history of the 
country. The WHO declared the end of the pandemic on 10th of August 2010 
(Folkehelseinstituttet, 2015).  
Internationally, the 2009 H1N1 crisis response was characterised by urgent decision 
making under uncertainty (Baekkeskov, 2016; Boin et al., 2017; Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 
2001). It took about four to six weeks to produce the large quantity of vaccines, and the 
“advance purchase agreement (APA)” obligated some countries to order the vaccines when 
the WHO declared the 2009 H1N1 virus as a ‘Phase 6 pandemic’3 on 11th June 2009 
(Baekkeskov, 2016, p. 299). Even though countries are free to manage their own strategies, 
some countries viewed this agreement to be too invasive, which has since led to a discussion 
                                                 
3 “During Phases 5-6 (pandemic), actions shift from preparedness to response at a global level. The goal of 
recommended actions during these phases is to reduce the impact of the pandemic on society.” (World Health 
Organization, 2009, p. 41) 
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on re-examining the role of the WHO and international cooperation during a pandemic 
(Flahault & Zylberman, 2010, p. 333) 
Even though the Ebola outbreak did not directly affect Norway, it was reported one 
import case in the country (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2019, pp. 17-18, 29-30 ; Meld. 
St. 10 (2016–2017)). The need for a national preparedness plan against Ebola came due to the 
outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014, where several Norwegian citizens aided in the 
treatment of patients in the afflicted areas. This had created a situation where Norway had to 
prepare for the possibility that infected aid workers could return from the inflicted areas. The 
interim Preparedness Plan against Ebola in 2014 was developed as a part of the ‘regulatory 
framework for infectious diseases’ (Helsedirektoratet & Folkehelseinstituttet, 2014), and a 
strategy to manage similar infectious outbreaks have later been included in the National 
Emergency Preparation Plan against Outbreaks of Severe Infectious Diseases (OSID). The 
Directorate of Health (HDIR) stated that the national crisis management strategy of the Ebola 
epidemic have strengthened the infectious disease preparedness in Norway (Helsedirektoratet, 
2015, p. 4), and in the evaluation of the Ebola epidemic, three learning points were pointed 
out. First, the need to develop procedures for Norway’s contribution to solve international 
health crises, with an emphasis on the clarification on roles and responsibilities both cross-
sectoral and within sectors. Second, a revision on how municipalities manages its 
responsibility to deal with the outbreaks of infectious disease was suggested, and finally, that 
Norway need to establish continuous national guidelines on medical evacuation by plane, 
helicopter, or boat (Helsedirektoratet, 2015). 
 
2.2 THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT OF 1860  
The Public Health Act of 1860 (PHA) “Sundhedscommissioner og om Foranstaltninger i 
anledning af epidemiske og smitsomme Sygdomme” (Sunnhetsloven, 1860) was the first 
Norwegian law that set out to create a legal framework on how to best combat and control the 
spread of epidemics and infectious diseases. Before this act, there were still specified laws 
that set out to manage the various disease outbreaks at the time, like tuberculosis, sexually 
transmitted infections, guidelines on vaccinations, protection against the transmission of 
infectious diseases from abroad, cholera, typhus, and pest control (Innst. O. nr. 37 (1993-
1994)). The PHA of 1860 would later prove to have a massive impact on the development of 
the Norwegian health and care sector, and the second chapter was in effect until 1994, when it 
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was superseded by the Act Relating to Control of Communicable Diseases (Act of 5 August 
1994, No. 55) (CCD) (Folkehelseinstituttet, 2019; NOU 2012: 17).  
In the early 1800s, Norway was, as many European countries, plagued by cholera and 
typhus epidemics. In the 1830s, commissions were implemented in some Norwegian cities to 
draft management strategies (Elvbakken & Ludvigsen, 2016). In 1850, a proposal for a new 
public health act was set in motion, and the ministry’s advisory medicine committee was 
trusted to take on the task to draft a new act, which had a stronger emphasis on the prevention 
and preparedness for epidemics, pandemics, and contagious diseases. The creation of this 
legal framework was inspired by international legislation, particularly from Britain 
(Elvbakken & Ludvigsen, 2016, p. 12). The working committee chose to separate the two key 
aspects of the PHA, as it was intended to cover the political and administrative organisation 
on the one side, and disease prevention and combating infectious diseases on the other 
(Schjønsby, 2001). Accordingly, the act was divided into two main chapters; the first chapter 
on “Om Sundhedscommissioner” or “about the health commission” and the second chapter on 
“Angaaende særegne Foranstaltninger imod epidemiske og smitsomme Sygdomme” or 
“Concerning specific measures against epidemic and infectious diseases”.  
The first chapter set out to define the authority and agency of the health commission. 
With the implementation of the 1860 PHA, all municipalities were required to have a health 
commission. In municipalities, these commissions were to be headed by state employed 
district physicians, and the city physician were to have the main responsibility in cities 
(Elvbakken & Ludvigsen, 2016, p. 11). PHA had two main motives for the local and political 
legitimacy on its preventative measures. First, there was a concern that the statutory provision 
to prevent or combat disease could impede personal freedoms. Consequently, in such cases, 
the local board of the municipality should decide on such provisions. The second motive was 
strongly influenced by the increased focus on democracy and egalitarianism – two important 
ideologies of that era – and the committee stated in short that “De locale Styrelser, valgte af 
Befolkningen selv, bør det overlades at træffe Bestemmelser af hiin Art, naar de have 
overbeviist sig om deres Hensigtsmæssighed”(Schjønsby, 2001). Loosely translated to ‘Local 
government, elected by the people, should be free to make regulations of another kind, when 
they are convinced of it advantageousness’.   
The second chapter in the PHA recognised what was considered the most important 
public health related aspect at the time, mainly to combat and protect the population against 
infectious diseases. This chapter also set guidelines that described the organising of an 
11 
 
emergency apparatus, or a commission, that would be set in motion in the case of an epidemic 
or infectious disease outbreak. The commission was given a great amount of authority, and 
was also expected to instigate measures on their own initiative. The PHA implemented an 
administrative and legal framework for preventative healthcare work, which happened at a 
relatively early time in history. Through the established framework reform and the flexibility 
it offered, it was considered an important tool for the local health and care sector, the medical 
professionals, and the municipality’s health councils that operated in the districts of Norway. 
This allowed districts the freedom to treat local disease outbreaks with a more specialised and 
effective approach, in contrast to a strategy that was based on a generic, national decision 
(Schjønsby, 2001). To this day, this principle of decentralisation in decision-making processes 
remains a vital part of the Norwegian crisis management and societal security strategy, known 
today as the ‘Principle of Subsidiarity’, or the principle of proximity.  
In 1982, the Act Relating to the Municipal Health Services (Act of 19 November 
1982, No. 66) (MHS) superseded the first chapter of the PHA (Kommunehelsetjenesteloven, 
1982). The MHS was superseded in 1991 (by LOV-1991-12-13-81), and then again on      
1st January 2012, where it was superseded by the Act Relating to Health and Care Services 
(Act Of 24 June 2011, No. 30) (HCSA) – which is the standing legal document to this day 
(Helse- og Omsorgstjenesteloven, 2012; UiO Law Library). Some elements of the original 
PHA of 1860 still remains in the current legal framework for the health and care sector, 
despite the fact that more is known about combatting infectious diseases today, than what it 
was in 1860. The field of health and care policy have grown immensely in the last decades, in 
accordance with new medical discoveries, and with the introduction of new laws and 
regulations. One of the legal principles that has been continued throughout the revisions of the 
PHA is the division of authority between local and national health and care services, which 
would also include the division of responsibilities in different scenarios, particularly in the 
early outset of an outbreak of an infectious disease. This idea is related to the core essence of 
the first chapter of the PHA, and remains an important principle in today’s response 
framework. Hence, it will be fruitful to explore the horizontal and vertical coordination of 
crisis management in the theory chapter as it guides the preparedness strategy in most areas of 
the Norwegian crisis management. The second chapter in the PHA that deals with epidemics 
and infectious diseases was, as before mentioned, superseded by the CCD in 1994 
(Smittevernloven, 1994). This law guides the legal framework in the Norwegian crisis 
management before or during a pandemic and epidemic outbreak, and the available measures 
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to contain or control the spread of the disease (Folkehelseinstituttet, 2019). As a result, the 
PHA could be regarded as the most central health and care related law in the 19th century 
(Falkum, 1978; Grund J, 1982; Larsen, 2010; Schiøtz, 2010).  
 
2.3 LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The Act Relating to Control Of Communicable Diseases (Act Of 5 August 1994, No. 55) 
(CCD) have undergone three revisions since it was first adopted in 1994; the first round of 
revision was in 2004 where small changes were made in order to be able to instigate an inter-
municipality collaboration. More comprehensive revisions was made in the second round in 
2019 (Folkehelseinstituttet, 2019). A third revision took place in 2021, in order to be able to 
initiate measures to contain the spread of the Corona virus. § 1-1 in the CCD states the 
purpose of the law, which is to (1) shield the population from infectious diseases, by 
preventing the spread of a communicable disease to, but also, within Norway. It (2) instructs 
the authorities to instigate necessary measures and coordinate its contagion control activities, 
in addition to (3) safeguarding the affected individuals or groups security under the law in 
regards to disease containment measures (Smittevernloven, 1994, § 1-1).  
The principle of liability is enshrined in § 22-1 of the Health Preparedness Act (Act of 
23 June 2000, No. 56 Relating to Health and Social Preparedness) (HSP). The purpose of this 
law is to protect the life and health of the population, and to contribute to providing necessary 
health related services during crisis, catastrophes, in peaceful times, and wartime.  
The purpose of the Specialist Health Services Act (Act of 2 July 1999, No. 61 
Regarding Health and Care Services) (SHSA) is divided into six areas, as mentioned in § 1-1 
and is to (1) promote public health and to counteract illness, injury, suffering, and disability, 
(2) contribute to ensuring the quality of services, (3) equal services, (4) the best utilisation of 
resources, (5) ensuring that the services offered are being adapted to the need of the patient, 
and (6) making sure that the service offered is available to all patients.  
The ‘Instructions for the Ministries' Work with Civil Protection and Emergency 
Preparedness’ (Instruction of Societal Security) is aimed at ensuring that all Ministries have 
an overview of its own sectoral preparedness (Helsedirektoratet, 2019a, p. 4). The rule was 
presented by the JBD on September 2017, and superseded the instruction from 2012 
(Samfunnssikkerhetsinstruksen, 2017). It naturally follows the guiding principle of liability, 
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which is at the core of every document on preparedness and crisis management in Norway 
(Helsedirektoratet, 2019a, p. 4).  
 
2.4 CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTACT WITH NATURE, AND HUMAN 
ACTIVITIES   
Humans have known for centuries that the climate could affect epidemic infections, even 
before we understood the nature of infectious agents (McMichael & World Health 
Organization, 2003, p. 103). Temperature, rainfall, drought, floods, and other climatic 
conditions have affected and been connected to outbreaks of epidemic diseases throughout 
history, as McMichael and the World Health Organization (2003) provides a host of examples 
on in the book on climate change and human health. During the last couple of decades, it has 
been possible to witness an increasingly shifting global landscape, with increased travel 
activity, an escalation in man-made climate changes, and increased contact with previously 
untouched nature and wildlife. These factors can, in part, be a driving force behind the next 
big pandemic or pandemic influenza (see: Saunders-Hastings & Krewski, 2016), as have 
become clear during the Corona pandemic. Man-made climate changes, an increased density 
of domesticated animals for food production, illegal wildlife tracking, the transformation of 
previously undisrupted nature and wetlands into farmlands or industrialised areas – which 
have led to more frequent contact with wildlife – and antibiotic resistance both in humans an 
domesticated animals, are all factors that have contributed to the heightened possibility of a 
new pandemic. Uncontrolled and illegal trade and consumption of wild animals have 
increased the possible human exposure of diseases that these animals carry. Consequently, it 
is no surprise that several of the recent outbreaks of influenza and other diseases have its 
origin in wet-markets or markets that sell a mix of domesticates and wild animals, creating the 
perfect conditions for the development of zoonosis4 (Jeffries, 2020) which can be transmitted 
through either pathogenic viruses, fungi, bacteria, parasitic protozoa, or other organisms.  
Climate changes have also led to a greater unpredictability on when and where the 
next crisis is expected to strike (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2019, p. 9).  
Previous pandemics have mostly originated through zoonosis, as influenza viruses in animals 
have later become transmittable to humans (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 
2019, p. 68), such as the 1918/19 H1N1, 1957 A/H2N2, 1968 A/H3N2, and the 1977 H1N1, 
                                                 
4 Infectious diseases that could be transmitted from animals to humans.  
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or other viral infections like HIV/AIDS and Ebola (Folkehelseinstituttet, 2014). The white 
paper Meld. St. 10 (2016–2017) (pp. 74-75) notes that population growth, climate changes, 
economic growth, and an increased dependency between different functions in society have 
contributed to the increased harmful potential of natural events. As of now, there are few, if 
any, contemporary Norwegian preparedness plans that address the increased threat of 
emerging pandemics in the context of climate change, and that provides strategies on how to 
manage such crises. Hopefully, measures that target these serious issues will become more 
important in future crisis management, particularly measures that also target disease and not 
solely natural disasters, in order to create a more holistic perspective on the challenges 
societies might face in the future.  
Climate changes, increased travel and trade activities, and the ever-expanding global 
food market are considered high risk factors in regards to future pandemics. One of the 
expectations for the preparedness plan would therefore be that they recognise this issue, and 
suggest measures to counteract this increased threat. Another expectation is that the plans 
focus on the overarching structures within crisis management, so to be applicable to all types 
of unforeseen pandemic crisis, as the same pathogen rarely appear twice 
 
2.5 THE NORWEGIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PREPAREDNESS 
STRATEGIES   
The Norwegian pandemic preparedness is based on encounters with previous pandemics, in 
addition to other crises and complex emergencies. These experiences are collected in 
preparedness plans, which is intended to guide decision makers on their management 
strategies if a similar crisis was to emerge. The Norwegian preparedness is based on four 
contextual principles (Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2018b) that inform how to organise 
responsibilities and agency in a crisis, which all happens within strong sector departments 
with ministerial responsibility. As is about to be uncovered, strong sectors can further 
complicate cross-sectoral management strategies, as the different sectors are responsible for 
the creation of their own preparedness, and the strong vertical, top-down coordination inhibits 
horizontal coordination efforts.  
A crisis is marked by a felt threat, a perception of urgency, and a sensed uncertainty 
(Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Boin, 't Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017). In order to counteract 
these issues, creating a situational overview and leaning from previously created preparedness 
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plans could be helpful in order to regain a sense of control. Planning and preparing for crisis 
of unknown unknowns require an operational and general framework, which allows for 
extensive exercises and training events as there is no way of knowing how the crisis is going 
to unfold or what it is going to look like. Such situation often take the form of a wicked issue, 
where uncertainty, complexity, and diversity guide the available decisions (Lægreid & 
Rykkja, 2015; Head and Alford, 2013). It is impossible to find a solution to an unknown 
problem, and hence, the main goal of crisis management should not be to seek out solutions, 
but rather focus on management strategies that can reduce the severity of the problem.  
Pandemics have, as mentioned previously in this chapter, been present for most of 
human history. Humans have always had to deal with the occasional outbreak of infectious 
disease, varying in form, size, and severity. How preparedness strategies and measures are 
established would correspondingly be dependent on how previous outbreaks have been 
managed in the past. It became apparent during the Covid-19 pandemic that many of the 
specific measures were unable to manage the outbreak of a pandemic that was not caused by 
an influenza virus, though the exercise of creating the plans did provide the governing bodies 
the ability to stay flexible and improvise when information was scarce. For instance, one of 
the measures that was advised against before the Covid-19 pandemic was to close national 
borders, mass testing and quarantining travellers for suspected infection, as “such efforts have 
a small effect, are resource depleting, and contradicts the principle of not slowing down 
normal activities” (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2014a, p. 60). Nevertheless, the 
International Health Regulation (IHR) states that the general secretary of the WHO can 
declare an event as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, which can trigger a 
number of temporary and lasting restrictions on for instance goods and people at border 
crossing points, etc. (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2019). As was experienced during the 
Covid-19 pandemic, restricting movement across borders was a successful measure, as it 
prevented further mutations from taking hold in Norway, in addition to reducing unnecessary 
cases of infection.  
As pandemics are not only managed domestically, but also have an international 
perspective, national plans would need to stay updated on international suggestions and 
regulations for preparedness and prevention. Especially since the world have become 
increasingly more connected, and challenges have become progressively more transboundary. 
Therefore, a common, international framework for possible management paths have gained an 
increased value in the last decades, and national plans would gain invaluable learning 
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experiences from further incorporating common guidelines from organisations Norway is a 






Pandemics are hard to manage for any organisation, especially with the added element of the 
situational stress of not knowing what kind of problems you might be facing. However, some 
crisis are more manageable than others, and some crisis bring about the possibility to increase 
the level of preparedness by implementing training exercises and management strategies. 
Some organisations experience a lock-in on a path that might limit the choices available to 
take action, and this could in turn inhibit the creativity and improvisation in the crisis 
management efforts of the organisation. Therefore, the first chapter will address the ways in 
which the path of the preparedness plan can dictate future measures, could prove itself as a 
useful perspective for further analysis. As the term – or the notion of – “crisis” will be at the 
core of placing the challenges of a pandemic in a societal context, the second perquisite would 
be to establish what a crisis is. Therefore, this chapter will start by defining the term ‘crisis’, 
and present how a crisis might come to be. The third chapter will cover the tools of which 
governments, public or private organisations, or actors can utilise in their crisis management, 
and in which way public policy and structures might complicate the preparedness and crisis 
management, before moving on to the last chapter on the expectations of this thesis.  
 
3.1 PATH DEPENDENCY  
According to Zürn (2018, pp. 91-100), path dependency is one of the core concept of 
historical institutionalism and is thought to be a set of critical junctures that can lead to 
organisational decisions, which later culminate into a certain path (Karlsen & Isaksen, 2008; 
Mahoney, 2000). There are several different understandings of path dependency, but they all 
include the notion of self-reinforcement or positive feedback, i.e. mechanisms or instruments 
that alter beliefs, opportunities, and the ambition of the involved actors, to one that is in 
favour of already existing practices. The self-reinforcement could lead to a deepening of an 
organisation, to a point where it would be too costly to alter the organisational design, or to 
diverge or alter the path. Small changes can also influence positive feedback processes in the 
early stages of a process and they can produce more than one outcome and generate patterns 
of branching of historic development (Pierson, 2004, pp. 20, 21). Historic processes that 
create path dependencies is strongly related to the positive feedback mechanisms, or by self-
reinforcement (Arthur, 1994; P. David, 2007; Goldstone, 1998; Pierson, 2004). As one 
particular path has been established, reversing back to a previous historic branch can be very 
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challenging (Pierson, 2004, p. 10)(see Figure 1). Positive feedback can also contribute to the 
explanation for why dysfunctional decisions made at a critical juncture remains unaltered 
(Zürn, 2018, p. 92). External shocks could force new critical junctures in an organisation, and 
consequently, it can create room for agency and opportunity.  
 Pierson (2004, p. 18) use the characteristics of positive feedback processes, previously 
summarized by Arthur (1994), in order to explain the dynamic processes that can contribute to 
the creation of multiple outcomes with positive feedback, which all depends on the specific 
sequence of the unfolding events, i.e. processes in which history matters (Pierson, 2004, p. 
18). The characteristics are summarised to four perspectives, being unpredictability, 
inflexibility, non-ergodicity, and potential path-inefficiency. First, since previous events are 
random and have a large effect on the path, the different outcomes would be impossible to 
predict, as several outcomes could be possible. Second, once a path has been chosen, and 
some time has passed, a shift from one path to another would prove to be more difficult as 
alternatives that once were plausible would now be irretrievably lost and ‘locked-in’ (Pierson, 
2004, p. 11). Third, small events are ‘locked’ in the path, and the influence of accidental 
events would be hard or impossible to remove from the path, and are challenging to overlook 
as they continue to affect future choices. Fourth, the path might prove to be less efficient than 
alternative paths, and generate a lower reward than other previously possible alternatives. In 
this case, history do matter since previous events are more impactful than later events, and 
various sequences could produce different outcomes. Consequently, by each step taken down 
the path, the more likely it is that one would continue to move down that same path, as shown 
in Figure 2.  
 
 




Discovering how the path started could become an important tool in order to analyse 
the consequences of organisational arrangements, social constructions, and relations that show 
how inequality of power are reproduced and reinforced. It can also act as a corrective measure 
for the social arrangements in place, which can be explained though the needs of those 
powerful actors they cater to (Pierson, 2004, p. 11). Traditionally, path dependency could be 
explained through “history matters” or “historical causation” (Pierson, 2000; 2004, p. 11), 
where one process or event triggered a reproducing pattern that continued long after the 
original process or event had seized to reoccur. By separating historical events into periods 
separated by critical junctures, or breaching points, historical development becomes apparent, 
and new paths emerge (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). Therefore, path dependency becomes an 
important tool in the study of processes of change (P. A. David, 2007), especially in a historic 
institutionalist perspective.  
Path dependency could be defined as “a dynamical process whose evolution is 
governed by its own history [...]” (P. A. David, 2007, p. 92), or “as a situation in which 
individual actors or organizations have lost their power to choose among alternatives [which] 
excludes path-breaking behaviour” (Jörg, Georg, & Jochen, 2009, p. 702). Jörg et al. (2009, p. 
696) also include a definition of organisational path dependence as “as a rigidified, potentially 
inefficient action pattern constructed by the unintended consequences of former decisions and 
positive feedback processes”. Levi, on the other hand, provides a narrower definition on path 
dependency:  
Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region 
has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice 
points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy 
reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. 
From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. 
Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other and essential 
if the chosen branch dies the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to 
follow. (Levi, 1997, p. 28) 
As decisions on what path dependency really is, and descriptions varies from narrow to 
broader concepts, clear definitions become harder to find (Pierson, 2000, p. 252). Concepts 
that focus on how previous events have shaped current decisions, which focus on the idea that 
‘history matters’ are not very helpful in creating an understanding of path dependency. In 
order to figure out the value of a social variable, it becomes necessary to determine how the 
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social variable came to be, and what path it took to get there. Previous events do not always 
cause paths to move in the same direction, as they can create a reaction in an opposite 
direction as well.  
 How a process becomes path-dependent is an equally important aspect as the 
definition of path dependency and positive feedback mechanisms. To summarise this, 
Schreyögg and Sydow (2011, pp. 323-326) divides the process into three phases, that 
constitutes different settings of actions and decision-making, and which are governed by 
various casual-regimes (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011, p. 323).  
Phase I, or the preformation phase. Previous events affect future choices, which cannot 
be predicted, and a self-reinforcing process can be set off, oftentimes unintentionally, by 
small events, which can create a ‘critical juncture’ that ends in Phase II. Whatever the size of 
the event that took place in shaping the path, its character cannot be observed unless a process 
has been formed. In the early stages of theory development on path dependency, the 
preformation phase was not restricted in its scope of action, and was viewed as an open 
situation where rationality could explain choices that were based on unconstrained decisions 
(Arthur, 1989, 1994). This, however, did not account of the importance of history in this 
phase. In figure 2, the darker areas are intended to show the “institutional heritage” of the 
available choices (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2011, p. 324).  
 
 
Figure 2 "The constitution of an organizational path (Sydow et al., 2009, p.692, modified)” collected from Schreyögg and 
Sydow (2011, p. 323) 
 
Phase II, the formation phase, is where a new dominant pattern is likely to take form, 
and other patterns face issues in attaining acceptance and attention, which further solidifies 
the path-creating process. This phase finds itself in a regime of positive and self-reinforcing 
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feedback loops, which determine a pattern of social practices. Some patterns become more 
predominant, and could affect the possible paths, which consequently, could lead to a critical 
juncture that occur between phase I and II. In Phase II, it becomes increasingly more 
challenging to reverse the central pattern of action, as the range of option narrows. Decisions 
made in this phase are not made by accident, but they are not predictable either, i.e. the 
processes have become non-ergodic.  
Phase III, the lock-in phase, is where the availability of possible options are so 
restricted that they eventually create an organisational lock-in, where dominant patterns 
solidifies. The dominant pattern can take on deterministic characteristics in extreme cases, 
where all future actions are compelled to replicate the dominant path, such as with the 
QWERTY5 keyboard. However, it is necessary to include slight modifications to the 
understanding of lock-ins’ in the case of organisational paths, as the processes are more 
ambiguous and complex due to their inherently social character. In order to conceptualise, 
using a corridor as an example might serve as the best way to illustrate the reasoning for why 
the final stage of path dependency processes should be viewed in a less restrictive way, as to 
allow some room for variation (as shown as a shadow in the Phase III, in Figure 2). However, 
lock-ins can cause the organisational system to lose its necessary flexibility, lead to 
insufficient measures, and force the organisation to remain on the current path, which simply 
replicates inadequate solutions.  
We could regard the establishment of the PHA as the starting point of the modern 
Norwegian pandemic preparedness and the following legal framework, in addition to the 
health and care management of infectious diseases, and for establishing lines of responsibility. 
Rooted in previous encounters with epidemics such as tuberculosis, cholera, and typhus, a 
commission was inserted in some Norwegian cities to manage such outbreaks, using strategies 
similar to those used in the Middle-Age (Elvbakken & Ludvigsen, 2016, p. 12). The 
experiences from the first part of the 1800s would prove vital for the establishment of the 
PHA, where its two chapters would later transform in to the HCSA and the CCD, which is the 
current legislation on the area. Though the principle of proximity and liability was first 
formally introduced in the white papers ‘St.meld. nr. 17 (2001-2002) (p. 4)’ and ‘Meld. St. 29 
(2011–2012) (p. 39)’ the PHA had still acted as the forbearer of these principles, as it had 
already established the division of power between the local and national management of 
                                                 
5 Regional alterations have been made to the QWERTY keyboard, such as the German QWERTZ keyboard 
layout, where for instance Z and Y have changed positions. 
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infectious outbreaks, following a principle of decentralisation. Hence, the implementation of 
the PHA could be regarded as a crucial event that set of the current path of crisis management 
in a Norwegian context.  
How is path dependency observed in the context of preparedness planning and crisis 
management? The theory emphasises the impact of historical events, often catch-phrased as 
‘history matters’, even though this has been labelled as an explanation that do not take into 
account other factors . Path dependency is a series of complex non-ergodic processes i.e. 
processes that are unable to detach themselves from history (Garud, Kumaraswamy, & 
Karnøe, 2010, p. 760). Once locked into paths by the self-reinforcing mechanisms, the paths’ 
evolution is determined by contingencies or coincidences, and unless an external shock 
occurs, actors or organisations remains locked in their path. The cost of changing path could 
also be too high (Pierson, 2000, p. 252), which makes it an undesirable option for many 
organisations. In the case of pandemic preparedness, plans are usually revised during the 
crisis in order to be able to better manage the different aspects that have not properly been 
planned for, or in the evaluation process that follows after the crisis has ended. Additionally, 
the urgency to revaluate or amend preparedness strategies are lower in the period between 
pandemics. The issue loses its ‘importance’ – or popularity – once the crisis is over, and more 
‘newsworthy policy’ issues emerge. Consequently, it could be taken off the agenda.  
Pandemic preparedness and management is not a new endeavour in human history, 
and methods that was used for centuries have been adopted and continued into today’s 
strategies – quarantine and isolation being two of the most notable measures. In addition, 
medical advances in the last decades has made it possible to screen and test the population as 
an infectious control measure. To control the spread of communicable diseases, vaccines have 
also become a vital part of stopping the spread of diseases.  
Path dependency goes beyond merely being trapped in past dependencies. It recognise 
the importance ‘small’ events play in self-reinforcing processes and that ultimately shape the 
development of the path. Self-reinforcing processes are triggered by contingent events, which 
acts as conditions for the paths future trajectory. These events are rarely clear at the beginning 
of the events, but assert themselves later on in the ‘path’. In the beginning of a path, an actor 
or organisation have a range of opportunity to change or alter the outcome, and there is a 
greater room to make decisions based on different sources of information. This range of 
alternatives narrows with time – i.e. when they are further down the path – and the outcome of 
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the processes become more determined by each previous choice made. This shows that the 
processes of the paths are non-ergodic. 
 
3.2 CRISIS TYPOLOGIES – WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRISIS? 
Before an understanding of crisis management in the selected preparedness plans can be 
constituted, a definition of what a crisis is, and what it entails, would be necessary. In 
academic discourses, several definitions and criteria exist when describing a crisis. The core 
of these definitions is that a crisis is marked by a sudden development of a phase of disorder, 
where those involved or affected experience a sense of urgency, uncertainty, and threat 
(Ansell et al., 2010; Boin et al., 2017). It is a situation where core values in a social system is 
challenged, and where immediate action is required. Information available at the beginning of 
a crisis is often scarce, and conditions of deep uncertainty reign when citizens and 
organisations look to their leaders for answers. The crisis management systems and structures 
are as a consequence, subjugated to a real-world stress test that expose and challenges the 
resilience of the political system (Boin et al., 2017).  
Not all events that takes us by surprise, or challenges the political systems, could be 
defined as a crisis. Usually, difficult situations that take us by surprise could be described as 
complex emergencies, i.e. explosions, fire, flooding, landslides, etc. which all occur with 
some degree of regularity, and where the management strategies can be rooted in previous 
experiences from similar kinds of events (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin et al., 2017). Similar to 
complex emergencies, crises evoke a sense of perceived threat (otherwise known as the 
Thomas theorem) (Boin et al., 2004, p. 380). However, in the case of a crisis, past experiences 
cannot provide sufficient guidance to policymakers and first responders on how resolve the 
crisis. Additionally, a large number of people would sense that widely shared core values of 
the societal system had come under threat, and the perceived importance of these values or 
systems by the population plays a part in whether the sense of crisis deepens or not. When 
faced with inconceivable threats that challenges available resources and puzzles our 
imagination, it increases individual and collective stress (Boin et al., 2017; Janis, 1989; 
LaPorte, 2007) 
A sense of urgency would also need to be present in order for a situation or event to be 
regarded as a crisis. The sense of urgency is often socially constructed, and not an inherent 
property of the situation or event. If a large number of different and dispersed people perceive 
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the threat as something that need to be managed right away – as an issue that cannot wait, a 
complex emergency can turn into a crisis. Proximity to a crisis also influence the decision of 
determining the urgency, and a distant observer will experience a less pressing sense of a 
crisis than the threatened individuals themselves. In the case of previously outbreaks of 
communicable diseases and epidemics, e.g. the SARS outbreak in 2003 or the continuing 
outbreaks of Ebola from 1976 to today (2021), Norwegian citizens would have felt a lesser 
sense of urgency, in comparison to the people residing in the affected areas. Nevertheless, 
Norway still produced a preparedness plan against Ebola, due to the increased fear that aid 
workers could be infected upon their arrival, and cause mass-outbreaks of the disease. 
As the emerging crisis starts to take form, a high level of uncertainty becomes 
apparent, as previous experiences provide little to no help or guidance for policymakers in 
their effort to instigate specific measures. Both the fear of potential consequences, and the 
nature of the threat, affects the search for solutions. Under such circumstances, policymakers 
face impossible choices. On the one hand, they do not have a clear overview of the situation at 
hand, and possess no knowledge of whether it is possible to act without exaggerating the 
situation. On the other, there is an expectation that a rapid response will be instigated, even if 
policymakers might still be racing to figure out exactly what happened, and how to best 
manage the crisis. (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin et al., 2017).  
Boin et al. (2017, pp. 7-9), presents two different kinds of uncertainty in a crisis: the 
“known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns”. Crisis of known unknowns are understood to 
be events where planning and countermeasures are possible to predict, train for, and that are 
easily implemented. For instance, local governments and collaborative organisations are able 
to prepare for an avalanche or mudslide, even if they do not know the size or the location of 
the potential event. These situations, which periodically occur, have operating procedures in 
place, and involved actors have had the time and resources to plan and prepare for these kinds 
of events.  
The latter type of crises, the unknown unknowns, are epitomes of crises that is hard to 
solve. Several elements happens simultaneously or within a short time period, and the 
situation is complex, ambiguous, and messy. Oftentimes, it is a “new” or previously un-
encountered type of crisis, which makes cross-sectoral communication and coordination more 
complicated, as different organisations and actors have contrasting information about the 
situation. The unfortunate consequence of crisis of unknown unknowns is that it can make it 
harder to determine which informational source to trust or how to think about the situation, as 
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there is not a clear plan on how to “do the right thing”. Consequently, such crises makes an 
already messy crisis harder to manage.  
Therefore, the crisis management would need to contain a set of extraordinary and 
interrelated challenges experienced by the governing bodies. A good response to an emerging 
crisis usually involves several pre-existing organisations – both private and public – in 
addition to newly established ones, both nationally and internationally (Boin et al., 2017). The 
perception of a crisis, and how a crisis is managed, is in many cases a matter of framing. 
Actors can chose to up-play or downplay the urgency or the need for a quick response. How 
actors in the same political system understands similar events during a crisis can also differ, 
especially in cases where there is differing views and understandings of the situation, 
sometimes even within the same response team. Crisis management can in some instances 
cause political leaders and other stakeholders to compete for the opportunity to frame the 
cause and nature of the problem, and subsequently, the best method to solve the crisis. In turn, 
this could create competing views amongst their key audiences, and in a worst-case scenario, 
it can create a delay to the implementation of measures, and divide the citizens’ perception of 
‘the right thing’ to do.  
As the very definition of a pandemic is that it reaches across national borders, 
considering the transboundary dimension of a crisis would also be required.. In addition to a 
more traditional definition of a crisis, the transboundary dimension emphasises the complex 
and interconnected web of critical infrastructure, which have come to be a core characteristic 
of a globalised, modern society (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin, 2009; Boin et al., 2017; Rosenthal 
et al., 2001; Rosenthal, Charles, & 't Hart, 1989). Ansell et al. (2010, pp. 196-197) provides 
three dimensions that can be used to determine the transboundary nature of a crisis: it would 
need to cross geographical, political, and functional boundaries, and at the same time 
transcend the boundaries of time. These crises pay no mind to neither physical nor functional 
borders, and can wreak-havoc across different sectors and nations. The financial crisis of 2008 
is a fitting example of a transboundary crisis, as it started in the USA and rapidly affected the 
global financial markets, and consequently, caused people to lose their livelihood on the other 
side of the world. Both pandemics and financial crisis are examples of crises that do not 
respect national geographical borders. 
Crises that move into the functional dimension can be hard to manage, as there are 
several non-connected actors involved with different operating imperatives and logics. As 
these organisations could be created to operate individually, a crisis that force them to 
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collaborate with other organisations, agencies, political interest groups, or government 
branches, often come as an unwelcomed surprise. Cross-sectoral collaboration could also 
prove to be a difficult task in crises, even if such collaborative efforts are implemented in 
preparedness plans in advance. If their day-to-day operations are too different from one-
another, and there has evolved a sort of ‘siloisation’ within the organisation, there might not 
be any arenas for contact, coordination, or collaboration.  
Most crises usually have a clear beginning and end, but that is not always the case 
with transboundary crises. An event of magnitude could transcend the traditional boundaries 
of time, where it would be difficult to pinpoint a place in time where it originated, or where it 
might have ended. The effect of such events can be felt several years later, and it run deep in 
the place(s) it has affected. Crisis such as this have no clear beginning, it escalates suddenly, 
and travel across geographical domains (Boin, 2009, p. 368). This risk runs high in the case of 
a pandemic, as it seemingly appeared out of nowhere, and the possibility for it to have spread 
undetected for a longer period of time would always present. In the more severe pandemics, it 
can be difficult to determine the exact end of the crises, as it might have brought about a wide 
range of long-term side effects that continues to affect people and societies for weeks, 
months, or years to come. Would the crisis be over the moment immunity in the majority of 
the population was achieved, or would it be when the long-term effects had subsided or been 
cured?  
In the early stages of a pandemic, leaders might feel the need to properly convey the 
gravity and seriousness of the situation to its citizens. In order to accomplish this, they need to 
frame the situation in a manner that conceptualises the issue, and change people’s attitude, 
towards one that is more favourable for the desired outcome (Chong & Druckman, 2007). 
They need to frame their communication in a manner that organises their “everyday reality” 
(Tuchman, 1978, p. 193) and provide “meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). The unfolding events during the first days or weeks of a pandemic 
would, in most situations, be defined as a crisis by either the government or the media. As 
more information on the pathogen becomes available to the public, and there is a sense of re-
gained control over the situation, the general perception of crisis may decrease. Boin et al. 
(2017, p. 103) states that a crisis is a temporary situation or a state of exception, but what 
happens when the sense of crisis disappear while the actual crisis continues?  
When the felt experience of threat, urgency, and uncertainty decreases, the positive 
attitude towards further measures might disappear as well. However, any crisis – and 
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particularly pandemics – are inherently different from any previous crises. During a 
pandemic, pathogens mutates, which allow for the possibility that the pathogen evolves and 
alter its ability to spread and cause harm in humans and animals, which can make crisis 
management more challenging. More importantly, our perception of crisis is largely affected 
by what, and whom, the crisis affects. Our sense of immediate threat is weaker if the event 
takes place far away from us, both geographically or on a functional level. One example is the 
earthquake – and subsequently the tsunami – that causes the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
power plant disaster in 2011, which did not directly affect Norway. In this disaster, there was 
no felt immediate sense of danger to the Norwegian population. On the other hand, the 2004 
Indian Ocean earthquake, and the following tsunami (Sumatra–Andaman earthquake) did 
instigate changes to the Norwegian crisis management and preparedness strategies, e.g. it 
inspired the formation of a crisis support group and the establishment of the Cabinet Crisis 
Council in 2006 (Lango et al., 2011, p. 176). In the aftermath of the Sumatra–Andaman 
earthquake, which affected a large amount of Norwegian citizens on their holiday, the 
government produced a white paper (St.meld. nr. 37 (2004-2005)) on preparedness and crisis 
management, which directly referred to the tsunami disaster and how it illuminated the need 
to improve the national preparedness. The implementation of policy following this white 
paper would later become one of the reasons for creating the first National Health 
Preparedness Plan (NHPP) in 2004 (Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2014b, p. 4). 
Following the liability principle, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was tasked to manage 
the tsunami disaster, since the crisis had harmed and killed Norwegian citizens abroad. The 
MFA was not prepared to manage such events, and they were quickly criticised for their poor 
coordination and response to the situation.  
These two cases demonstrate the difference in crisis management between the tsunami 
disaster in the Indian Ocean and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear power plant disaster, where 
the former triggered a shared experience of a “call to action” from both government officials 
and the citizens of Norway, while the latter did not. What, where, and more importantly whom 
a crisis hits, have a substantial effect on our perception of the seriousness of a crisis, and 
whether we feel affected by it or not. This could in turn influence whether there is a felt 
obligation to follow safety measures in place to manage the situation, or not. Likewise, a 
pandemic infection that only affect the elderly might not be perceived as equally as serious as 
an infection that mainly affected children.  
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A threatening event is, as mentioned above, more likely to be defined as a crisis by 
those closest to the event. It is also important to keep in mind another distinction of such 
threat, namely, what it hits. Some crisis threaten infrastructure, personal possessions, values in 
society, or the health and safety of people (Boin et al., 2017, p. 7). Most of the time, such 
events are categorised as disasters or complex emergencies, as they are incidents of known 
unknowns that can be prepared for. However, the latter example, a threat to the health and 
safety of people, has the potential to become a crisis of unknown unknowns, as it is in the 
case of an epidemic or pandemic.  
An additional aspect that presents itself when analysing the crisis management in 
Norway, is ‘where’ a crisis hits. Whether a crisis is limited to a region or municipality, or the 
nation as whole, different approaches apply. Effectiveness and available resources in the 
different municipalities, and the size of the threat, can affect whether intervention from other 
municipalities, the county, or state, is required. The terrorist attack on Oslo and Utøya in 2011 
revealed why good communication and rapid responses across local borders is vital during a 
crisis. The Commission tasked to evaluate the sequence of events found that, while there was 
enough resources available, first responders and specialised actors were not able to ‘find each 
other’, nor did they accept help from other police districts (Fimreite, Lango, Lægreid, & 
Rykkja, 2013, p. 849; NOU 2012: 14, 2012; Wernersen, Brekke, & Alstadsæter, 2012; 
Zondag et al., 2012). The principle of proximity in Norwegian crisis management also plays 
an important role in how and by whom, a crisis is managed. 
As pointed out earlier, when faced with a crisis, uncertainty can take the from of 
known unknowns or unknown unknowns. Similarly, uncertainty can also be viewed as 
‘wicked problems’ or ‘wicked issues’. Head and Alford (2013) defines wicked problems as 
problems without an optimal solution, which can contribute to the difficulty surrounding 
coordinating efforts made by government agencies. This could be due to the size of the 
problem, the overwhelming complexity of the situation, or an unclear understanding of 
possible solutions (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015). It can be difficult for different actors to agree 
upon a specific solution when faced with a wicked issue, though it is possible to come up with 
a provisory alternative for action, a partial solution, or a ‘quick fix’. Political processes and 
organisational structures can further complicate the shared understanding of an event, and 
subsequently, available paths for action.  
The ‘wickedness’ of wicked problems can, according to Head and Alford (2013, p. 
718), be defined by three different categories – uncertainty, complexity, and diversity – that 
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affects the possible ways in which an actor can respond appropriately when faced with a 
wicked issue. It is important to note that the goal should not always be to solve wicked issues, 
as that could prove to be an impossible task. In such cases, helping actors negotiate and reach 
a shared understanding of the problem, or an agreement on the path ahead, can result in 
solving parts of the problem. In the case of a pandemic, ‘solving the problem’ does not always 
entail eradicating the disease, but rather gain control of the situation through measures like 
quarantine or isolation, and reduce the risk it poses on the population, by for instance 
providing vaccines, and appropriate medical attention to the infected.  
Problems faced in the social sciences distinguishes themselves from the problems 
faced by the natural sciences, as social problems usually are inherently wicked. “The 
objective of the work is coherent action, not final solution” (Head & Alford, 2013, p. 718), 
which often is the case in natural sciences where one can have a clear mission and a definitive 
answer on whether a problem has been solved or not (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160).  The 
aim for public policy issues should be to seek a resolution by improving coordination and 
collaboration among organisations, actors, or agencies so that governments become more 
equipped too face complex challenges and find a way forward (Head & Alford, 2013; 
Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Rittel & Webber (1973) distinguishes 
between ten properties of wicked problems, to further show the complexity and ambiguity of 
such problems, and how that separates them from what they refer to as “tame” problems.  
In crisis management, wicked issues present themselves despite of the work the 
government put into risk assessment and preparedness planning for extraordinary events. Both 
known unknowns and unknown unknowns in a crisis are inherently wicked, as it is impossible 
to determine the course of events or to know whether the problem was solved or not. Such 
situations can stretch across administrative levels, policy sectors, and ministerial 
responsibilities (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015, p. 484). Without a coordination strategy in place 
before an incident occur, coordination efforts across policy areas can prove to be a 
challenging exercise. Even with a coordination strategy in place, it may turn out to be 
insufficient or less relevant to the specific problem at hand during a crisis. Organisational 
flexibility and improvisation is also a key aspect in collaboration efforts to manage wicked 
issues, but this is often further complicated by internalised norms, values, or symbols within 





3.3 CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
In addition to different ways of relating the history of pandemics to crisis management, it 
would be fruitful to use a perspective on pandemics that focus on how to manage crises. Crisis 
have become inherently more transboundary in recent years, like the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
and the SARS epidemic, terrorist attacks, or environmental crisis like the BP oil spill, or man-
made climate changes (Ansell et al., 2010). This has created a need for better collaboration 
between nation states, as it has become increasingly more difficult to handle these events 
alone (Blondin & Boin, 2020). However, even with international collaboration and 
coordination, different nations still chose their own path of response (Baekkeskov, 2016). The 
WHO have facilitated pandemic preparedness since 1997, yet in the case of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, the response of different countries varied greatly, i.e. some countries were more 
successful in their management strategies then others. Routine incidents are easier to manage 
than ‘black swans’ (Blondin & Boin, 2020, p. 3; Boin et al., 2017, p. 26), which are unknown 
crisis that are almost impossible to plan and prepare for – like a pandemic or financial crisis.  
One of the key coordination challenges leaders face in crisis management is 
safeguarding and facilitating collaboration across different organisations and actors (Boin & 't 
Hart, 2012, p. 179). In the early stages of a crisis, decisions made ad hoc adhere to guidelines 
stated in the preparedness plans, which inhibit the possibility for leaders to micromanage and 
control critical decisions. The decisions that prove themselves critical in shaping the course of 
the crisis, would therefore only be visible in hindsight. Emergency and first responses to 
large-scale events initially follow a bottom-up strategy, while it would later be managed and 
planned in a top-down structure. A well organised and managed crisis response can increase 
the popularity of leaders – while bad management might end political careers (See Boin & 't 
Hart, 2003).  
Boin et al. (2017, p. 15) introduce “the five critical tasks of strategic crisis leadership” 
where they attempt to provide an overview of the different stages of a crisis, and how leaders 
can work during a crises situation in order to effectively manage it. The first stage is ‘sense 
making’, where information is collected and processed in order to detect the emergence of a 
crisis, and determine the significance of the possible threat. Second, ‘decision making and 
coordination’, where a response is formulated and decisions implemented. Third, ‘meaning 
making’, where the situation is framed in order to make it more convincing and helpful to the 
responders. Fourth is ‘accounting’, where decisions and actions made to manage and prevent 
the crisis are explained. Lastly, ‘learning’, where an evaluation-process is instigated on the 
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cause of the crisis and the responses to it. These five tasks are intended as a suggestion to 
leaders on how to manage known unknowns, and not unknown unknowns, as these have 
proven to be impossible to properly prepare for.  
Still, can preparedness planning be described as a meaningful endeavour? Does it 
actually solve crises? Sadly, previous research on crisis management have shown that there 
usually is a big gap between what was planned for, and the actual crisis (Quarantelli, 1988, p. 
374). One reason for this might be that the planning was poor to begin with, and that it was 
too specific rather than general, making it so that it was not applicable to the crisis at hand, 
and therefore trying to solve problems that did not exist – and maybe creating new problems 
in the process. Another reason might be a failure to recognise the difference between a 
complex emergency and a true crisis. Studies on previous disasters have shown that these two 
are not always distinguished in the preparedness planning activities, which can have dire 
consequences should a crisis occur. There could be an assumption that the preparedness plan 
could simply be implemented once the threat manifested itself, in order to manage the 
situation. Such a response might be appropriate in the face of a complex emergency, but it 
would be a catastrophic response to a large-scale crisis (Boin, 2008, p. 46).  
When the crisis occur, it can be managed with either a top-down or bottom-up 
approach (Boin & Bynander, 2015), with horizontal or vertical coordination, or by following 
local principles and core values. At its core, crisis management should be as close to everyday 
governance as possible, but with an increased collaboration and flexibility between 
organisations. However, paradoxically, the complexity of modern organisations have made it 
harder for organisations to detect impending crises (Boin et al., 2017, pp. 43-44). Incidents – 
that in hindsight appear to be large, red, warning lights – reveals signs that should have 
alerted the government of what to come. Small interactions or events that fall between 
organisations and are left unchecked, can grow into a critical events. The failure to become 
aware of an unfolding situation also inhibits data collection in the earliest stages, making it 
impossible to implement preliminary actions to avert the crisis in the first place.  
For a crisis to be managed in an acceptable manner, there is three dimensions that 
need to be fulfilled: communication and information, psychology, and organisation (Boin, 
Kofman-Bos, & Overdijk, 2004, p. 380). Time after time, it is evident that the crisis managers 
did not have the appropriate information available. Having a centralised, small team of 
decision makers further complicates the issue, as they are far away from the threatening event, 
making it harder to make rapid decisions on location. Crisis managers are also prone to the 
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psychological effects of decision making (see Comfort, Oh, Etrtan, & Scheinert, 2012), like 
‘group think’ or heightened stress. Even though crisis simulations and training exercises can 
be utilised in reoccurring incidents or complex situations, this is not the case in an extreme 
event, or unknown unknowns. 
When discussing crisis management in public institutions and between organisations, 
how coordination efforts are conducted and organised, can prove useful – especially if the 
crisis is of a national concern. A distinction can be made between horizontal and vertical 
coordination, where the former is cross-sectoral coordination efforts, often between 
hierarchically similar organisations, and the latter usually is coordination efforts that takes 
place between local and national government. In this context, coordination– whether it be of 
something or someone – entails incorporating or integrating different parts of an organisation, 
in order to achieve a specific set of collective tasks (Van De Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). 
Crises can also cross political and organisational boundaries, both vertically and horizontally. 
In the vertical dimension, local government can request assistance from a higher level of 
government, should the crisis become overwhelming or un-manageable. Two organisations 
can also collaborate horizontally if they operate at the same level of government, like two 
municipalities or counties. Both horizontal and vertical coordination can be applicable to 
international collaboration; in the case of a pandemic, it would be common for the national 
government to reach out to supranational organs like the WHO, and for the HDIR and the 
Norwegian institute of public health (NIPH) to collect data from similar organisations in other 
nations. When both horizontal and vertical coordination is required, crisis management is 
expected to be more challenging (Ansell et al., 2010, p. 196), as there are several 
communication channels conveying different messages and calls for action.  
Division of labour and specialisation has become a key feature in modern 
organisations, which makes coordinating efforts challenging, and at times, problematic 
(Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015, p. 487). An example of this is policy fields falling between two or 
more jurisdictional boundaries, making it hard to establish responsibility. Nevertheless, well-
defined organisational boundaries between horizontal and vertical coordination should not be 
viewed as an outdated mind-set. Horizontal coordinating efforts can be valuable in several 
situations, but it is a resource and time-consuming activity, which can make it a less desirable 
option. Public organisations, which oftentimes work “top-down”, face the problem of 
“siloisation” (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015, p. 476), which makes problems that cross through 
traditional responsibilities more difficult to solve, especially in transboundary challenges. 
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Vertical coordination, when it is the subject of siloisation, makes horizontal coordination 
more challenging.  
Both vertical and horizontal coordination brings with it some degree of wicked issues, 
despite the fact that this method of organisation also has contributed to reducing the overall 
‘wickedness’ in the political fields. Vertical and horizontal coordination becomes a wicked 
issue when the coordination efforts fall between policy fields or jurisdictions between two or 
more actors, making them the responsibility of no one (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015, p. 487). 
Nevertheless, how challenges connected to these models of coordination are approached, can 
become a central aspect of the management of wicked issues, particularly if a lead agency 
model, elements of voluntarism, and the formalisation of structures is used. According to 
Lægreid and Rykkja (2015, p. 487), an effective coordination effort can solve wicked issues 
in three ways; by increasing the understanding of the problem and its underlying causes, 
which increase the probability of finding a solution, and makes it easier to implement 
solutions. Coordination and collaboration thus becomes a way to understand the complexity, 
ambiguity, and uncertainty of transboundary wicked issues, which involves cross-sectoral 
actors and levels of governance (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015, p. 487). In order to reduce the 
wickedness of horizontal and vertical coordination in a crisis, the Norwegian crisis 
management also involves four principles of which actors have to adhere to in crises. These 
principles will be referred to as ‘contextual principles’, and are included in the National 
Health Preparedness Plan (NHPP) (Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2018b). The contextual 
principles are guiding principles in all areas of crisis management and preparedness planning, 
not just on issues regarding health and care strategies, but also in all sectors and areas of crisis 
management and societal security.  
The principle of liability states that actors in charge of a specific service or policy field 
have the responsibility to ensure the necessary preparedness and management strategies in the 
case of an extraordinary event, and is established by law in the Act on Health and Social 
Preparedness (HSP) (Helseberedskapsloven, 2000, § 2-1). The principle of proximity – 
otherwise known as the subsidiary principle – states that a crisis should be managed at the 
lowest possible governance level, while the principle of conformity is to ensure that 
organisations established during a crisis, should operate as closely as possible to those that 
operate on a day-to-day basis. Lastly, the principle of collaboration states that all 
organisations has the independent responsibility to ensure the best possible collaboration with 
relevant actors in prevention efforts, preparedness work, and crisis management (Helse- og 
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Omsorgsdepartementet, 2018b, p. 5; 2019, p. 11; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet). The 
principle of liability, proximity, and conformity was first introduced in modern preparedness 
strategies after the ‘St.meld. nr. 17 (2001-2002) (p. 4)’– which is based on findings from the 
1999 “Willoch Committee” and the subsequent official Norwegian report NOU 2000: 24 
(2000), in addition to the NOU 2001:31 (2001) – that came after the 9/11 2001 terrorist attack 
in the USA. The last principle – the principle of collaboration – was introduced in the white 
paper Meld. St. 29 (2011–2012) (p. 39) (Meld. St. 13 (2015–2016), p. 6) and came as a 
response to the insufficient and highly criticised collaboration efforts in the 22nd July 2011 
terrorist attack.  
Still, some of these principles have been included in Norwegian crisis management 
strategies for several decades, where some, like the principle of proximity, originates from the 
PHA of 1860. These four principles are connected to one of the core values of the Norwegian 
governance model, which is that of autonomous municipalities.  
The principle of self-governing and local democracy is important in all aspects of the 
Norwegian governance model, but also in the early stages of a crisis, as it can provide an 
enhanced sense of responsibility due to the proximity of the crisis. The municipal reform of 
1992 aimed at counteracting centralisation and a strong ‘sectorisation’ from the Norwegian 
central government (Lango, Rykkja, & Lægreid, 2011, p. 171), where the main purpose was 
to strengthen the municipalities and the local autonomy of local government, whilst reducing 
a strong sectorisation and centralisation. The concept of self-government is a central feature 
of Norwegian policy, as local authority, governance, and democracy are relatively strong 
societal values (Lango et al., 2011, p. 171), which is strongly connected to the core values of 
the 1860 PHA. Policy that reduce the autonomy of local government is highly contested in the 
population, which was demonstrated during the debates surrounding the new Municipality 
reform of 2014.  
Another core value in the central Norwegian governance model is the ministerial 
responsibility. This means that the head of a given Ministry has the overarching responsibility 
of everything that takes place within his or her Ministry, in addition to all associated 
directorates, agencies, and the various government branches related to the ministry in a 
vertical line (Lango et al., 2011, p. 171). This value is closely related to the principle of 
liability, especially in vertical coordination efforts. The consequences of a strong ministerial 
responsibility can result in strong sector-based ministries, and hence strengthen the vertical 
coordination. This, in turn, brings about weakening of the horizontal coordination between 
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policy areas, institutions, and sectors. The dominating principle in this area is in favour of a 
specialising within the sector, the purpose, or the task, which can make the coordination 
between traditional sectors challenging. Sector-based ministries have more authority than the 
ministries in charge of sector-crossing coordination, which could imply that the ministries 
operates as separate ‘silos’ with a limited opportunity to catch on to sector-crossing political 
questions (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, & 
Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016a, p. 5). Historically, the principle on proximity has been an 
important part of the Norwegian political system, where questions regarding crisis 
management and risk assessments are usually organised at a local level. In contrast to the 
principle on liability, the principle on proximity allows for the possibility to implement 
coordination efforts across different sectors on a lower level. This contributes to an increased 
horizontal coordination between different organisations. The principle on conformity could 
turn out to be particularly hard during extraordinary crisis, as the need for improvisation, 
supplements to existing organisations, and temporary organisations could grow and become 
crucial to the crisis management.  
A common aspect in crisis management, especially with a (post-) NPM perspective, is 
that decentralisation can increase effectiveness and responsiveness in a crisis. Lower-level 
officials and first-responders are the first to make critical decisions on-sight in the beginning 
of a crisis, and when procedures are highly centralised, critical responses are slowed down. 
Centralisation in this case can be a liability to the management of the crisis, because a crisis 
never appear as envisioned or predicted. It may leave organisations and actors powerless or 
incapable of action, and path dependent organisation may see themselves locked-in or unable 
to respond. If one could predict a crisis, one can argue that it would not be a crisis in the first 
place. Boin et al. (2017, p. 60) argues that the prime source of problems in a crisis situation, is 
that centralised models respond to fast moving and distributed threats. Decentralisation is 
suggested as an “unavoidable necessity during a crisis response” (Boin et al., 2017, p. 60). 
To successfully manage a crisis, decentralisation  (Boin et al., 2017, p. 42) – also in 
addition to safety and awareness training – needs to be addressed in crisis response guidelines 
and preparedness plans. However, one of the unintended effects of decentralisation and other 
NPM techniques, is that it provides regulators and policymakers protection in case of failure 
in their crisis management (Boin et al., 2017, p. 118).  
Christensen & Lægreids’ (2011, p. 126) differentiation between NPM and post-NPM 
reforms, are that “NPM reforms are chiefly about structural devolution, horizontal 
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specialization, market and management principles, and efficiency, while post-NPM reforms 
focus more on central capacity and control, coordination within and between sectors, and 
value-based management”. One of the issues facing NPM-oriented reforms and features, is 
that they have issues with events that transcend traditional ministerial areas or silos, 
administrative levels, and organisational boundaries (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015, pp. 475-476) 
 
3.4 EXPECTATIONS 
The theoretical framework for this thesis is based on two different elements that are 
present in the preparedness and crisis management, namely path dependency and crisis 
management. This is all to be understood within the framework of crisis typologies.  
The first sub-chapter starts by facilitating for including path dependency in our 
analysis, as it will become possible to point out how previous events have partaken in creating 
the overall pandemic preparedness. Different paths that form strategies and measures become 
trapped in self-reinforcing, positive feedback loops where options for future action becomes 
increasingly restricted. Both the general preparedness and the pandemic preparedness follow 
the same framework for preparedness, which has been developed over several years. 
Evaluations and learning points from previous crisis, disasters, or complex emergencies have 
influenced the direction of the overall preparedness strategies, as they have reached critical 
junctures, and as a result, have contributed to creating possible lock-ins’ of the crisis 
management.  
The second sub-chapter on crisis typologies is important in order to establish a 
common understanding of the phenomena or event that is being prepared for. It also serves a 
purpose if the ambition is to explore collaboration and coordination between different actors 
and organisations, as it is important that everyone involved have a clear perception and 
understanding of the event. Creating an understanding of what constitutes as a crisis, would 
also be useful going forward.  
As the research question is “how have previous large-scale pandemic or epidemic 
outbreaks contributed to shaping the current crisis management and pandemic preparedness 
plans in Norway?”, the three theoretical points would serve as an explanatory theoretical 
framework for further analysis. In order to analyse how previous events have shaped current 
strategies, a path dependent approach is required. Additionally, since I am interested in how 
this has affected the crisis management and preparedness strategies in Norway, a need to 
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understand what crisis management is becomes decisive in order to conduct a thorough 
analysis. Information of what constitutes a crisis, and which aspects this understanding 
provides, would therefore be required.   
The third sub-chapter on crisis management demonstrates that crisis can be hard to 
manage and prepare for, especially when encountering a crisis of “unknown unknowns”. 
However, complex emergencies or other critical events that happen somewhat regularly and 
that can prepared for, is possible to manage. In the case of pandemics, even though several 
types of pandemic pathogens have been encountered in the past, and hopefully, provided 
various learning experiences, it remains impossible to predict how the next pandemic is going 
to present itself in the future. Norway has four principles that guide actors on their 
responsibility, which is that of liability, proximity, conformity, and collaboration. These 
principles is expected to be prominent in all preparedness plans and strategies. However, how 
these principles guide coordination and collaborative efforts during a pandemic outbreak 
might not be sufficient on this specific area. The overall Norwegian preparedness strategies 
are, for the most part, a general strategy that do not separate between different types of crisis 
or complex emergencies.  
Since the 22nd July 2011 terrorist attack in Norway, several efforts have been 
implemented on the field of preparedness and societal security, as the attack uncovered poor 
management strategies, lacking cross-sectoral coordination, and coordination efforts within 
organisations. The solution to these challenges was to increase centralisation across Norway, 
favouring bigger response units instead of smaller, geographically dispersed units. These 
changes have also affected the pandemic preparedness, as the number of municipalities and 
counties have been reduced, and these new organisations are required to create new RoS-
analyses6 which might be a time consuming effort that takes months or years to fully 
complete.
                                                 
6 Municipalities and counties are tasked to develop a comprehensive risk-and vulnerability analysis (ROS) to 
map-out undesirable events that might affect them, the occurrence probability, and the effects it might have on 
society (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2014a, p. 12) 
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4. METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION 
4.1 PROCESS-TRACING CASE STUDY  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how previous large-scale pandemic or epidemic 
outbreaks have shaped the current crisis management and pandemic preparedness plans in 
Norway. The historical context in which these plans were developed would also be intriguing 
for further examination, which suggest that using a process-tracing case study would be a 
useful part of the data collection process and analysis.  
 Table 1 presents an overview of the five preparedness plans used in this thesis, as well 
as the current edition and year of publication. From this, it is possible to observe that the plans 
have all been either updated or implemented by the current government, which is headed by 
the Conservative Party.  
 
Table 1 Overview of the preparedness plans included for analysis in this thesis. 
Preparedness 
Plan 
Year  (Latest) edition Produced by Number of 
pages 
NHPP 2018 3rd.ed HOD 47 
CBRNE 2016 1st.ed HOD, JBD, MD 14 
OSID 2019 1st.ed HOD 52 
PPI 2014 4th.ed HOD 90 
AKS 2019 4th.ed7 DSB 228 
 
 In order to establish that the pandemic preparedness in Norway is based on 
experiences from previous crisis or pandemic events, the first step would be to examine the 
content of the five plans, in order to establish how the management of pandemic outbreaks is 
shaped. The aim is not to compare measures in the different plans, as they are closely 
connected within a preparedness framework for the health and care sector, and cover different 
aspects of a pandemic crisis. As a result, it is feasible to assert that this case takes place within 
the boundaries of single case study, as there are no comparisons between this and other cases, 
which makes it a single-case study and not a comparative case study.  
                                                 
7 It is the fourth annually collection of reports since 2012, that is considered to be similar to its predecessors. 
Reports have been published in various formats since 2005. 
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Yin presents a twofold definition of a case study (2018, p. 15), where the first being as 
an empirical method that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and 
within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context may not be clearly evident”. This definition sets the scope of the study, but its features 
would still need to be included. Yin calls for this need because it is not always possible to 
distinguish between context and phenomenon in real-world situations. The “how” formulation 
of the research question would also point towards the need for a case study in order to discuss 
the research question (Bukve, 2016, p. 139; Yin, 2018, p. 9).  
Collier (2010, p. 2) defines the purpose or process tracing as a method that  “[...] 
examines diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as part of a temporal sequence of 
events or phenomena—with the goal of achieving and refining causal inference.” This would 
result in either the overturning or the support of the research question or hypothesis, which is 
one of the central tools in qualitative research. Further, Collier summarises process tracing 
into four empirical tests, which are based on two criteria: if the test is necessary and whether 
it is sufficient in order to establish a causal relation. The four empirical tests evaluate the 
evidence in specific ways, but should not be regarded as rigid tests, but rather as heuristic 
guidelines for evaluation. Collier (2010, pp. 5-7) refer to the four tests as ‘Straw-in-the-wind 
tests, hoop tests, smoking gun tests, and double-decisive tests’.  
The straw-in-the-wind test tests the plausibility, or raises doubts about any given 
research question, but it is not a decisive criterion on its own. Even though the test may be 
consistent with the research question, it cannot confirm it. Additionally, it provides no 
sufficient or necessary criteria in the support or rejection of a research question. 
Consequently, it is the weakest of the four tests, as it have no effect on rival research 
questions or hypothesis. The second test, the hoop test, is more demanding. It cannot prove 
support for the research question, but it can discard it. It does not provide a sufficient criterion 
for the acceptance of an explanation, but it does establish a necessary criteria. Similar to the 
first test, the hoop test have no ramification for rival research questions. The third test, the 
smoking gun test, could firmly support one research question, but a failure to pass the test 
would not imply rejection. It provides a sufficient, however not necessary, criteria for 
affirmation. Similar to the two former tests, it has no significance in regards to rival research 
questions. The final test, the double-decisive test, is the strongest of the four tests. Here, it is 
possible to confirm a research question, and hence, eliminate every other hypothesis or 
research questions. The test can be combined with the three other tests in order to strengthen 
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the certainty in the result. However, the researcher must be able to find and identify every 
other rival research questions or hypothesis in order to do so.  
For this thesis, the research question addresses whether previous pandemics have 
affected the current preparedness plans and crisis management. Our first clue is that several of 
the preparedness plans, NOU’s, white papers, and reports written in the years after the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic reference the pandemic as a reason for the need of an increased 
preparedness. Or second clue is that the preparedness in several plans were updated in the 
time after the 2009 pandemic, in addition to that new preparedness plans and legislations were 
implemented after the pandemic. However, the reason for the updates and implementation of 
these preparedness plans could have been because of other, non-related events such as the 
terrorist attack on the 22nd July 2011, natural disasters such as the volcanic eruption on 
Iceland in 2010, the nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011, or that the plans simply needed a 
revision due to their age. If the double-decisive test was to be passed, it would need to rival all 
other possible explanations in order to determine whether previous pandemics was the sole 
event responsible for shaping new or existing crisis management strategies or preparedness 
plans. In the case of this case study, it would not be decisive to pass this final test, as the 
research question and theme of the thesis acknowledges the possibility that other events could 
have influenced the pandemic preparedness.    
The process-tracing strategy guided the selection of the pandemic preparedness plans, 
where the selection of one plan directed the attention to another plan. Tracing the different 
processes was possible through an extensive review of the all the preparedness plans related 
to the topic, white papers, government hearings, and various informational pamphlets and 
reports. Most of the plans would either call for the creation of new plans, or reference to 
preceding plans, as a part of their own preparedness. Likewise, it was possible to track the 
informational path through the government hearings, white papers, and NOUs commonly 
found after the evaluation process of a crisis, e.g. the St.meld. nr. 37 (2004-2005) on the 
tsunami disaster in Central Asia, which would bring about a new wave of crisis management 
in Norway, including the creation of the Health Preparedness Plan in 2004. After the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic, it was discovered that the preparedness planning for pandemic influenza was 
insufficient, and consequently, the ‘National Preparedness Plan for Pandemic Influenza’ was 
updated in 2014. Later, with the 22nd July 2011 terrorist attack, the NOU 2012: 14 (2012) 
report from the 22nd July Commission (Gjørv-kommisjonen), which was emphasised in the 
creation of the Meld. St. 21 (2012–2013) on the management of a terrorist attack and societal 
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security, would bring about changes to the Norwegian framework for preparedness. The 
terrorist attack had increased the fear of the possibility that biological weapons could be used 
in future terrorist attacks, or as a means of warfare. Following, it lead to the call for the 
implementation of a National Strategy for CBRNE-Preparedness in 2016. The follow-up of 
the CBRNE plan would later result in the National Emergency Preparation Plan against 
Outbreaks of Severe Infectious Diseases (OSID) in 2019.  
The report NOU 2021: 6 (2021) that discusses the governments’ management of the 
Covid-19 crisis, will most likely influence a new white paper on societal security, which 
would consequently be built on experiences from the Meld. St. 5 (2020–2021) that was 
adapted during the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. Before this white paper, Meld. St. 10 
(2016–2017) 8 on societal security, was included in The National Health Preparedness Plan of 
2018, where it states the basis for systematic quality improvements in societal security and 
crisis management (Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2018b, pp. 10,12). A new white paper 
on the evaluation of the measures and strategies implemented during the covid-19 pandemic, 
in addition to more comprehensive risk-analyses that consider other communicable diseases 
when estimating the risk of new pandemics, might similarly be influencing future updates to 
the NHPP.  
As the goal is to understand how previous encounters with pandemics have shaped the 
current crisis management and preparedness in Norway, the case design would also need to 
factor in a historical perspective; mentioning impactful events that have affected the 
preparedness strategies, similarly as the previously presented examples of the different 
processes. It would also require pre-existing theory as a basis for analysis, as it would aid in 
the explanation on how preparedness plans and crisis management strategies came to be. 
Nonetheless, what sets this analysis apart from a purely historical analysis, though sharing 
similar techniques, is that it is possible to interview and collect information from people that 
have observed or experienced these impactful events (Yin, 2018, p. 12). Therefore, an 
analytical tool that would be able to trace the different processes over time, would be 
required. This resulted in the selection of a process-tracing case study – also known as an 
explanation-building case study (Yin, 2018, p. 179) – or more precise, a result-explanatory 
process-tracing case study.  
                                                 
8 White Papers preceding the Meld. St. 10 (2016-2017) on societal security: Meld. St. 16 (2012-2013), Meld. St. 
29 (2011-2012), St.Meld. nr. 22 (2007-2008), St.Meld. nr. 17 (2001-2002) 
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Bukve (2016, p. 140) points to two types of process-tracing analysis that can be used, 
depending on the goals of the researcher: a theory developing process-analysis or a result-
explanatory process analysis. The former aims at developing new theories or hypothesis 
through testing, while the latter draws on interchangeable explanations that the researcher 
deem relevant in order to explain an incident. Collier (2011, p. 823) defines process tracing as 
a “fundamental tool of qualitative analysis [that] can contribute decisively both to describing 
political and social phenomena and to evaluating causal claims”. Even though Yin (2018, p. 
45) points out that “how” case studies are usually descriptive, and not explanatory like many 
“why” case studies. The purpose of this thesis is to explain how a previous event have shaped 
a current plan, not merely point out how it came to be. Swanborn (2010, p. 116) describes 
explanation building as a “special form of pattern matching”, and Bukve (2016, p. 140) points 
to the need to examine the underlying events and processes that led to the particular incident, 
by either reconstructing the decision making process or identifying the triggering causes that 
led to the chain of events. In this case, the final ‘incident’ would be defined as the finished 
preparedness plan.  
Under ‘normal’ circumstances, it would be impossible to properly test in what way 
previous pandemics could have influenced the current crisis management and pandemic 
preparedness, though it could have provided some insight through the evaluation of training 
events or other forms of learning and preparedness exercises. Such events are usually limited 
to ‘known unknowns’, as described in chapter 3, since it is impossible to properly prepare for 
‘unknown unknowns’. Throughout the duration of writing of this thesis, the effects of the 
Covid-19 pandemic have been experienced and felt, which has made it possible to test the 
Norwegian preparedness and crisis management against the implemented measures as they 
were implemented. Additionally, path dependent decisions could become apparent in the 
initial measures implemented at the beginning of the pandemic, which could be influencing 
the strategies available at the beginning of the summer of 2021, a year after the pandemic shut 
down societies across the world. Nevertheless, as the Covid-19 pandemic is an ongoing crisis, 
this approach would still need to rely on too little information, as the uncertainty and 
ambiguity surrounding the decision making process is still being analysed by the Corona 
Commission, which at this point, could limit the amount of publicly available information. As 
the evaluation process has not yet been finalised, and the pandemic evaluation remains 
complex and unclear, the accessibility and quality of available data to base such an analysis 
on, remains doubtful.  
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Consequently, the choice of analysing ‘how’ preparedness plans and the Norwegian 
crisis management was organised and structured prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, would be 
more fruitful in order to create a groundwork for why certain decisions were made at the early 
onset of the crisis. In turn, this analysis could provide future researchers with an explanation 
for ‘why’ particular measures – based on their historic preconditions – were implemented. A 
result-explanatory process-tracing approach would therefore provide more useful in the 
analysis of the five preparedness plans in the following chapter, as it could prove useful for 
future research on the Norwegian crisis management, after the Covid-19 crisis has ended.   
 
4.2 DATA AVAILABILITY AND SELECTION  
Similar to the choice of method, the selection of documents were guided by the research 
question. The choice to solely rely on documents as part of the analysis was made because it 
would have been the most widely available and accessible information at the beginning of the 
Covid-19 pandemic – or of any pandemic scenarios – that could provide different actors and 
organisations with similar information and measures in the initial phase of the pandemic. If 
the information in the pandemic preparedness plans were outdated or insufficient, or too 
specific or too general, the Norwegian crisis management would be severely compromised. 
How these documents came to be, then, would prove to be essential for future preparedness 
planning and crisis management. As the first evaluation from the Corona Commission on the 
Covid-19 pandemic have shown, the preparedness in advance was insufficient in order to 
manage or prepare for this type of pandemic crisis (NOU 2021: 6, 2021, p. 63) as most 
scenarios only tackled influenza pandemics. 
 Where the preparedness plans have been collected from, is a vital part of the source 
evaluation. I have selected the most recent editions of these documents that could be found on 
pandemic preparedness and crisis management in the health and care sector in Norway, which 
could also be analysed by using a social scientific qualitative method. Additionally, previous 
editions of the plans have been included in the research in order to guide the creation of 
historic lines in the preparedness, but they have not been analysed in this thesis. Plans that 
tackled registration, tracking, vaccination strategies, and early detection systems of pandemics 
were not included, similar as plans that strictly tackled how to recognise particular diseases or 
international collaboration. The plans are the final, published version of the plans, and not 
drafts. White papers, subsequent reports, and documents that have called for the creation of 
these plans, have passed in the Storting after being voted on. After this process, the work of 
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creating the preparedness plans have been the tasked to the Regjering, which have published 
the official preparedness strategies on their websites, www.government.no. The plans are 
written by institutional sources, meaning that they have been written in collaboration with 
several authors, within a sector or in a collaborative cross-sectoral effort. The preparedness 
plans originates from government white papers, NOU’s, and reports, which pointed to a need 
for updated preparedness strategies.  
Plans made on a municipal or county level were not included, as this thesis seeks to 
explore the plans that were applicable for the entire country. The Ministry of Health and Care 
Services (HOD) have written or co-authored four out of the five preparedness plans chosen 
for further analysis, and the last document is a report on the most recent risk assessment and 
analysis by The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB). The reason why this 
report was included instead of an actual preparedness plan is that no other relevant plan that 
took a general focus on pandemic preparedness could be found, nor where they referenced to 
in the NHPP. However, the Crisis Scenario Analysis of 2019 (AKS) is referenced as an 
analysis on which all organisations should base their preparedness and crisis management 
(Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2018b, p. 11). These five documents will be referred to as 
preparedness plans.  
The data and collected information used in this thesis is collected from two types of 
sources, the political sources and other types of sources. The political sources consist of white 
papers, NOUs government documents, and reports ordered by public organisations. The other 
type of sources are collected from public sources, such as publicly available websites, 
historical research and publications, news articles, or articles published by independent 
organisations and actors. All preparedness plans analysed in the following chapter is retrieved 
from public government websites. The support for claiming a high level of trustworthiness of 
the sources and the contextual assessments of the preparedness plans would therefore be 
prominent (see: Grønmo, 2016, pp. 177-178), which in turn would strengthen the reliability of 
this thesis. Further assessments on the quality of the research design and data collection 






Figure 3 The preparedness plans are ranked hierarchically, and establish a level of authority between the plans. The figure 
is influenced by the figure provided by HOD (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2019, p. 5) 
 
By using a process-tracing strategy, documents were selected after a read-through of 
all preparedness plans that could be of interest for this thesis. The starting point was the 
NHPP as it presents the overall framework for crisis management in the Norwegian health 
and care sector (see Figure 3). The NHPP pointed in the direction of white papers, NOU’s, 
and other preparedness plans. In turn, these documents would lead to the discovery of other 
plans. In the end, a decision was made to go forward with the selected five plans, due to their 
connections to one another, their relevancy, context, and content, in order to be able to discuss 
the research question (see: Grønmo, 2016, pp. 175-177). Additionally, either a Ministry or a 
Directorate wrote the plans, which would increase the plans relevancy in a crisis scenario, and 
in the overall crisis management framework. The number of preparedness plans were limited 
to five, as it became apparent that a small selection was necessary in order to examine why 
and how the plans was created, in contrast to including a larger sample of plans which could 
have produced a weaker analysis of the preparedness and crisis management. Only choosing 
one preparedness plan for this study would also prove to be an impossible task, as several of 
the preparedness plans are based on, or called for, in previous plans, which connects them to 
the overall framework (see: Grønmo, 2016, pp. 125-126). The selected plans are introduced in 
the section below, and their connections to other plans will be presented in the next chapter.  
The National Health Preparedness Plan (NHPP) was included due to it being the 
overall framework for preparedness and crisis management in Norway. It describes the roles 
of actors within the sector, fundamental mechanisms for coordination, collaboration, and 
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detection and response strategies (Helsedirektoratet, 2019a, p. 34). All other preparedness 
plan are grounded in this framework. The National Strategy for CBRNE-Preparedness 
(CBRNE) was created to aid in the crisis management of “unknown unknowns”. The plan is 
intended as a cross-sectoral plan for collaboration between the JBD, HOD, and the MD, 
where each ministry is in charge of different events. The National Emergency Preparation 
Plan against Outbreaks of Severe Infectious Diseases (OSID) is a follow-up plan of the 
CBRNE-strategy, in order to further the preparedness against biological agents. The National 
Preparedness Plan for Pandemic Influenza (PPI) is the only preparedness plan that 
specifically deal with the management of a pandemic influenza in detail. It is mentioned in 
Meld. St. 16 (2012–2013) (p. 44) that, in addition to the general crisis management, some 
scenarios are too complex and demanding for them to be handled within the competencies of 
‘regular’ crisis management. To improve crisis management in a pandemic scenario, the PPI 
was developed as a specialised preparedness plan for the Health and Care sector. The Crisis 
scenario analysis of 2019 (AKS) is not a preparedness plan, but a report that describes the 
status quo of the preparedness at the end of 2019. It estimates that a pandemic is the most 
likely scenario to occur within the next 100 years that would also have the most severe 
consequences. This scenario was also included in the 2014 edition of the report (Direktorat for 
Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2014b, pp. 69, 201, 2013). 
Interviews were not included as a process of data collection, as the documents and 
information required was publicly available. In a process-tracing study such as this, it is 
possible to trace patterns through written sources, which in turn could provide a better 
overview of the processes. The data collection took form from following a process tracing 
process, where the collection started with one document, which made it possible to find a 
connection with another document, white paper, or NOU’s. The data collection process was 
decisive for the choice of method, and it was no need to conduct interviews in order to find 
additional information, as the process tracing led to the required documents. However, 
interviews could have been conducted as an empirical data collection method in this study, 
but there is a chance that the thesis would have taken a different direction than first intended. 
The informants could have pointed in the direction of supplementary information, similarly in 
the document analysis, but it could also have altered the theme of the thesis, as various 




4.3 QUALITATIVE DOCUMENT ANALYSIS  
The empiric was collected by using a systematic analysis of relevant documents. One of the 
advantages with this method, is that the sources remain uninfluenced by the data collection 
process as texts are not altered when they are analysed (Grønmo, 2016, p. 180), nor do they 
provide situational influenced information. After a systematic review of the content of the 
selected preparedness plans – and other preparedness plans that were not included in this 
thesis –, a selection of information relevant to the theme and purpose of this thesis was chosen 
as the foundation for further analysis.  
By conducting an analysis of a previously, little explored phenomena or relation, it can 
become necessary to utilise theories and definitions that have been used to examine and 
explain a similar phenomenon. Therefore, a theory-informed analytical framework need a 
certain flexibility in order to accommodate for findings that could lead the research in a new 
direction. Following this logic, the analytical framework of this thesis would need to extend 
as far out as the research question, and the purpose of the research, allows for. By using a 
theoretic interpretation as a goal for this thesis, the goal would not be to establish new 
theories or terms, but rather to analyse and give meaning to this particular case. Theories 
utilised in this thesis is used to interpret the data, and to put it into a larger context (Bukve, 
2016, p. 88). Accordingly, an interpretive reconstruction would be best suited in order to 
collect the empirical material. Interpretive reconstruction starts with the data collection, for 
then to seek out theories and terms that provides the best interpretation and understanding of 
the data (Bukve, 2016, p. 88). This method of data collection would also further the result-
explanatory process analysis, as it allows room for interpretation and contextual analyses.  
In order to create better grounds for a comparison of the different preparedness plans, 
three questions that address different aspects of the research question was included. The first, 
‘What were the main reason for the implementation or revision of the current Norwegian 
pandemic preparedness plans?’ explores and seeks to find an explanation for why there was a 
need for a new or revised preparedness plan. The second, ‘Is it possible to detect a path 
dependent decision making in the creation of the pandemic preparedness plans?’ aims to 
point out the historical aspects that may have guided the different decisions made in the 
preparedness plans, e.g. measures, coordination efforts, or the general content. The third, 
‘How do the pandemic preparedness plans allow for autonomy or deviation from the 
established ‘paths’ of crisis management in order to solve an unforeseen event?’ seeks to 
determine the flexibility and room for manoeuver the different plans allow. As mentioned in 
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the previous chapter, flexibility and improvisation plays a major role in the management of a 
crisis. In addition, an analysis of the findings in these plans would also require us to view the 
preparedness plans in their context, and in their entirety. The three questions are included in 
order to create points of comparison between the preparedness plans.  
 
4.4 DATA QUALITY 
The collected data need to be able to answer or explain the study’s research question, and 
depending on which questions the researcher seeks to explain, the quality of the data can vary 
greatly within one source, as the researcher selects and choses the information that is most 
relevant for the research. Its suitability is dependent on a variety of conditions, which can be 
explored through validity and reliability assessments (Grønmo, 2016, pp. 240-242), which 
measures the quality of the research design (Yin, 2018, pp. 42-47) 
The validity tests the quality of the empirical social research against the research 
question (Bordens & Abbott, 2014, pp. 111-117; Grønmo, 2016, pp. 241-243; Yin, 2018, pp. 
42-47) and can be divided into two tests that create an overview of the internal and external 
validity. The validity tests examines how the data selection is discussed, if they are relevant 
for the research and provides a valid overview, and if they are the ‘right’ documents for the 
research. One can achieve high validity if the collected data result in empirics that is relevant 
to the research question, and the researchers’ intentions for the case design. The data used in 
this thesis is based on a selection of five preparedness plans, and the intention behind using 
them is to establish whether they show signs of previous pandemic crisis in their suggested 
measures and management strategies.  
As this thesis is an explanatory study based on the premise that historical events have 
contributed in creating path dependent preparedness plans and crisis management, internal 
validity becomes an important test (see: Yin, 2018, p. 45). Internal validity is “seeking to 
establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other 
conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 2018, p. 42) whilst being 
aware that causal relations could be interpreted as causal by the researcher, e.g. in cases where 
there might not be a causal relationship. Correlations could also come from other sources or 
factors not explored (Swanborn, 2010, p. 36). Therefore, an examination would need to be 
made on whether there is a connection between the theoretical models of this thesis, and the 
observational patterns and data – and if it is possible to come up with a theoretical model that 
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can explain the observed correlations (Bukve, 2016, p. 100). One of the perquisite that need to 
be present in order to draw conclusions on causes and causal mechanisms, is that there is 
enough relevant data available (Collier, 2011, p. 825). 
As the data collection in this thesis solely consists of document analysis, one of the 
challenges concerning the internal validity is that there is an interpretation of causality on 
issues that can be explained using different methods. The pandemic preparedness is also 
influenced by other crises, and the subsequent evaluation of the crisis management and 
pandemic preparedness – e.g. after the terrorist attack in Norway in 2011, or the 2004 
Sumatra-Andaman earthquake – have made it necessary to include data on the most important 
events that have affected the Norwegian crisis management. Similar to the process tracing 
tests provided by Collier in point 4.1, incorrectly assuming that there is a relationship between 
previous pandemics events and contemporary pandemic preparedness plans, without knowing 
if any other non-pandemic events really caused the change to the preparedness plans, would 
weaken the internal validity of this thesis. I have sought to make no such assumptions, and I 
have been open for other explanations on how the current crisis management and pandemic 
preparedness came to be. In order to ensure that a conclusion would be able to account for 
these alternate explanations, four analytical tactics – pattern matching, explanation building, 
addressing rival explanations, and using logic models – are utilised in the following chapters 
to ensure that the research question and selected preparedness plans have a valid connection.  
The selected documents fits within the research question and the theme of this thesis, 
as they all concern the Norwegian pandemic preparedness. They are selected from a larger 
sample of data in order to ensure that no important documents have been overlooked in the 
process. To ensure that the documents have not been viewed out of context, previous editions 
of the specific preparedness plans, if any, have been included as a historical context in the 
analysis. The plans that have been superseded by newer editions of the plan have not been 
analysed, but they have been used as part of the analysis in order to create a better 
understanding of the path dependent process.  
In a case-study design, external validity is measured by whether the results are 
theoretically or strategically representative. External validity is “showing whether and how a 
case study’s findings can be generalised” (Yin, 2018, p. 42). It also express whether the 
results of an experiment is realistic and can be generalised to ordinary societal situations, so 
that the validity of the conclusion on casual relationships is not merely valid under 
constructed research conditions (Bukve, 2016, p. 100; Grønmo, 2016, p. 254). 
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  It  would be useful to examine whether the preparedness plans in the health and care 
sector are guided by the same principles as preparedness plans in other areas, for instance in 
the Defence sector as part of the external validity test. As mentioned in chapter 3, the 
Norwegian societal security is based on the principles of liability, proximity, conformity, and 
collaboration, but does the interpretation of these principles vary from one sector to another? 
Alternatively, is the observation a general understanding of what preparedness is, instead of a 
more sector-specific definition? Whether it would be possible to generalise the processes that 
led to the creation of the preparedness plans, or if it only applicable to this one case, would be 
an interesting aspect for further analysis. If the development of the pandemic preparedness 
plans and crisis management turns out to be unusual, while there being signs of generalizable 
patterns, the external validity of this thesis could be strengthened. However, it would prove to 
be a tiresome exercise to agree upon a common understanding of what is universally valid in 
social scientific studies, which weakens the potential for generalisation and makes the 
conclusion contextually conditioned.  
In addition to the validity test, a reliability test would also need to be included in order to 
assess the quality of the collected data. To what degree can the data be trusted? Is it possible 
to repeat the data collection procedure and get the same results? Reliability speaks of the 
‘trustworthiness’ of a study, with the objective to ensure that if a researchers were to conduct 
the study again, the researcher would arrive at similar conclusions or findings (Bordens & 
Abbott, 2014, p. 126; Bukve, 2016, p. 101; Grønmo, 2016, pp. 240-243; Swanborn, 2010, p. 
36; Yin, 2018). Testing reliability in qualitative studies such as this, would usually prove to be 
an impossible task by using standardised test, though it could be made possible to establish an 
empirical foundation in order to assess reliability (Grønmo, 2016, pp. 248-249). A high level 
of reliability sets requirements for the process of selecting documents, and the subsequent 
interpretation of them. The data collection process has been carried out systematically in order 
for the study to be credible and reliable, in accordance with the assumptions and procedures 
that were established in the case design (Grønmo, 2016, p. 249). Since the thesis is based on 
publicly available data, and information on how it has been used is provided, it contributes to 
strengthen the reliability of this thesis. The documents have been analysed as they are, and it 
is possible for others to collect the documents, and analyse them in an equal manner and then 




4.5 ON THE METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES IN THIS THESIS 
The selected preparedness plans are relevant to the research question, and the path dependent 
processes behind the creation and alterations of these plans becomes apparent when including 
previous editions of the documents. The documents are well suited to answer the research 
question, as well as the three sub-questions. In addition to solely relying on the content of 
these plans, it would be possible to supplement the data by sending a survey to the different 
directorates and ministries, in order to establish whether they know about the content of the 
plans, the importance of the plans, and whether they are relevant in the overall preparedness 
strategies. However, since the plans have extensively been used and referenced to during the 
last 12 months, it remains uncertain whether these plans were as visible or known before the 
beginning of 2020.  
Additionally, other methodological choices could be used in this thesis, in order to create 
a different direction of the case study. Such choices could have affected the data collection 
process, and perhaps contributed to the desired, overall understanding of the theme and topic. 
Instead of choosing an explanatory process analysis, a decision could be made to follow a 
theory developing process analysis instead, which would have contributed to the theory 
development on the societal security area, that have not yet been properly established. 
however, I believe that this submission would prove itself useful for further research on the 
area of crisis management and preparedness, as it is combining two theories and perspectives 
that usually are not used together on this research area. 
In process-tracing studies, careful descriptions are fundamental for the quality of the 
research, since it, at its core, analyses sequences and trajectories of causation and change. If 
the observed phenomena were not described adequately in each step of its path, the analysis 
would surely fail. Therefore, description becomes an important building block for studying 
processes (Collier, 2011, p. 823; Mahoney, 2010, pp. 125-131). Following, lacking 
descriptions could complicate the process tracing study, and the thesis would be less valid as a 
result. I have included all descriptions that were of interest to the research, but there is always 
a chance that my subjectivity or interpretation could have nudge this thesis in a specific 
direction. As a result, measures have been implemented in the data collection process and in 




5. PREPARING FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC 
The precondition for all societies that successfully have been able to prevent spiking infection 
rates in its population, have been to plan and prepare for future infectious disease outbreaks. 
Both domestic and international infectious outbreaks have influenced the amendment, 
continuation, or drafting of the selected preparedness plans. The most notable pandemics and 
epidemics in recent times that have influenced the crisis management strategies in these plans 
are the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), the epidemic Ebola virus outbreaks, the epidemic Zika virus outbreak, and the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic influenzas (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2019, p. 5). Additionally, 
experiences made from previous pandemics, such as the 1918/19 H1N1, 1957 A/H2N2, and 
the 1968 A/H3N2, have also contributed to shaping the management strategies in these five 
plans.  
This chapter seeks to create an understanding of the underlying reasons for the 
creation of the preparedness plans, investigate the provided information in the different plans, 
in addition to the suggested strategies for managing infectious outbreaks. Following, all five 
pandemic preparedness plans involve strategies on preparedness and management in the case 
of an outbreak of infectious diseases. The examination will include information on the 
triggering factors that sparked a need for changes in the current plans – or the need to create 
new plans. Sources as white papers, NOU’s, propositions, hearings, or government documents 
have been included in the research and examination of the preparedness plans, in order to 
further contribute to an analysis of the data, by using a the theories of path dependency and 
crisis management. This will allow us to observe, if any, emerging patterns of self-
reinforcement in the area of societal security and preparedness.  
Amendments to existing plans, alterations, or the implementation of new plans that 
took place after 1st January 2020, will not be included in this thesis, as the framework is 
limited to the preparedness level in place before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. This 
decision establishes an overview of the preparedness plans in place at the start of the 
pandemic, and thus allows an opportunity for future researchers to evaluate the measures in 
place before the start of the Corona pandemic and connect them to measures implemented 
during the pandemic.  
The selected preparedness plans for this thesis are all part of the national framework 
for health and care related emergency preparedness and crisis management. The plans are 
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divided into hierarchical levels of importance and the plans concern both general health 
related preparedness, and specific measures to counter various communicable diseases and 
infectious outbreaks.  
After presenting a summary of relevant material from each preparedness plan, a summary 
of the most relevant findings from each plan will be included. Three questions will also be 
utilised in the data collection of the five preparedness plans (described in chapter 4.3), in 
order to provide a better basis for analysis in the following chapter. The first two sub-
questions will be covered in the ‘findings’ subchapter, while the last sub-question will be 
discussed in point 5.8.  
References made in the specific preparedness plans for each sub chapter, will only show 
the page number of the source; however, all other sources will be included as usual. 
 
5.1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT, PREPAREDNESS PLANS, AND REGULATIONS  
Experienced threats and the ‘closeness’ of threatening events play a vital part in shaping the 
Norwegian crisis management. Even though it is know that a particular event might be 
eminent or a ‘most-likely scenario’, if it is not perceived as urgent by policy-makers or the 
population at large, other pressing policy areas are more likely to be prioritised. The WHO 
listed influenza pandemics as one of the 10 threats to global health as late as 2019 (World 
Health Organization, 2019), and have done so since the second publication of the World 
Health Report in 1996 (World Health Organization, 1996). Similarly, several Norwegian 
organisations have emphasised the impending threat of an outbreak of a pandemic influenza 
in the near future, e.g. in the DSB’s ‘Crisis Scenario Analysis of 2019’ (AKS). As pandemics 
represent ‘unknown unknowns”, flaws to the crisis management and preparedness only 
become visible once they are tested in real life situations. Therefore, learning and evaluation 
processes become increasingly important after such incidents as the quality of this learning 
potentially could affect future management of similar crisis.  
 
5.2 THE CREATION AND REVISION OF THE PLANS 
Table 2 presents an overview of the processes behind the creation of the plans, and the 
triggering factor (shown in light blue, second row from the top). The top row contains the 
name of the plan, in addition to the organisation that wrote it.  
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plan in 1999 
Royal decree of 
24th June 2005 
27.05.2005 
By the JBD 
St. Meld nr. 37 
(2004-2005). 
13.08.2012 
By the 22nd July Commission 
NOU 2012 : 14 
09.12.2016 
By the JBD 
Meld. St. 10 
(2016–2017) 
January 2001 





name in 2012 
09.06.2005  




By the JBD 
Meld. St. 29 
(2011-2012) 
20.03.2013 
































3rd edition published 
June 2013 
16 risk analysis 




By the HOD 









By the ECDC and HOD 






fire in tunnel 
02.06.2014 
By the HOD 
2nd ed. NHPP 
05.06.2013 
DSB tasked to map risks in 
society, Part I of report was 
completed 
Report Part I delivered to JBD 
06.01.2014 
02.12.2019 




Report from DSB, focus 





New name in 
2017 
09.12.2016 
By the JBD 
Meld. St. 10 (2016–
2017) 
26.06.2014 
HOD, JBD, and MD 
mandated the DSB to lead 
risk-analysis group for Part II 








Draft for strategy and report 
Part II and III delivered 
 08.03.2013 
By the HOD 






Strategy for CBRNE events 
published 
 14.05.2013 




By the HOD 
3rd ed. NHPP 
  03.06.2013 
Approved 
 
   16.12.2014 
4th edition published 
 
                                                 
9 Report by ECDC and Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services (2008, p. 4) that point out further 
improvements to the pandemic preparedness.  
10 The specialised theme from the report by Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap (2008) was on 
pandemic influenza 
11 A revised plan was suggested used in the 2009 pandemic, but it was decided against, as the HOD had not yet 
processed the new plan (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2010, pp. 34-35). 
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Table 2 does not only trace the processes behind the creation of the plans, but also 
demonstrate the connection to previous events or policies that have contributed to shaping the 
overall preparedness in Norway. It provides an overview of connected the connected 
processes that were a big part of how the plans came to be, and the previous decisions that 
shaped the content of the different plans. Additionally, the blue field, second from the top, 
provides the triggering cause at the start of the path. For instance, the terrorist attack on the 
22nd July 2011 would prove to be one of the significant events behind the creation of the 
CBRNE, similarly as the OSID would be heavily influenced by the outbreak of Ebola in West 
Africa between 2014 and 2015, in addition to the creation of the CBRNE strategy. This table 
is to be read top-down, where impactful events are listed chronologically.  
 
5.3 NATIONAL HEALTH PREPAREDNESS PLAN (NHPP)  
Produced by HOD, (Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2018b)  
The NHPP is an overall framework that defines the different roles and responsibilities of all 
actors involved in the preparedness work and crisis management, including their mandate on 
the preparedness of the health and care sector (p. 4) in all types of health related crises. The 
NHPP presents the legal framework that guide this, and every other preparedness plan or 
strategy, role distribution among actors and their responsibilities, scenario-based tasks, in 
addition to providing advice on preventative measures and the general preparedness. 
International coordination and collaboration efforts are also included in this document. Some 
of the information provided in this document is unconsidered for further analysis, due to its 
relevancy for this thesis, as the NHPP it contains guidelines on all health-related crisis 
scenarios.  
The HOD is responsible for this preparedness plan, and the third edition from 2018 is 
the most recent publication of this document. The first edition came in effect on 31st January 
2007, and was as a response to the 2004 Sumatra–Andaman earthquake. It became painfully 
apparent during this natural disaster, that Norway needed new preparedness strategies in order 
to accommodate the growing need for improved crisis management in times of crisis. An 
updated second edition came in effect on the 2nd June 2014, and included improved guidelines 
for cooperation efforts, based on experiences made from previous crises. The NHPP lists the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic, the volcanic eruption on Iceland in 2010, the nuclear disaster in Japan 
in March 2011, the terrorist attack in Norway on 22nd July 2011, the Dagmar hurricane in 
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2011, and the terrorist attack against Statoil in Algeria in January 2013, as events that 
prompted the changes to be implemented to the second edition (Helse- og 
Omsorgsdepartementet, 2014b, p. 4).   
The NHPP and every other preparedness plan follows Norwegian legislation, such as 
the HSP, the CCD, and other related laws and regulations. The preparedness plans are 
structured hierarchically, and the HSP is the overarching plan in the preparedness framework. 
Other preparedness plans, which are more specific in order to manage certain incidents, all 
follow the generalised guidelines set by the NHPP.  
Changes in the third edition of the NHPP ensures that the general principles behind the 
emergency preparedness, to a larger degree, have been implemented in the plan. Arenas for 
cooperation are highlighted, the description of the status of the various preparedness plans 
have been improved, and the dependencies on infrastructure and medical resources have been 
emphasised. The NHPP builds on previous experiences from exercises and real-world events, 
such as the increased international and domestic terrorist threat in the summer of 2014, the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014-2015, and increased asylum-seeking immigration in 
2015-2016 (p.4).   
The NHPP is comprised of ten chapters, and divided into four themes. It starts by 
presenting involved actors, the regulatory framework, and it describes how collaboration 
across national and international actors can be organised. It then presents specialised 
preparedness plans, before it moves on to crisis management. A summary of the most relevant 
information will be included and further discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis.  
Chapter 1 in the NHPP start by introducing the background and reason behind the 
establishment of the document, while Chapter 2 covers the legal framework for preparedness 
planning. Chapter 3 starts with presenting an overview of relevant reports, analysis, and 
responsibilities, which the health and care sector is expected to be familiar with, such as the 
‘The Overall Risk and Vulnerability Assessments for National Preparedness in the Health and 
Care Sector (ORV)’ published by HDIR, the AKS and “Vital functions in society” published 
by the DSB, in addition to the White Paper “Meld. St. 10 (2016-2017)” (p.10- 11). HDIR has 
the responsibility to plan and carry out a bi-annual national exercise event for the health and 
care sector – the most recent exercise being carried out in 2018, and was a cross-sectoral 
training event called Trident Juncture.  
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Chapter 4 describes the different role and responsibilities of relevant actors, while 
Chapter 5 describes the role and responsibilities of the different Directorates and how cross-
sectoral collaboration should be implemented and conducted. Chapter 6 outlines the 
international collaboration between Norway and various organisations in the case of a border-
crossing event, such as a pandemic. Norway participates in international collaboration where 
prevention, monitoring, detection and response, and disease management, are key 
preparedness components, in addition to being part of a Nordic agreement that ensures the 
exchange of information in times of crisis, and during threatening events, among the Nordic 
countries.  
HOD, HDRI, and NIPH are the three main actors in charge of the preparedness 
strategies on a government level, particularly in the case of a pandemic outbreak. HOD is 
responsible for the overall national health preparedness, and govern the responsibility through 
local and national regulations, laws, and supervisory efforts. The minister of HOD also has 
ministerial responsibility, and is therefore responsible for everything that happens in the 
health and care sector, in a downward-pointing vertical organisational line.  
HDIR is responsible for the national health preparedness based in its role. The task of 
the directorate is to ensure the upholding of collaboration between actors in the health and 
care sector, and between other sectors, to maintain its advisory role, implement policy, and 
manage regulation. HDIR provide guidelines and guidance to municipalities through the state 
administrator, and facilitate exercises and competence development. The HDIR is, after 
delegation from the HOD, to be responsible for national coordination efforts in the health and 
care sector, and tasked to implement necessary measures when a crisis threatens or has 
occurred. HDIR also has the ability to implement such coordination efforts without having 
conferred with HOD first, if the situation calls for it. HDIR chairs the ‘pandemic and 
epidemic committee’, which is an advisory body to HDIR and NIPH (p. 14), in addition to 
chairing the ‘Health Contingency Council’ that is tasked to ensure increased collaboration 
between the civil and military sector in times of crisis. HDIR is also responsible for 
collaboration and communication with NGOs and lower-lever government agencies.  
The NIPH is a national advisory organisation for the health and care sector. NIPH is 
tasked with the supervision of communicable diseases, detect and response strategies, the 
national vaccine preparedness, the national vaccination register, and to act as a point of 
contact with international organisations, such as the IHR, WHO, EWRS, and EU. NIPH 
should provide aid and counselling to municipals, counties, and other national organisations if 
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necessary, as well as provide information on communicable infectious diseases and infection 
control measures to healthcare workers and the population at large. NIPH have an advisory 
role to the HDRI, where they provide professional advice should it be required or necessary.  
In addition to these three government organisations, different competence 
organisations are also part of the crisis management and preparedness at a national level. One 
of these is the CBRNE centre (p.19), which is tasked to conduct research on the CBRNE area, 
increasing knowledge and responsiveness, strengthening cooperation and collaboration 
between first responders and high-risk responders, and the coordination and management of a 
national medical team for high-risk infectious disease patients.  
In addition to generic preparedness plans, more specialised plans are also part of the 
preparedness framework. Chapter 7 list ‘mass-injury events’, ‘CBRNE-events’, ‘plans and 
systems to reduce vulnerability and dependencies’, and ‘armed conflicts and war’ as the most 
probable threats against Norway. Pandemics and epidemics are mentioned in the CBRNE-
preparedness section as B-events – i.e. evets that include a biological agent – and emphasises 
the crisis management responsibilities established by the CCD.  Chapter 8, 9, and 10 focus on 
crisis management and the different roles each actor or organisation has in the case of a crisis, 
in addition to national and international detection systems.  
Noticeable changes have been made from the second edition to the third edition in the 
NHPP.  The third edition from 2018 has a more specified focus on armed conflicts, terror 
incidents, and decreasing dependencies. The second edition of the NHPP from 2014 focussed 
more on communicable infections, as mentioned in the sub-chapter 4.0 in the NHPP, e.g.‘4.2 
preparedness against bioterror’, ‘control of communicable diseases and pandemic 
preparedness’, and ‘4.3 preparedness against acute pollution and chemical incidents’ 
whereas no such chapters had been dedicated to pandemic preparedness in the third edition . 
However, with the renewal of the NHPP in 2018, more specified plans had already been 
implemented, and the need to include further management strategies in the NHPP may not 
have been necessary. Additionally, there were no major outbreaks of communicable disease in 
Norway between 2014 and 2018, which may have contributed to a lack of ‘sensed threat’ that 
in turn caused a lack of experienced urgency on the area. 
However, findings from the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise demonstrated that despite 
the NHPP being an overall framework, the plan was to a lesser degree an operational plan. 
Therefore, the HDIR are considering the need to develop a new operational plan that could fill 
the gap between NHPP and other preparedness plans (Helsedirektoratet, 2019a, p. 34).  The 
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ORV have also pointed to the need for a more uniform use of central terms and definitions 
within the preparedness sector (Helsedirektoratet, 2019a, p. 34). The focus on terror threats 
and other mass-injury events appears to be the main focus of the 2018 edition, which might be 
further supported by the national exercise event Trident Juncture from 2018, which was a 
collaborative exercise held with the military (Dale, 2019). However, the White Paper Meld. 
St. 10 (2016–2017) (p. 99) emphasises that an analysis of the most severe scenarios that could 
affect Norway have estimated that a pandemic was the most likely event to occur, that would 
also have the biggest societal consequences. 
As mentioned in the NHPP, experiences made from various natural disasters, the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic, and the heightened terrorist threat, contributed to the need to update the 
second edition of the plan.  However, updates in the third edition of the plan were mostly 
implemented as a response to natural disasters and to domestic and international terrorist 
attacks, and not based on the high likelihood of a new pandemic. Some of the more important 
improvements made in the third edition, was for instance to further enhance the cross-sectoral 
cooperation and coordination efforts.  
 
5.4 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CBRNE-PREPAREDNESS 2016-2020 (CBRNE) 
Produced by JBD, HOD, MD, (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet et al., 2016a)  
The CBRNE strategy was presented by JBD, HOD, and MD, based on a draft on a cross-
sectoral report (Part III) for a strategy on 1st September 2015. A decision was made to 
evaluate the CBRNE strategy at the end of the four-year period in 2020, as the area is in 
continuous development. This evaluation was meant to create the basis for further revisions 
and changes to the work on preparedness on dangerous substances and communicable 
diseases (Justis- og Beredskapsdepartementet, Helse- og Omsorgsdepartementet, & 
Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016b). The CBRNE plan is intended to be used at a central 
government level, but municipal and county officials are expected to base their local CBRNE 
strategy on this plan.  
 The CBRNE strategy need to be viewed in context with the preceding reports that 
have laid the foundation for this strategy. The DSB was tasked in assignment letter 10 on the 
5th August 2013 to complete report Part I, which was sent to the JBD on the 6th January 2014 
(Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2014a, p. 5). On the 26th June 2014, the 
JBD, HOD, and MD mandated the DSB to lead a project group to describe and analyse the 
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preparedness status on the CBRNE area, i.e. reveal weaknesses and challenges. This work 
was presented in three reports, and the findings was compiled in Part I and Part II. The 
analysis from Part II was later used as a foundation for Part III, which would in turn lead to 
the CBRNE strategy of 2016 (Helsedirektoratet et al., 2015, p. 13). Due to the complexity of 
the academic work, it was decided that Part II and III were to be delivered to the JBD on 1st 
September 2015, 6-4 months after their original deadline (Helsedirektoratet et al., 2015, p. 
14).  
The CBRNE strategy originated from the white papers Meld. St. 29 (2011–2012), and 
the Meld. St. 21 (2012–2013) – which followed-up the discoveries made in the NOU 2012: 14 
(2012) report – where CBRN events were presented as situations that required increased 
preparedness in regards to possible future terrorist attacks, though pointed out that biological 
agents rarely had been utilised in terrorist attacks in the past (p.26). The Meld. St. 21 (2012-
2013) was the first white paper that proposed a draft of a CBRNE strategy, as it continued the 
perspective on societal security provided in Meld. St. 29 (2011–2012). The Meld. St. 21 
(2012–2013) (p. 11) stated that the government would develop a national strategy for dealing 
with attacks by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear substances, which constitutes 
the task of the CBRNE preparedness. Further, the DSB was tasked on behalf of the JBD, to 
prepare a national strategy for emergency preparedness against CBRN events. The strategy 
covers both undesirable misguiding incidents and major accidents where such substances are 
involved (Meld. St. 21 (2012–2013), Chapters 8.18, 8.2).  
The CBRNE preparedness plan was developed in order to improve the capacity to 
prevent and manage CBRNE-events. Currently, Norway is able to counteract and manage 
smaller, day-to-day events, which made this preparedness plan focus on events that can cause 
a greater extent of damage, and that would require extraordinary emergency resources in 
addition to collaboration and coordination between several actors. The CBRNE plan 
emphasises the importance of preparation and on the day-to-day preparedness for smaller 
events, which acts as a cornerstone in the Norwegian crisis management. Preparedness and 
crisis management should also be built on, and adapted to, local preparedness plans, which 
can be supplemented with regional and national capacities if necessary (p.3).  
The CBRNE strategy is the result of three rounds of reports, and consequently, does 
not go into depth on each measure. The strategy is divided into seven chapters, which 
addresses responsibilities, management of events, main challenges, goals for the strategy, 
main priorities and measures, and economic and administrative consequences. In order to 
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establish a better basis for further analysis, government documents, NOU’s, white papers, and 
the report for Part II of the CBRNE preparedness have been included in the following section.  
CBRNE is a classification of possible events, which includes (c) chemical substances, 
(b) biological agents, (r) radioactive substances, (n) nuclear materials, and (e) explosives. This 
thesis will only consider the parts on the management of biological agents in the preparedness 
plan. Biological events are defined in the CBRNE strategy as an agent that can cause sickness 
caused by microbes (viruses, bacteria, fungi, toxins), which has the ability to spread through 
the air, surfaces, through human interaction, from animals and insects to humans, or between 
animals (p.4). HOD is responsible for coordination and crisis management if a biological 
event were to occur. The B events are, in part, based on the previous experiences with the 
Norwegian Ebola patient in 2014, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, food-born e-coli outbreaks in 
2006 and 2009, the legionella outbreak in Østfold in 2005, and the giardia lamblia outbreak in 
Bergen in 2004 (Meld. St. 10 (2016–2017), pp. 100-101).  
Chapter 1 states the intention of the plan, which is to further develop Norway’s ability 
to prevent and manage large CBRNE events. Chapter 2 states the responsibility of the 
different ministries in each of the five categories: JBD is responsible for C and E events in 
civilian cases, but not in schemes established within acute pollution, where the Ministry of 
Transport and the Norwegian Coastal Administration have separate roles. HOD is responsible 
for B events, in addition to the RN events in civilian cases. The Ministry of Climate and 
Environment is in charge of the crisis management in situations with acute radioactive 
pollution. The MD is responsible for the entire CBRNE preparedness in the defence sector. 
The principles of liability, proximity, conformity, and collaboration are the foundation 
for collaboration between ministries, directorates, and regions in the CBRNE preparedness, in 
addition to the central crisis management (p.5). The CBRNE strategy points out that in cases 
with unwanted events, an overall coordination from central governments will always be 
required. Chapter 4 points to the challenges emergency responders face in larger CBRNE 
events, as they have been unable to train and prepare for such events. The complexity of such 
incidents could also be significantly greater than day-to-day accidents (p.6). In these cases, 
the central government would need to provide resources and competences to support local 
actors, and it is vital that all actors quickly gain a common situational understanding. The 
chapter further stress the means in which technology and international trade could provide 
information on how to produce CBRNE agents for terrorist attacks or weapons. It further note 
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that import and export control, in addition to other preventative measures, contributes to 
preventing unauthorised people from getting their hands on CBRNE materials (p.7)  
In order to be more prepared for B-events, it is suggested that there should be regular, 
formal meetings on coordination, prevention, preparedness strategies, and improved 
management within and between sectors (p.9). Suggested measures are to update the NHPP, 
and to establish a cross-sectoral collaborative arena for prevention, preparedness, and 
management of B-events on a directorate level under HOD. HOD would also include 
coordinative efforts in the ‘National Emergency Preparation Plan against Outbreaks of Severe 
Infectious Diseases’ (OSID), and establish a cross-sectoral arena for collaboration, 
prevention, preparedness, and management of future crisis (p.10). HOD would also have the 
responsibility to strengthen the National Preparedness Plan for Pandemic Influenza (PPI), 
which include continuity planning, and domestic and international collaboration for 
prevention, monitoring, notification, and management (p12).  
One of the most prominent reasons behind the creation of the CBRNE strategy, is 
implied to the increased threats of terrorist attacks, as the strategy is based on the white papers 
on societal security and terror preparedness (Meld. St. 21 (2012–2013); Meld. St. 29 (2011–
2012)) that was adapted as a response to the poor crisis management on the 22nd July 2011. 
Additionally, there is a considerable focus on the prevention of CBRNE-related terrorist 
attacks, even in case of B-events. As the strategy is based on three reports, the information it 
contains, and the reason behind it, is lacking. It would have been possible to connect this 
strategy more closely to additional documents on the creation process, and to risk analyses 
made prior to this strategy. Nevertheless, other documents that aid in the explanation behind 
the creation of this strategy are drafts or descriptions of analysis that were the precursor to the 
adopted CBRNE strategy.  
 The responsibilities in the CBRNE strategy are based on the lines of responsibility 
provided in the NHPP, and though it calls for increased cross-sectoral collaboration, it does 
not mention how such a collaboration could be organised or carried out. Challenges listed on 
B-events are, for the most part, limited to acknowledging possible challenges. The chapter on 
measures for improvements do not address these challenges any further. DSBs evaluations of 
the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak and the 2009 H1N1 pandemics have also pointed to the need 
for increased cross-sectoral collaboration on crisis management in order to be able to more 
efficiently manage B-events (p.9). The strategy does not contain specific measures in the case 
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of a B-event, but rather focus on the framework and tasks that would need to be improved in 
advance.  
 
5.5 NATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPARATION PLAN AGAINST OUTBREAKS 
OF SEVERE INFECTIOUS DISEASES (OSID) 
Produced by HOD, (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2019) 
As a follow up on the national strategy for CBRNE-preparedness of 2016-2020, the HOD 
drafted the OSID in 2018 to further develop the preparedness against biological factors and to 
establish Norway’s cross-sectoral collaboration for the prevention of communicable diseases, 
increase preparedness, and the management of biological threats on a national level. The plan 
was finished and subsequently published in 2019. The Mandate for the Emergency 
Preparedness Committee against Biological Incidents with Counselling and Coordination at a 
Regional Level (BBH) was also established at the same time as the OSID. The OSID and 
BBH are built on experiences from previous events and exercises, and the purpose was to 
prevent sickness and spiking mortality rates in the population, and to facilitate the 
continuation of important societal functions throughout all sectors (Helse- og 
omsorgsdepartementet, 2018a). The OSID is primarily a tool developed for leaders, doctors, 
and healthcare personnel in the primary and specialist healthcare service; nevertheless, it is 
still a useful tool for other sectors (p.5). The OSID is a disease specific plan and is 
supplementary to the NHPP and the current legislation (see Figure 3 on p. 45). 
Additionally, the OCC distinguish between general communicable diseases and other 
infectious diseases. Severe infectious diseases are, in most cases, defined as a general 
communicable disease and hence covered by the regulation on general communicable 
diseases (p.6). With this definition, certain provisions in the OCC becomes applicable, e.g. 
disease tracing, free medical assistance, forced treatments, and other control measures to 
prevent the spread of the disease (Smittevernloven, 1994, § 1-3).  
The OSID addresses the significant threat communicable diseases poses on society 
and the global public health. It lists some of the biggest reasons for why infectious diseases 
have become more frequent – and have a spread easier – in the last decades, which is due to 
increased population growth, climate changes, urbanisation, increased cross-border travel 
activity, and a shared international food market. The plan further points to the outbreak of 
SARS, MERS, pandemic influenza, the Ebola outbreaks, and the Zikavirus, as communicable 
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infections that have demanded a considerable preparedness effort in Norway. Domestic 
outbreaks of E.coli, legionella, and giardia lamblia have also revealed the importance of 
maintaining and improving the preparedness for communicable diseases outbreaks (p.5), as 
pointed out in the CBRNE plan.  
The OSID defines severe infectious disease as diseases that can cause high mortality 
rates and requires extensive measures (p.7). The NIPH is responsible for determining whether 
there is an outbreak of a severe infectious disease or not. Outbreaks of a biological nature are 
classified in four different Bio Safety Levels (p.9); the first level being an outbreak of a 
biological factor that usually do not causes illness in humans. The second is a biological 
factor that can cause infection in humans, but have a low chance of spreading to society, and 
where effective preventative measures or treatments are available. The third is a biological 
factor that can cause a severe infection in humans, and that can cause a real threat to workers. 
There is a high probability for it to spread through society and there is usually no effective 
preventative measures available. The fourth level is a biological factor that causes a severe 
infection in humans and pose a serious threat to workers, with a high probability to spread to 
the rest of society. There usually is no effective preventative measures available. The term 
‘high risk disease’ is oftentimes used to describe this fourth level, and implies an infectious 
disease that easily spreads between humans, and is associated with high mortality rates, where 
there normally is no effective treatments available. 
Chapter 3 of the OSID states the goals, strategies, principles, and the organising of the 
preparedness plan. The aim of this plan is to; prevent and limit the spread of communicable 
disease and sickness in the population, prevent fatalities, improve treatment and care for the 
afflicted or dying, maintain trust and safety in society through knowledge-based and 
comprehensive information and guides to the population and all sectors, and to maintain 
necessary operative functions in all sectors. The preventative strategies for outbreaks of 
severe infectious diseases varies according to the type of outbreak, but usually contain: 
monitoring, detection systems, and creating an overview of the situation through reporting, 
general infection control measures, vaccination, medical treatment of the sick, isolation and 
quarantine, and if necessary, the restructuring and reallocation of resources in order to 
increase capacity. Chapter 5 further elaborates on the general measures available with the 
outbreak of a severe infectious disease (p.19), and the legal framework for each measure. The 
measures to reduce infection rates in the population is hygiene measures (cough and hand 
sanitary measures, the use of personal protective equipment, and environmental sanitary 
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measures), isolating affected individuals or groups, and limit activities (prevent large 
gatherings and travel restrictions) (p.22).   
Chapter 6 addresses the communication perspective of infectious diseases, and 
establishes roles and responsibilities, coordination, target groups and documentation. Chapter 
7 has a short section on ethical challenges, chapter 8 on psychological support, chapter 9 on 
economic and administrative conditions, and chapter 10 on exercises and training events. 
Chapter 11 focus on international collaboration, e.g. the EU and WHO, in addition to 
collaboration within the Nordic agreement. Most of the content from chapter 7-10 is covered 
by other strategies or plans.  
The OSID was based on previous disease outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics, such 
as the Ebola outbreaks (Meld. St. 10 (2016–2017), p. 104), the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, measles 
outbreak (see: p.22-23) and the Zika virus. Several domestic outbreaks of infectious food-
borne diseases such as E.coli have also pointed to the need for good preparedness plans. The 
OSID was also a plan that followed-up on the B-section of the CBRNE preparedness, and 
went into detail on specific measures during an outbreak of a severely infectious disease. In 
comparison, the CBRNE plan does not go into details on the specific measures, but rather task 
various ministries with different areas of responsibility. The most important infection-
reducing measures is hygiene measures, isolating the sick, and the limitation of activity.  
 The OSID is the only preparedness plan that has included comprehensive definitions 
and concepts of the most important terms in health and care related preparedness. Generally, 
there is a lack of good definitions in the preparedness plans, which could lead to a poor 
situations understanding or misunderstandings in the early phases of a crisis or complex 
emergency. The need for a uniform use of key concepts within the sector, but also between 
sectors, have been pointed out by various plans, analysis, or strategies (Helsedirektoratet, 
2019a, p. 34), as good communication relies on a common understanding of each other’s 
terminology, references, contexts, and words. Good definitions and a common terminology 
could also make it easier to collaborate and coordinate with other actors or organisations, 
because it could help increase the understanding of the situation, and highlight the specific 





5.6 NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PLAN FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (PPI) 
Produced by HOD, (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2014a) 
The fourth, and latest, edition of the National Preparedness Plan for Pandemic Influenza (PPI) 
was published in 2014 and has not been updated since. As a result, it is the oldest 
preparedness plan examined in this thesis. Paradoxically, the PPI calls for the need to keep 
updated preparedness plans and strategies for pandemic preparedness (p. 32, 44) in the health 
and care sector. The ‘pandemics committee’ is tasked to annually review whether a revision if 
the PPI is necessary (p.17), and since no revisions have yet to be carried out, some of the 
information could be deemed as outdated, e.g. parts that reference to the implementation of 
new preparedness plans that existed at the end of 2019. Nevertheless, it is the most 
comprehensive preparedness plan in this essay, and covers goals, measures, actors, generic 
literature on the area, and the like.  
The PPI was first established in 2001 by HOD, and was based on the suggestions 
made by the WHO after publishing the WHO Influenza pandemic plan in 1999. The second 
edition came in 2003, and the revision of the plan was limited to the adaption of the plans’ 
new tasks and responsibilities after the re-organisation of the central social and health 
management, in addition to the specialist health and care reform from 2002. The third edition 
from 2006, came after a revision and expansion of the second plan (Meld. St. 16 (2012–2013), 
p. 44), and was a response to the outbreaks of avian flu and the recommendations provided by 
the WHO and EU to keep updated preparedness plans and to include the new phase division. 
The 2014 edition is the fourth and most recent version of the document (Helse- og 
Omsorgsdepartementet, 2006, p. 1) and was published after the 2014 edition of the NHPP. 
The first plan – as well as the third and fourth edition – was based on the experiences made in 
the 1918/19 H1N1, 1957 A/H2N2, and 1968 A/H3N2 pandemics (Helse- og 
Omsorgsdepartementet, 2006, p. 3; 2014a, p. 8; Sosial- og Helsedepartementet, 2001, p. 2) 
and these pandemics inspired the possible scenarios for future pandemic influenza outbreaks.  
The PPI determines and distributes responsibilities in management for several 
organisations, including both the private and the public health and care services. The goal of 
the PPI is to ensure a common pandemic preparedness in order to manage an influenza 
pandemic, and facilitate for the continuation of necessary societal functions within all sectors 
during a pandemic. It aims to do this by: preventing and limiting infection, sickness, and 
fatalities; provide treatment and care to the sick and dying; maintain trust and security in 
society by providing comprehensive and knowledge-based information and guidelines to the 
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population, sectors, and Norwegian citizens abroad; contribute to maintain vital societal 
functions (p.9). The plans’ main strategy to manage a pandemic is to vaccinate the population. 
Until a vaccine becomes available, preparedness-stored antiviral pharmaceuticals should be 
used to treat the infected, in addition to common sanitary measures (Direktorat for 
Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2019, p. 67).  
The PPI is divided into three parts, which all need to be understood in their own 
context. The first part is a ‘general part’ that presents the goal of the PPI, its target-groups, in 
addition to the roles and operative responsibility of the different actors throughout the various 
phases of a pandemic. It also reference the NHPP for a general overview of roles and 
responsibilities. The second part, ‘measures’ is the most important part of the document, as it 
describes measures and goals for the various actors in accordance with the WHOs phase 
divisions for pandemic influenza (p.5). The third, ‘professional elaboration and background’ 
presents guides on communication, surveillance, reports, and diagnostics on influenza, 
infection control measures, vaccines, pandemic scenarios, and preparedness plans for 
municipalities and the specialist health services. 
The PPI was drafted in the aftermath of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and is built on 
experiences, assessments, and knowledge collected in the evaluation process (p.7). The 
pandemic was classified as moderate by the WHO (p.8), and changes to the preparedness 
strategies provided by the WHO were incorporated into the PPI. It is a generalised plan 
intended to provide valuable resources to manage a pandemic in all its phases (p.7) The 
intendent recipient for this preparedness plan is particularly the health and care sector, but 
also other sectors, in order to aid them in their work to establish their own preparedness plans 
(Folkehelseinstituttet, 2015). Municipalities and the special health scervice providers are 
responsible for creating their own specialised preparedness plans according to the HSP and 
the CCD (p.7), but the PPI is intendes to act as a guide on important aspect that should be 
included in the different plans (p.6). The DSB, in collaboration with HDIR, published the 
“Continuity Planning – Pandemic Influenza (KPI)” in the period 2009-2010, which can be 
applied as a foundation for preparing for a large internal absense in their organisations (p.7).  
Pandemics caused by communicable diseases is one of the most likely possible causes 
of future acute crises in Norway (p.8). Accordingly, exercises remains an important tool in 
order to control whether plans, detect and response systems, reporting, and lines of 
communication is functioning as intended. This applies for all levels of government, where 
every sector has the responsibility to initiate preparedness exercises (p.9). These exercises 
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could also be part of a collaborative effort with other cross-sectoral exercises that have 
different goals, or as a specified health related exercise. In cases with cross-sectoral 
collaboration on a national level, the JBD would act as the central driver of the exercise (p.9) 
After the H1N1 2009 pandemic, the estimated number of deaths were between 
150,000-550,000 people worldwide. On the other hand, the H1N1 1918/19 pandemic were 
estimated as killing more than 40 million people, and is oftentimes used as a ‘worst-case’ 
scenario for influenza models and preparedness planning (pp.27,84). However, due to the 
increased standard of living and improved sanitary conditions, in addition to new treatments 
options such as vaccines, antivirals, and antibiotics, one assumes that a future pandemic 
would result in a significantly lower mortality rate (p.78) than what were seen during the 
1918/19 H1N1 pandemic. 
The central administrative system for crisis management builds on the main principles 
for preparedness work in Norway (p.10) – liability, proximity, conformity, and collaboration. 
The ministries has sectoral responsibility, in addition to the preparedness planning within its 
own sector. This structure applies for all crisis situations, from natural disasters, pandemics, 
or war, and should not be of hindrance in order to make appropriate adaptions in a crisis 
(p.10). 
The PPI has not been changed since its fourth publication in 2014, even though it was 
specifically called for in the CBRNE plan (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet et al., 2016a, 
p. 12). The PPI and other preparedness plans call for a regular, oftentimes yearly, revision of 
the most important preparedness plans. To provide vaccines to the public was the one of the 
main strategies during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and as it was an influenza pandemic, 
vaccines were readily available after a short period – it took about six months from the 
beginning of the pandemic in April 2009, to a finished vaccine in October 2009 (Flahault & 
Zylberman, 2010, p. 320).  This might help explain why the central focus of the PPI is the 
vaccine strategy, which is based on previous strategies from former influenza pandemics. The 
PPI was also updated in 2014 due to the revised pandemic phases provided by the WHO 
(p.24) which can be viewed as an indication of changes to the biological and epidemiological 
situation both domestically and internationally. One of the main updates in the 2013 WHO 
report was the strengthened strategy of vaccine responses (World Health Organization, 2013) 
The PPI, in turn, provides a good framework for the management of a pandemic in the phases 
provided by the WHO. How healthcare personnel and central actors should act in specific 
scenarios, make up most of this plan.  
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5.7 CRISIS SCENARIO ANALYSIS OF 2019 (AKS) 
Produced by DSB, (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2019) 
The Crisis Scenario analysis is a report published by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection (DSB), and was first published in 2011 (p.5).  The reports cover 16 risk areas that 
could pose a threat or danger to the Norwegian society, such as nuclear disasters, politically 
motivated violence, earthquakes, and extreme weather, and contain 25 different risk-analyses 
(p.9). The AKS is a cross-sectoral risk analysis that presents information, and aim to create 
awareness amongst the different administrative levels (p.9). From 2011 to 2014, the AKS was 
published as a yearly collection of reports, and has since then been published as regular sub-
reports for each analysis. The 2019 report is the first collection of reports published since the 
previous in 2014, due to the broad timeframe these reports are meant to cover (p.13). The 
2019 edition of the AKS is comprised of a collection of all the 25 completed risk-analysis 
included in the 2010 version (p.22). The risk analyses in AKS has a social scientific 
qualitative approach, as they analyse events with a limited data basis, and where the 
consequences of such events is considered as a loss of societal values, which to a large degree 
is qualitative assessment (p.25).  
Chapter 5 addresses three different scenarios concerning the outbreak of diseases. The 
first scenario is a downscaled version of the scenario presented in the 2006 PPI, with Thailand 
as the origin country. The second is scenario is on food-born infections, and the third is on an 
outbreak of an antibiotic-resistant bacteria. The scenarios provided in this chapter on 
pandemic outbreaks in Norway, is based on previous experiences from pandemics in the last 
100 years, such as the 1918/19 H1N1, 1957 A/H2N2, 1968 A/H3N2, and 2009 H1N1 
pandemics, and the epidemic Ebola outbreak between 2014 and 2016 and again in 2018 
(p.66). The pandemic scenario presented in the AKS is roughly based on the 1918/19 H1N1 
pandemic (p.11), due to the severe consequences it had on the population across the world. A 
pandemic scenario scores high in regards to the transferred probability and consequences in 
DSBs risk matrix, and it is estimated a 75% probability for an outbreak of a severe pandemic 
in the next 100years (pp.13-14) – the same probability as medicine shortages. Nevertheless, a 
pandemic event is still estimated to have a lower probability than for instance fire in an 
underwater tunnel, rain floods in cities, medicine shortage, and foodborne infections (p.14), 
but it has the highest estimated consequence pr. scenario (p.15).  
The information provided in this report can be included in RoS-analyses, planning-
processes, training exercises on a local, regional and national level, and used in preventative 
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and harm-reducing measures (p.19). The Meld. St. 10 (2016–2017) (p. 161) highlights the 
AKS as a knowledge-basis for the work on societal security, and a document that provide an 
overview of the interests and values Norway seeks to protect. Further, it notes that DSBs 
crisis scenarios provide a good starting point for the municipalities’ work to create their own 
risk and vulnerability analysis. Nevertheless, the sectoral and national expertise authorities 
within the specific areas have to evaluate the risk-acceptance and the subsequent measures, 
and present these for political process (p.30).  
The infectious disease portion of the AKS is based on previous pandemic events such 
as the 1918/19 H1N1 and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the Ebola outbreak (p.66), and the 
terrorist attack on 22nd July 2001 (p.28). Amendments to this plan happens regularly (p.9), but 
since 2017, sub-reports for each analysis have happened separately from a collection of 
reports. It is a cross-sectoral report that aims at establishing cooperation and collaboration 
between the most important actors within crisis management. For several years, pandemics 
have been listed as the most likely crisis scenario with the highest societal consequences.  
 As it is a not a preparedness plan, nor a document intended solely for the health and 
care sector, it differs from the rest of the plans on certain areas, e.g. on definitions and 
terminology. The strategy relies on the Norwegian Defence Research Establishments (FFI)’ 
definitions (p.28), which focusses more on the general crisis management instead of a more 
case specific crisis management (Busmundrud, 2019). 
 
5.8 REFLECTION FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 
The four principles of crisis management – liability, proximity, conformity, and collaboration 
– is the building block of the Norwegian preparedness planning. So, to return to the third 
question ‘How do the pandemic preparedness plans allow for autonomy or deviation from the 
established ‘paths’ of crisis management in order to solve an unforeseen event?’ our findings 
would be twofold. Firstly, as the four principles refer to a general method of crisis 
management, they do not limit the actors’ room to adapt specific strategies in order to 
encounter a particular case. Secondly, as the principles establish an ‘overall-framework’ for 
where and by whom a crisis should be managed, the possibility is that an overwhelming crisis 
would not be managed sufficiently within this frame. 
The first finding is that none of the plans follows an established, straight guideline for 
how to solve a practical task on the particular area they are set to manage. How these four 
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principles are applied in the different scenarios varies, and this would in turn provide a greater 
freedom for the different municipalities and organisations on how to best manage a problem. 
It gives the opportunity to manage situations based on what one would normally do, which 
implies that there is a strategy in place to handle such situations. However, the second finding 
would imply that this strategy works best for emergencies or disruptive events that can be 
planned and prepared for, and not a national crisis. It can be difficult to ensure good 
horizontal coordination in a stressful environment, especially if the coordination effort is with 
other actors that normally do not collaborate on bigger issues. Vertical coordination can be 
necessary in these cases in order to manage bigger events, and to ensure that all involved 
actors follow a similar plan. A crisis would also cause a path-breaking event, where the 
rebuilding of the path can entail different strategies for everyone involved, making 
coordination efforts even harder to accomplish.  
These plans are made to be used on a national level, however, regional and local 
preparedness strategies are encouraged to use the information provided in these documents to 
their own preparedness plans – or RoS-analysis – as to ensure similar approaches. The plans 
themselves does not mention specific management strategies, but only builds on a general 
understanding of the four principles. They are for the most part, restricted to the work within 
the health and care sector, and few present a plan for cross-sectoral collaboration. As 
discovered in chapter 3, it is impossible to plan for a crisis, but it is possible to train and plan 
for collaborative efforts. Every plan points to the importance of gaining experiences and 
conduct exercises to be prepared for the outbreak of a pandemic, but none mentions what the 
most important aspect of these training exercises should be, or how to conduct them. This can 
contribute to an unequal preparedness between hospitals, small and large municipalities, and 
regions, who are tasked to conduct these exercises on their own, as they are in charge of their 
own preparedness.  
There also is an expectation that there will be available vaccines, personal protection 
equipment, and medication when the crisis hits, or after a short period. There are preparedness 
plans that deal with these issues, but from the plans selected for this thesis, none take into 
account that such commodities might not be available. In addition, the estimation of the 
duration and severity of a possible pandemic have been based on influenza pandemics, most 
recently being the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and have not prepared for a worst-case event, i.e. 




This chapter has shown that five preparedness plans are based on previous experiences 
with pandemic influenzas, or other path breaking crisis i.e. natural disasters, terrorist attacks, 
and refugee crises. A summary of the most influential events that have shaped the 
preparedness plans, and which the plans or white papers have mentioned as the influencing 
factors have been included in Table 3. Events that took place both domestically and 
internationally have contributed to shaping the plans, and guidelines set by the WHO is 
included in the PPI and NHPP. 
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This chapter intend to analyse the empiric data collected from the five preparedness plans and 
other relevant documents and reports, within the theoretical framework provided in chapter 3. 
This theoretical framework encompasses two main perspectives, that of crisis management 
and path dependency, which is contextualised in the framework of crisis typology. The ‘path 
dependency’ sub-chapter address critical junctures and the self-reinforcing possesses in the 
preparedness planning, and possible lock-ins that might have occurred in the process of 
preparedness planning. The ‘crisis typologies’ sub-chapter address the different dimensions of 
a pandemic, the terminology provided in the five plans, and whether the plans prepare for 
crises or complex emergencies. Finally, the ‘crisis management’ sub-chapter address the core 
principles in Norwegian preparedness and crisis management, the suggested strategies for 
collaboration, and horizontal and vertical coordination.   
As the world currently finds itself in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, the option to 
view the measures and plans in hindsight would become plausible in the analysis, as the 
different strategies already have been tested in a real-life situation. This approach would allow 
for the reveal of a new aspects of the preparedness plans, which would be unobservable 
before the beginning of 2020 at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, this 
approach have some pros and cons. It would allow us to evaluate the documents more 
accurately, since the content of the plans and suggested measures have become increasingly 
visible through testing. On the other side, it would be more challenging to see the plans in the 
context of which they were approved and created, as more is known today about managing 
pandemics that are not influenza pandemics, than it was previously. Additionally, by 
examining the path dependent dimensions of these plans, it would be possible to trace the 
decision-making processes, and consequently counteract some of these contextual challenges.  
With our research question and the three sub-questions utilised in chapter 5 in mind, it 
will be achievable to conduct an analysis of how previous pandemics have participated in 
shaping the current Norwegian pandemic preparedness and crisis management. As further 
observed in chapter 5, the findings spoke to the fact that not only previous pandemic events 
have shaped the current pandemic preparedness or the health and care sector preparedness. If 
crisis management strategies are influenced by other sectors, or the preparedness in other 
sectors have contributed in shaping the pandemic preparedness in a central way, would 
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therefore need to be included in the analysis, as it provide us with required understanding to 
conclude on our research question.   
 
6.1 CRISIS TYPOLOGIES 
The crisis definition provided in chapter 3.3 is central in our understanding of whether an 
event can be defined as a crisis, or if it can be deemed as a complex emergency. Crisis that 
have transboundary dimensions, as a pandemic most often do, usually crosses both functional, 
geographical and political, and time boundaries. The Norwegian preparedness would 
therefore need to acknowledge these dimensions as a vital part of the preparedness, and 
consequently, they should be visible dimensions in the selected preparedness plans.   
Functional boundaries are connected closely to cross-sectoral collaboration between 
organisations that normally do not interact, or with newly established organisations. The 
NHPP is the leading document on preparedness in the health and care sector, and provides 
instructions on how to carry out collaboration efforts between different actors and 
organisations, and the regulations and laws that guide each field. The NHPP cannot be said to 
be an operational plan, as it could not be directly applied “as is” in a health and care crisis. 
Additionally, it does not describe how cross-sectoral collaboration is to be carried out, trained 
for, or how coordination efforts is to be established in different crisis scenarios. The NHPP 
provides guidelines of which organisation is to report to other organisations, ministries, or 
directorates in a vertical pointing line, often ignoring horizontal organisational efforts. It 
reference other plans, instructions, or guidelines as part of the management of a specific case 
or organisation, which could be argued contributed to making the NHPP more complex than 
need be. Further, the ECDC12 pointed out in their review of the Norwegian pandemic 
preparedness in 2008 that the preparedness plans would need to be operational in order to be 
fully able to manage future pandemics. Other plans, such as the PPI and the OSID have 
implemented this aspect in their strategies.  
Crossing geographical and political boundaries is inevitable in the case of a 
pandemic, and international detect and respond systems is vital for the domestic management 
of the crisis. If the pathogen has the ability to spread rapidly between humans or/and animals, 
it would be harder to prevent it from spreading to more countries unless strict, internationally 
coordinated measures are implemented – which often would require local governments to 
                                                 
12 The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, an Agency of the European Union.  
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initiate drastic measures based on very little information. International collaboration and crisis 
management is therefore a vital part of the domestic preparedness work. Norway collaborates 
with supranational organisations such as the WHO, NATO, and the EU, in additional to being 
part of a Nordic collaboration. The WHO provides guidelines and recommendations for 
managing infectious diseases, and provides tracking and report systems where countries share 
information with each other. The NHPP, PPI, and OSID addresses international collaboration, 
though they simply states the nature of the collaboration, and the role and mandate of each 
organisation. Each country is responsible for the domestic management of a pandemic crisis, 
but the WHOs Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework and the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) offers guidelines on the national crisis management, vaccine content, 
production, and strategies, and commits countries to measures, obligations, and report systems 
for communicable diseases of international concern – e.g. the MSIS13 and IHR regulation, and 
the ‘HelseCIM’14. 
The time boundary is the most impactful dimension when it comes to pandemics, as it 
is a slow, creeping crisis, and the pathogen can be hard to detect in its early phases. It is 
difficult to touch or see a pandemic crisis, but it is possible to observe the consequences and 
impact of the pathogen, which is in stark contrast to complex emergencies or disasters like 
mudslides, tsunamis, or earthquakes. These types of disasters or complex emergencies would 
also have a clear start and end, and when the event and the crisis management have subsided, 
the crisis would end15. The level of uncertainty would be higher in our efforts to determine 
exactly when a pandemic started, or when it ended, as the pathogen could still infect 
individuals or groups in the population years later. For instance, would it constitute as part of 
the pandemic crisis if the pathogen caused semi-permanent or permanent side effects in the 
population, that were present for weeks, months, or years after the virus was controlled? None 
of the five preparedness plans have estimated, or prepared for, a pandemic crisis that could 
last for several years or discussed the possibility that the side effects of the infection could be 
worse than the pandemic itself.  
                                                 
13 Report system for Infectious Diseases/ Meldingssystem for Smittsomme Sykdommer (MSIS) is operated by 
the NIPH. 
14 The HelseCim is a crisis support system where actors can report and alert incidents to other hospitals or 
national organisations.  
15 Even if a crisis have ended, a new crisis could appear in its place. One example is in the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake and following tsunami in Haiti, where the first crisis were the devastation of the tsunami, which was 
managed by the international community. When the sensed crisis was over, and the international community lost 




Having a common terminology and definition of events is a crucial aspect of good 
crisis management, as it is important that all actors are ‘on the same page’ in their 
communication in order to prevent delays in the response or that decision are made on a faulty 
understanding of the problem. Definitions and the understanding of a specific subject within 
crisis managements varies across sectors and organisations. Consequently, there is no good 
cross-sectoral terminology used in the preparedness planning, and different sectors have their 
own understanding of what “something” is. Terms regarded as important aspects in 
management strategies also varies within and between sectors, giving rise to the possibility 
that some sectors do not have an overall terminology that can be used in every possible 
scenario. This could cause cross-sectoral collaboration to become confusing or unclear, 
especially in a stressful and complicated situation.  
 The OSID is the only preparedness plan that dedicates a chapter to the terminology 
important for the plan, and in the preparedness against severe infectious disease. The AKS 
provides definitions on vulnerability, consequences, and uncertainty that serves as a general 
terminology for the preparedness strategy, in addition to an explanation to important terms 
and scenarios in each chapter. As the AKS is published by the DSB, hence being published 
within another sector, the terminology used differs slightly from the other plans, as they are 
created in the health and care sector. The PPI provides a short overview of definitions at the 
end, and the NHPP and CBRNE does not provide any definitions, and does not contribute to 
the establishment of a common terminology.  
Observing that the goal for all involved actors in a crisis is to create a common 
understanding of the event, an effort should be made to create and include a common 
terminology in the health and care preparedness. All health and care preparedness plans, 
which are based on the guidelines set by the NHPP, appears to be written in their own context, 
and only reference other plans on areas that they are not intended to cover. The overarching 
framework for the preparedness plans, which connects the different preparedness plans 
together, appears to do so only loosely. One explanation for this might be because the plans 
are written at different times, and under different pretences. As there is not a yearly, common 
review of all the plans in order to correlate and align the content and the strategies provided in 
the plans, the information provided are at some points repetitive and unconnected to other 
strategies and plans. Even if the intention were that the plans could be understood as 
independent documents, they would still be insufficient in order to create a situational 
understanding in order to manage crises, as they rely too heavily on other plans in their 
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reasoning and explanations to be self-standing plans. Two possible solutions to the issue of a 
lacking common terminology could be to either incorporate definitions to the NHPP that 
would be sector specific, or to create a new document that aim to create a common cross-
sectoral situational understanding of crisis and complex emergencies,  
 Creating a common, overarching framework that connects all the preparedness plans 
and that prevents unnecessary repetition, could greatly improve the Norwegian preparedness 
in the health and care sector. It would also allow the different plans to be more specialised 
towards specific events, in order to include several strategies that aim to manage a larger 
range of likely events. Additionally, information on a specific case would be more available 
to other sectors, actors, organisations, and municipalities, which oftentimes are tasked to 
create their own preparedness strategies. The definition of what constitutes a crisis should also 
be included in the crisis management plans, as it is not always apparent when an event is a 
crisis or merely a complex emergency. This, and creating other common definitions, would 
strengthen the Norwegian understanding of preparedness, and increase cross-sectoral 
collaboration as actors that normally do not collaborate or interact with each other would be 
able to easily familiarise themselves with the sector-specific terminological framework. This 
would as a result, aid in reducing the wickedness on the area.  
Following the arguments made in the points above, preparedness plans usually come 
as a response to a crisis or complex emergency, where issues with the previous preparedness 
strategies are revealed during the crisis management. The current pandemic preparedness is 
based on experiences from previous pandemics, like the 2009 H1N1, 1918/19 H1N1, 1957 
A/H2N2, and the 1968 A/H3N2 pandemics, seasonal flu outbreaks, the outbreak of Ebola in 
West Africa between 2014 and 2015 (in addition to the outbreak in 2018), and the Norwegian 
Ebola patient in 2014. The overall pandemic preparedness shows signs of self-reinforcing 
patterns, particularly in the time after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, as management strategies in 
the plans follows measures implemented during the pandemic, and the learning points from 
the evaluation process. For example, the main strategy in the PPI is to vaccinate the 
population, in addition to measures used for centuries, like sanitary measures, quarantine, and 
isolation of the infected. The vaccination strategy worked well during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, as it was possible to produce a large quantity of vaccines within a short time 
period. However, that might not be the case for future pandemics. The emergence of new 
pathogens, anti-vaccine movements, and production issued might affect the effectiveness of 
this strategy. These issues will be further addressed in point 6.3.  
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 Climate change and increased human activities in nature have created the perfect 
climate for new infectious pathogens to emerge and spread, and which could later turn out to 
become epidemics or pandemics. The preparedness plans that mentions climate challenges, 
usually point to antibiotic-resistance, foodborne diseases, the challenge of climate-refugees, 
and changes in international trade as the main issues. None of the five preparedness plans 
used in this thesis connects climate changes and human activities to the increased possibility 
for new pandemics of un-encountered pathogens. Consequently, the suggested measures and 
strategies in the preparedness plans might not work on new pathogens, which would make the 
more specific plans like the PPI and CBRNE less useful to manage the crises. One of the 
issues of preparing for a certain type of pandemic is that it leaves little to no room for 
manoeuvre within the established preparedness strategies, as previous measures have been 
discarded in the path creation process and returning to them could be harder, if not 
impossible, further down the path. For centuries it has been known that the climate can affect 
the emergence and spread of communicable diseases (McMichael & World Health 
Organization, 2003), but this challenge is not prioritised or listed as a possible future threat in 
the preparedness strategies. One explanation might be that it would be too costly or too 
complicated to implement the climate aspect in future preparedness plans, and unless a path-
breaking event occurs and the plans are forced to change, it is less likely for the main 
strategies of the plans to change. Since it is impossible to predict the next pandemic, preparing 
and training for a host of different scenarios for diseases that have been un-encountered or 
unregistered, could therefore become a time-consuming and pointless endeavour. In addition, 
when made in advance, preparedness plans will never be entirely relevant for the possible 
situations that might occur during a pandemic. Therefore, an approach that emphasises 
response issues and the processes in place might prove more useful than planning for specific 
events or provide a detailed description of the course of action, as they might not be 
applicable to manage new situations. However, the activity of writing the preparedness plans 
might still provide an overview of the overall preparedness, and provide valuable learning to 
the actors or organisations that are tasked to produce them.  
 Since the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, no other pandemics have directly affected Norway, 
which might explain the lack of urgency to improve the preparedness on the area. 
Additionally, as most estimates predict a new pandemic within the next 100 years, there is no 
immediate sense of threat, as the possibility of a pandemic occurring could be decades from 
now, which does not require immediate action by the current government. Hence, as several 
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policy areas do require immediate action, the government would need to prioritise whether to 
make improvements on a current problem, or prepare for a future problem.  
It is impossible to predict how the next pandemic is going to present itself, and due to 
this uncertainty, relying on what is already known might be the most cost-effective and simple 
approach for pandemic preparedness. The process of creating ‘good’ preparedness strategies 
are bound to be coloured by a degree of wickedness, as some of the measures are based on 
previous “quick-fixes” or provisory solutions that were implemented spontaneously to 
manage a specific problem.  
  
6.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE OVERALL PREPAREDNESS  
How crisis management and preparedness is understood determines the measures suggested in 
the preparedness plans. The NHPP, CBRNE, and AKS have an ‘all-hazards’ approach to the 
preparedness, which means that they take into account several imaginable kinds of crises, 
while the PPI and OSID present a specified preparedness approach that plan for one ‘kind’ of 
crises. It is important for the ministries and directorates to create plans that are able to manage 
a wide range of possible crisis, but they also need to prioritise crises that are estimated to be 
most likely to occur. Much of the content in the five preparedness plans overlap with other 
plans, and an argument could be made to support fewer plans, or that much of the content of 
these plans could be revised and collected into a more comprehensive plan. As many of the 
plans have been revised or established as a response to previous crisis, they could have 
created a situational understanding that does not correspond to other plans or to guidelines. 
Additionally, when there is no yearly revision of the plans, despite it being called for in white 
papers, NOUS’s, government documents, and the preparedness plans themselves. Not 
conducting regular revisions could lead to outdated strategies and information, as better 
understandings of the possible threats might have emerged, and older strategies could be 
providing contradictory measures or strategies from the newly established or updated plans. 
The most notable example of this is the PPI, which have not been updated since 2014. One of 
the possible explanations for why the plan have not been updated for seven years, could be 
because there have not been any new outbreaks of pandemic influenza in this period. As 
mentioned in chapter 5.6, the PPI was updated after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and was based 
on the collected information and learning points during the pandemic, in addition to the 
updated WHO pandemic phases.  
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Even though personnel, infrastructure, and preparedness plans are vital parts of the 
structures in place to ensure readiness, crisis management is not a static exercise: frequent 
training exercises and testing that could lead to the improvement of the preparedness plans 
and strategies, are necessary in order to detect flaws in the overall preparedness. If the NHPP 
is to remain an overall framework, and not an operational plan, it needs to address the issues 
of how collaboration and cooperation is to take form, both horizontally and vertically. It 
would also need to be supplemented with plans that are operational, as quick responses and 
flexibility are vital in crises or complex emergencies. In order for the NHPP to be a 
functioning, operational preparedness plan that can manage crises on its own, it would need to 
not only include the actors and measures designed to enable responses, but include a full 
range of recovery activities, mitigation strategies, and preventative measures.  
Annual or regular training exercises are part of the recommended measures in many of 
the preparedness plans, government documents, white papers, NOU’s, and in the general 
preparedness guidelines to improve the overall preparedness. On a local level, regional 
hospitals and municipalities have the responsibility to carry out these exercises as part of their 
preparedness. On a national level, the national health preparedness exercise is one of the 
measures to further preparedness, as mentioned in the NHPP, and is to be carried out every 
second year. The most recent one being the NATO military exercise Trident Juncture in 2018, 
which was a cross-sectoral collaboration with the military and other governmental 
organisations and NGOs (see: Helsedirektoratet, 2019b, pp. 5-6). The health preparedness 
exercise before that was the IKT16 that were held in 2016, which focussed on cyber security 
(see: Helsedirektoratet, 2016, p. 49), and the exercise in 2014 was set to aid Svalbard in the 
case of a shipwreck disaster (see: Helsedirektoratet, 2014, pp. 63-64). There was also an 
exercise in 2015, the HarbourEx15, which focusses on larger accidents on the harbour in 
Sydhavna/Sjursøya-area in Oslo (see: Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2015, 
pp. 9-10). These exercises have mostly prepared for the management of complex 
emergencies, and not crises – following our definition of a crisis. The need for cross-sectoral 
collaboration could have – in the case of the ‘health preparedness exercise’ – prevented the 
health and care sector to properly prepare for crises that prioritises health and care related 
preparedness, while giving the perception that the overall preparedness on the field was 
improved.  
In order for local actors to plan exercises based on the national preparedness 
framework, the plans would need to set clear guidelines on how such preparedness exercises 
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are to be carried out, and point out risk areas where the preparedness could be improved in 
order to ensure a good, overall preparedness in the Norwegian regions. As previous research 
has shown, it is impossible to prepare for a crisis as they present themselves as unknown 
unknowns, which makes general management guidelines and structures – in addition to 
training exercises – even more important. If a core structure of preparedness and 
communication lines is established, which could also be used on a day-to-day basis, in 
emergencies or disasters, or in crises, the crisis management could provide the necessary 
flexibility to instigate more case-specific measures across the country, while insuring a similar 
level of preparedness as regional actors are expected to manage their own preparedness.  
The five preparedness plans mention the principle of liability, proximity, conformity, 
and collaboration as their core strategic framework in preparedness and crisis management. 
These principles follows the general preparedness in Norway, and are not specific for the 
crisis management in the health and care sector. The principle of liability, proximity, and 
conformity was introduced in the St.meld. nr. 17 (2001-2002) that came in the wake of the 
9/11 terrorist attack in USA in 2001, which focussed on the challenge future terrorist attacks 
poses on society, and possible threats to the infrastructure in a societal security perspective. 
The principle of collaboration was later added to the core preparedness in Meld. St. 29 (2011–
2012) and was implemented after the evaluation process of the 22nd July 2011 terrorist attack. 
The principle of Liability states that the HOD is responsible for the overall 
preparedness on Norway, while it can delegate some of its mandate to HDIR. As the JBD has 
the role of the Leadership Ministry (LM) unless otherwise determined – as stated in the 
instruction on societal security (2017) chapter VIII – flexibility, situational understanding, and 
rapid reorganisation is required when the HOD is to take the role of LM in crisis that affect 
the health and care sector.  
The principle of Proximity place the responsibility to manage crisis on the lowest 
possible level, which is the municipalities, public organisations, and regions. The NHPP and 
the regulatory framework states the line of communication and reporting, in a vertical line 
from a local level to a regional level, like the county and regional health authorities, and to a 
national level to the HDIR, DSB, JBD. Therefore, communication and information sharing 
with all other relevant actors and organisations becomes a vital part of this structure. The 
coordination efforts mentioned in the preparedness plans are structured in a way that comply 
with the theory of ministerial responsibilities and strong sector-based ministries, as it first and 
foremost addresses centralised, vertical coordination. The increased focus on centralisation in 
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crisis management came as a response to the poor management effort during the 22nd July 
terrorist attack, where the different actors were unable to collaborate or ‘find each other’. 
Oftentimes, decentralised strategies are more efficient in complex emergencies with fewer 
actors that collaborate and share information on a regular basis, than it is in catastrophes or 
crises that have a national or international aspect, because the complexity of the situation and 
the number of actors involved further complicates coordination across horizontal lines.  
The principle of Conformity states that in a crisis, society needs to operate as similar 
as possible to the normal day-to-day operation, regardless of what it is exposed to, and to 
ensure that the ordinary lines of responsibility are fixed. The preparedness plans follows this 
principle in their strategies, and take into account that newly established organisations are to 
follow the same guidelines as similar organisations in a crisis. For instance, hospitals are 
expected to operate as usual during a crisis, treating non-infected patients as they would 
normally do, as well as infected patients. However, this is a challenging task, and the hospitals 
are at risk of being overwhelmed by the increased pressure by infected people. Resources 
might also be scarce, like PPE and healthcare personnel. This applies for all other 
organisations as well, as people can get sick and having to be in quarantine or isolation, which 
can create a lack of workers that can execute their tasks, creating delays or postponements of 
services or projects. Budgetary issues might force the employer to temporarily lay off people 
or terminate contracts. Though the aim to operate as one would in ‘normal’ situations might 
be a good principle in theory, it would almost certainly be impossible to follow in practice, as 
the situation would require improvisation and flexibility. National and local measures could 
also inhibit organisations to carry out their day-to-day task in an effort to stop the spread of 
the pandemic.  
The principle of Collaboration is to ensure that organisations collaborate with other 
similar organisations in their preparedness, crisis management, and prevention strategies in 
order to better utilise cross-sectoral resources. Collaboration is more efficient between 
organisations or actors on the same ‘level’, as they often have the same preconditions and 
resources available. In a pandemic, municipalities in close proximity can cooperate on 
measures to shield or manage the spread in the region, and regional health authorities can 
share information with each other, or help relieve some of the pressure should one hospital be 
overwhelmed by infected patients. On a government level, ministries and directorates can for 
instance collaborate by either taking on responsibilities to reduce the risk of contagion, 
collaborate through knowledge sharing, or by creating cross-sectoral strategies, that provides 
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a more holistic approach to crisis management and preparedness. This form of collaboration 
happens in horizontally. The CBRNE plan was, as an example, developed in a cross-sectoral 
collaboration between HOD, JBD, and the MD. Noted, the plan still divides the responsibility 
of the different categories between the ministries, in order to ensure sectoral responsibility. 
The NHPP also lists collaboration areas, and structures lines of communication and 
coordination between the different organisations. Horizontal coordination is encouraged, but 
the current Norwegian preparedness is based on vertical coordination, with top-down decision 
making, in strong sector ministries, which came as result of the 22nd July 2011 terrorist attack 
and the new governments’16 election platform to improve the area of societal security. 
Consequently, horizontal coordination would be more challenging to establish and carry out 
within this preparedness framework.  
Cross-sectoral collaboration and coordination efforts are stated as a goal in the 
preparedness plans, but whether these instructions are trained for or implemented in exercise 
events before a crisis occurs, and not merely planned for or described, varies. According to 
the principle of liability, the government is not the sole responsible actor for preparedness. 
Both private and public organisations and private citizens have a responsibility to ensure their 
own safety, as those who have a responsibility in everyday situations also have the best 
conditions to manage a complex emergency. The reason for this is that, oftentimes, on-site 
civilians carry out a large share of search and rescue activities, first aid efforts, and other 
initial responses before the emergency response teams arrives. Civilians also constitute a large 
number of the voluntary response efforts across the country, and can take the form of 
unstructured civilian responses to an event, ad hoc organisations created in response to an 
emergency, or as members of an NGO. Examples of these structure are people in close 
proximity to the event such as in a car crash, temporary searching groups established to search 
for missing people, and NGOs like the Red Cross or Amnesty International that provide 
national and international aid. All actors that operate within this system of preparedness and 
management rely upon coordination and collaboration, in addition to an awareness of how 
they fit into the system.  
 However, managing a crisis that affect a large number of geographically dispersed 
people requires better coordination and collaboration strategies, either horizontally by 
regional actors, or vertically by national actors. Ideally, collaboration happens both vertically 
                                                 
16 The Conservative Party won the election in 2013, and after a second win in 2017, are still the ruling party in 
Norway until the next election in the autumn of 2021. 
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and horizontally, but due to strong sector-ministries, this endeavour becomes more complex 
in large crises. In the beginning of a crisis, the situation is characterised by complexity, 
confusion, and uncertainty, and a need for information in order to create an image of the 
situation becomes vital (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin et al., 2017; Head and Alford, 2013). In 
these instances, horizontal coordination might prove to be an insufficient endeavour, as the 
multiple actors have not yet formed a common, clear understanding of the situation. This can 
cause policy areas to fall between fields of responsibilities, which makes them ‘no-ones’ 
problem. In the health and care preparedness, the overall responsibility of coordination lies 
with the HOD, and HDIR is tasked to carry out this effort. Cross-sectoral collaboration occurs 
between the JBD and the DSB, and other directorates that varies between the types of crises. 
The structure of this collaboration is established in the NHPP, and applies to all other 
preparedness plans.  
 Collaboration and coordination efforts on a national level in the case of a pandemic 
usually happens between the HOD, HDIR, and the NIPH, where HOD has the overall 
responsibility, the role of the HDIR is to coordinate, and the NIPH is tasked to provide 
information and advice to the former organisations. In addition to the health and care sector, 
the JBD is responsible for the general coordination in the area of social security, and have 
established the Instruction on Societal Security, that guide the general preparedness and crisis 
management, along with the role of all involved actors and organisations. The DSB supports 
the JBD in its coordinative efforts on the area of societal security, and is tasked to attain an 
overview of risks and vulnerabilities, of which could be expose the society. Collaboration 
between these organisations might prove to be confusing in stressing situations, especially if 
the guiding principle of collaboration varies from one situation to the next, they have different 
understandings of their mandate or role, or if the NHPP cannot be utilised in an operational 
cross-sectoral preparedness framework. 
As previously mentioned, the cornerstone of the Norwegian preparedness are the four 
contextual principles, which is applied to all sectors and areas that deal with societal security 
and preparedness. The principles came as a response to the previous management experiences 
with terrorist attacks, and in the health and care preparedness, this becomes painfully visible 
as exercises have largely focussed war and terrorism on a national level the last couple of 
years. No cross-sectoral large-scale pandemic or epidemic preparedness exercises have been 
trained for in recent years, despite being named one of the most likely and impactful events 
that could occur in the next decades (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2019). 
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The general preparedness and crisis management in Norway is predominantly based on 
experienced made from previous crisis like the 22nd July terrorist in Norway, the 9/11 2001 
attack in the USA, and the Sumatra–Andaman earthquake in 2004. Consequently, this has 
caused the general pandemic preparedness to be based on principles established after terrorist 
attacks and natural disasters. Strategies that are specific to pandemic and epidemic outbreaks 
are based on experiences from 1918/19 H1N1 pandemic, which acts as an unlikely worst-case 
scenario, and learning points from the more recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic. In order to analyse 
this process, the path dependency in the preparedness plans would need to be addressed.  
 
6.3 INFLUENCE FROM PREVIOUS PANDEMICS  
The modern framework of preparedness plans in the health and care sector can be traced back 
to the first NHPP from 2007, with the exception of the PPI. As described in chapter 5.3, the 
first NHPP came as a response to a the failed coordination and collaboration in a natural 
disaster abroad, while experiences made in the second edition from 2014 came from natural 
disasters, terrorist attacks, and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. The third update was based on 
increased immigration concerns, terrorist attacks, and international epidemic outbreaks. The 
second edition of the NHPP focussed more on pandemic management than the third edition, 
which could be explained by a need to update the plan in the aftermath of the 2009 pandemic. 
In addition, pandemic preparedness would have been on the agenda as experiences and 
learning points from the recent pandemic was still fresh in mind. The most recent PPI was 
published after the second edition of the NHPP in 2014, and included changes and 
experienced made from the 2009 pandemic. As the three first editions of the PPI were created 
before the establishment of the NHPP, and the third edition was not updated before 2014, the 
PPI could be viewed as an independent plan that operated besides the NHPP in the period 
between 2006 and 2014. They followed the same general preparedness and crisis management 
principles in this period, but the PPI did not mention the NHPP as the framework for the 
overall health and care preparedness. Therefore, the 2009 pandemic might have been a critical 
juncture where the PPI was officially included in the NHPP framework, as the PPI did not 
reference the NHPP framework before its update in 2014.  
The fourth update of the PPI was originally intended to be published between 2008 
and 2009, as much of the work had already been done after input for revision of the third 
edition (Direktorat for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap, 2008; 2010, pp. 35-36). However, as 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic reached Norway in this period, and the HOD and other directorates 
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and government organisations had yet to approve the plan, the fourth edition was not 
implemented as a management framework during the pandemic. In 2013, Meld. St. 16 (2012–
2013) on pandemic preparedness was passed in the Storting (see Table 2, p. 54), and the 
fourth edition of the PPI was published the following year. Therefore, the pandemic might 
have delayed the publication of this fourth edition, so much so that it took seven years before 
it the PPI was updated, from 2006 to 2014.  
 The NHPP is the central plan in the health and care crisis management framework, 
seen as all other preparedness plans in the health and care sector follow it, and have 
incorporated it into their framework. The NHPP is a framework for collaboration and 
cooperation within the health and care sector and across various sectors, but it is not an 
operational plan, which makes it hard to utilise the plan in a crisis. As previously mentioned, 
the general preparedness in Norway is to a large degree based on learning points from 
previous terrorist attacks, accidents, and natural disasters or complex emergencies. This 
general preparedness is included in the health and care preparedness and crisis management, 
as it encompasse previous situations that have required cross-sectoral collaboration with the 
health and care sector. Preparedness specific to the health and care sector, like pandemic 
preparedness, is based on specific events that cannot always be transferred to events that 
appear to be similar, but in reality are too different from imagined crisis scenarios. 
Consequently, if it turns out that the general preparedness and crisis management strategies 
are inapplicable on several health and care crises, the NHPP could be insufficient in managing 
future pandemics or crises. If the NHPP presents a flawed framework or is based on 
inadequate principles to manage health and care specific crises, that could have a massive 
impact on the preparedness and crisis management for the entire sector, as all other 
preparedness plans and strategies builds on this framework.  
 The most prominent events that affected the pandemic preparedness in the last two 
decades were the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the Ebola patient in 2014. Both these events led 
to changes in the pandemic preparedness, and experiences from these events could be viewed 
as critical junctures in the Norwegian preparedness (see Figure 4, p. 88). In the three first 
versions of the PPI, events such as the 1918/19 H1N1, 1957 A/H2N2, and 1968 A/H3N2 
pandemics, seasonal flu outbreaks, and SARS in 2003 influenced the pandemic preparedness. 
The 1999 WHO pandemic plan also called for the need for all member states to create their 
own pandemic preparedness plans, and this plan was in 2005 replaced by the WHO influenza 
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preparedness plan, as emerging new technologies made it easier to detect pathogens, create, 
and manufacture vaccines.  
 After the 2013 election where the Conservative Party and its supporting parties won, 
they launched their political platform for the following year – the ‘Sunnvoldplattformen’ of 
2013. This platform had an increased focus on improving the national preparedness, as the 
Gjørv-kommisjonen had handed the NOU 2012: 14 (2012) to the prime minister the previous 
year, emphasising that the Norwegian preparedness was insufficient to manage larger crises 
(Statsministerens Kontor, 2013, pp. 5, 17-18). The five preparedness plans in this thesis were 
all created or updated after the regime change in 2013, and are the result of the current 
government’s focus on increasing the Norwegian preparedness and crisis management.   
 
 





This process tracing study can be summarised in Figure 4, that show the creation or updates to 
the preparedness plans in relation to four critical junctures that occurred in the last two 
decades. It is divided into four colours: green is most influenced by pandemics, mustard is 
most influenced by natural disasters, red is most influenced by terrorism, and light yellow 
have no prominent event as its influence. The boxes are listed chronologically, in order to 
highlight when the different plans were implemented, and how they stand in relation to the 
other plans in time. It starts with the PPI, which came in 2001 and was updated in 2003, and 
2006, as well as the first critical juncture that was the Sumatra–Andaman earthquake in 2004. 
As demonstrated in the Figure, all of the plans was revised or implemented into the overall 
preparedness framework after the 2013 election, which speaks to the political ambition of the 
current government.  
Displayed are four of the most notable critical junctures that shaped the health and 
care preparedness, and by extent the pandemic preparedness, which is the Sumatra–Andaman 
earthquake in 2004, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the Ebola patient in 2014, and the 22nd July 
2011 terrorist attack. These events varies in size and reach, from only one person being 
directly affected, to a whole country, both domestically and internationally. Nonetheless, their 
impact on the Norwegian crisis management and preparedness remains prominent.  
 The Sumatra–Andaman earthquake in 2004 was the wake-up call for the health and 
care preparedness in Norway, especially when it came to cross-sectoral collaboration and 
crisis management abroad. Poor coordination and collaboration efforts in treating and taking 
care of Norwegian citizens abroad shed a light on the lacking preparedness on the area. 
Because of this disaster, the NHPP was created as a tool to ensure better collaboration across 
sectors, such as between the HOD, JBD, and the MFA, who were central actors in this 
disaster.  
 Experiences and decisions made during the 2009 pandemic created an increased focus 
on pandemic preparedness, and successful choices made during the pandemic would later find 
their way into the overall preparedness against communicable diseases. Examples of this can 
be observed in the vaccination strategy in the OSID and PPI, in addition to several best and 
worst case scenarios of pandemic outbreaks. The 2009 pandemic would influence our view of 
how a pandemic could (or would) look like in the future, which is why most pandemic 
scenarios are on pandemic influenza, and not on other types of communicable infections.  
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 The Ebola patient of 2014 is the only confirmed case of Ebola in Norway, but the 
preparedness in advance of this patents arrival was still extensive. The fear that volunteers and 
healthcare personnel that travelled to West Africa to assist in the medical treatment, would 
later return whilst carrying the virus, started the process to create a more comprehensive 
strategy to prevent them from infecting others upon their arrival. This led to the creation of 
the interim Ebola preparedness plan by HDIR, in addition to influencing the preparedness 
strategies in the OSID, NHPP, CBRNE, and AKS. A review of the evaluations from the 2009 
pandemic and the Ebola epidemic made by the DSB in the AKS, pointed to the need to be 
better prepared for future B-events, and that fixed, formal structures for collaboration in the 
preparedness, management, and prevention strategies is necessary, both within sectors and 
cross-sectoral.  
 Not only pandemics have shaped the pandemic preparedness and crisis management. 
Even though the terrorist attack on Norway did not have any direct impact on pandemic 
preparedness, it changed the way in which crisis management and preparedness is viewed, in 
addition to the guiding principles in all preparedness efforts. The evaluation process after the 
terrorist attack created a wave of increased centralisation, reforms that renewed coordination 
and collaboration efforts amongst first responders and in the regional division in Norway, and 
further solidified the contextual principles in the Norwegian preparedness.  
 Successful measures implemented during a crisis would later follow positive feedback 
self-reinforcing patterns, which could make future decisions path dependent, as these four 
critical junctures have shown. If successful measures and decisions made during stressful 
situations are continued, and given the opportunity to solidify through repeated repetitions, 
reversing the created path might be impossible in order to implement a more favourable 
strategy or measure. This could be the case with the new municipal reform that was 
implemented in order to create a more centralised base of operations in order to promote a 
larger, more efficient, and professional environment that was better equipped to respond to 
emergencies or crisis. However, even though many are opposed to this new form of 
structuring public organisations, reversing the decision might be hard, if not impossible, 
because it is based on previous decisions and experiences.  
In the case of pandemic preparedness, the five preparedness plans provide some insight 
on the path dependency of strategies and measures that are used to regain control of pandemic 
pathogen. To reduce the infection rate, the main strategy is to provide vaccines to the majority 
of the population. The 2009 pandemic is one of the more recent reasons behind this strategy, 
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due to the success vaccinations had on striking down the virus. Regardless, if a situation 
occurred where it would be impossible to create vaccines, the plans would provide no 
alternate solution to end the pandemic. In addition, the strategies to manage the pandemic in 
the PPI and the OSID does not take into account that other factors can be just as harmful as 
the pathogen itself, like quarantining or isolating people for a long period of time, and the 
long-term psychological damages it can cause. Generally, the Norwegian pandemic 
preparedness is based on historical pandemics, where the 1918/19 H1N1 pandemic is seen as 
a worst-case scenario. This worst-case scenario is viewed as unlikely to happen, due to a 
higher standard of living, available medical treatments, and improved sanitary conditions. 
With the emergence of new technologies, creating new vaccines or mass-producing vaccines 
is now possible within a short period. Nevertheless, it would still be necessary to be 
previously familiar with the pathogen in order to start vaccine production, which can prove to 
be a challenge in future pandemics, especially if there is no prior experience with the 
pathogen. One example of this issue can be found in the chapter in the OSID that address 
vaccines and vaccine strategies, which does not mention scenarios where vaccines would not 
be available, either due to production difficulty or if they for some reason were not available 
for specifically Norway.  
There is an assumption that vaccines would be readily available soon after the start of the 
pandemic in the preparedness plans that tackles vaccine strategies. The World Health 
Organization (1999, p. 32) wrote in their pandemic influenza preparedness plan from 1999 
that “[...] the situation in 1997 also indicated that assumptions about ability to make vaccine 
against a new virus must allow for the possibility of a strain that has biological properties 
which hinder the use of traditional vaccine production methods”.  Despite the advancement in 
vaccine production since this statement from the WHO, the issue is still a cause for concern. 
Vaccination strategies have become the only method in order to get rid of the pandemic, 
which means that other methods are discarded or deselected. The PPI includes experiences 
from the 2009 pandemic in its vaccination strategy, as it was one of the biggest vaccination 
accomplishment in Norway. Nonetheless, the plan was drafted seven years ago and 
consequently, it fails to address new societal challenges, like the growing distrust in vaccines 
around the world, false information about vaccines, international trade restrictions and 
delivery issues, and challenges related to mass-production of vaccines and PPE. 
After the 22nd July 2011 terrorist attack on Utøya and the government block, the general 
Norwegian preparedness and crisis management strategies were updated in order to counteract 
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future attacks. One of the main changes to the overall preparedness was the increased focus 
on cross-sectoral collaboration and coordination. Similar changes were implemented in the 
health and care preparedness after the Sumatra–Andaman earthquake in 2004. However, these 
changes were not sufficient in order to collaborate during the terrorist attack, or alternatively, 
they were not sufficiently implemented or trained for in advance. Hence, the general 
preparedness required and update.  
One of these updates was the strengthening of the contextual principles, which are 
prominent in all areas of public preparedness. Responsibilities were further accentuated, 
similarly as the role of involved actors and organisations. Measures to strengthen 
collaboration and coordination across and within sectors was emphasised in the preparedness 
plans that came in the following years. These principles can be regarded as having been 
‘locked-in’ in the Norwegian preparedness strategies, as there is not one single plan that does 
not follow these principles. As the final step of the path dependency process, this lock-in 
might have crated the preparedness strategies to lose its ability to be flexible and to improvise, 
particularly in scenarios that fall outside of the planned preparedness.  
In order to demonstrate the possible challenges the lock-in have caused when it comes to 
pandemic preparedness, a short examination of some of the implemented measures at the 
beginning of 2020 becomes necessary. Following the principles of liability and proximity, the 
responsible actors in the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic were local authorities, such as 
municipalities and county officials. As the Corona virus had reached Norway, municipalities 
were left to their own device to make decisions and instigate measures, as national health 
authorities did not provide clear communication to the municipalities nor the public. The 
advice provided by national health and care organisations such as the HOD or the HDIR was 
ambiguous, which caused varying practices for cancelling events and concerts, and 
understandings of how quarantine rules were to be enforced. For instance, Bergen banned 
indoor events with more than 1000 participants, while Stavanger set the limit at 500 
participants. Several municipalities like Oslo did not put restrictions on the number of 
participants, while other municipalities hinted that birthday parties and family gatherings 
could be banned (see: Hovden & NTB, 2020; Otterlei, 2020). Managing a national crisis on a 
local level could prove to be impossible, seen as different actors could choose different 
strategies, creating unequal measures that could be seen as ‘unjust’ or ‘unfear’ by the 
population, reduce the degree of compliance to the measures, and as a result loose the 
legitimacy. In pandemic crisis, municipals should not stand alone and manage their own 
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preparedness, as the virus transcends national borders, and even more so regional borders. 
Measures and strategies would not be effective if everyone is doing ‘their own thing’.  
The lack of communication between the national government and municipalities were 
also criticised in the beginning of the pandemic. All preparedness plans emphasise the need 
for good communication and information sharing in the beginning of a pandemic or crisis. 
Communication is a vital part of the local and national crisis management, as is the need for 
national government to take control of the unfolding situation. Precise and coherent advice 
should be present from the beginning, and the information need to be framed in a way that 
demonstrate a degree of control over the situation. Measures would also need to be well 
reasoned and coordinated, to ensure that everyone is fronting the same information.  
The structures of crisis management could have caused a degree of uncertainty when it 
came to the roles of the involved actors, especially between national and local government as 
crises are expected to be managed at the lowest level possible. Combined with the need for 
clear and coordinated communication, national government might not have seen the 
usefulness of providing contradictory information to the municipals at this stage.  
The pandemic crises management differ from other types of complex emergencies, 
disasters, or crisis, as it transcends geographical and political boundaries, functional 
boundaries, and the boundaries of time. Accordingly, managing a pandemic crisis should not 
follow the same principles as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, as pandemics does not 
follow the same restrictions as other crises have to abide by. The majority of all preparedness 
plans follow the principles of general preparedness, which came as a response to previous 
crises or complex emergencies. Preparedness plans are changed, updated, and revised after 




7 CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS  
The three phases of path dependency provided by Schreyögg and Sydow (2011) in chapter 3 
of this thesis, are able to provide a perspective on the challenges that decision makers 
encounter in the process of establishing the Norwegian preparedness. In the preformation 
phase, previous choices can affect the range of possible future choices and this process is 
oftentimes happens unintentionally or is perpetuated unknowingly by the actors. When events 
in this phase reaches a critical juncture, new patterns will emerge and start to take form. As 
demonstrated in Figure 4, four critical junctures have notably influenced the Norwegian 
preparedness in the last two decades. Choices made during the crisis management in these 
disasters and crises would later affect the available future options in the preparedness, as 
measures and strategies that had proven themselves to be inefficient or harmful were 
discarded, and positive measures were continued. These experiences lead to the formation 
phase, where in the case of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the vaccine strategy would be one of 
the measures that gained acceptance and attention in the management of pandemic crises. 
Measures that were not as effective in managing the pandemic would face more challenges in 
becoming the dominant strategy in the updated versions of the preparedness plans.  
 Similarly, the 2011 terrorist attack in Norway would uncover poorly planned and 
trained for cooperation and collaboration strategies – both across sectors and within the 
sector. Consequently, measures that improved strategies that followed this new pattern of 
crisis management and preparedness would become increasingly more accepted than 
measures that reproduced other suggested paths or strategies that were influenced by older 
patterns, which can be viewed through the measures and focus areas mentioned in the white 
papers after the attack (Meld. St. 10 (2016–2017); Meld. St. 13 (2015–2016); Meld. St. 21 
(2012–2013); Meld. St. 29 (2011–2012); NOU 2012: 14, 2012).  
 Then, as the lock-in phase occurred, the dominant patterns are solidified in the 
management strategies and preparedness plans. The creation of dominant paths after the 2011 
terrorist attack and the 2009 pandemic can be demonstrated through the municipal reform of 
2014 that centralised the Norwegian crisis management and preparedness, in addition to the 
updated version of the NHPP and the PPI in 2014. Similarly, the introduction of the fourth 
contextual principle after the 2011 terrorist attack, would further solidify the path of how and 
who is expected to manage future crises, and in what way such management strategies are to 
be planned and trained for.  
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7.1 MAIN FIDINGS 
In order to increase the preparedness level in Norway, an effort has been made to improve the 
preparedness throughout the years, especially in the time directly after a crisis. Nevertheless, 
it is remains uncertain whether the improved measures and preparedness documents have 
made Norway more prepared to competently respond to the next pandemic, as the actual 
preparedness level is revealed through exercises and real-life events. A host of measures and 
guidelines have been added to the pandemic preparedness in the last couple of years, such as 
the resources provided by the NIPH, HDIR, and other NGO’s and non-profit organisations. 
Overarching, non-operational, and vague plans, in addition to case-specific plans, are not well 
equipped to manage unknown unknowns, as they either provide too little guidance in a crisis 
scenario, or have been rendered inapplicable to manage specific cases. Since the majority of 
the recent pandemic preparedness is based on experiences from the 2009 pandemic, the 
prepared scenario of the next pandemic is thought to be a new pandemic influenza. Vaccine 
strategies would be quite useful in this type of scenario, but vaccines might not be as effective 
if a different type of pathogen were to emerge, in addition to the fact that the creation of 
vaccines could prove to be more challenging, or even impossible when faced with a new type 
of pandemic pathogen.  
The suggested measures for managing a pandemic crisis varies in the five 
preparedness plans, as they have different objectives and tasks to cover. The NHPP covers the 
overarching framework for preparedness planning and crisis management in the health and 
care sector, and the PPI and OSID address outbreaks of severe infectious diseases, i.e. 
pandemic influenza. The CBRNE was a temporary plan that was intended used until 2020, 
and is still in the revision and evaluation phase, meaning that no decision have been made to 
renew the plan, and finally, the AKS is a risk analysis that intended to point out vulnerabilities 
in society published by the DSB.  
Improved cross-sectoral coordination and collaboration have been at the focus of the 
Norwegian preparedness since the 22nd July terrorist attack, which also becomes apparent in 
the health and care preparedness plans. The principles of liability, proximity, conformity, and 
collaboration are present in all areas of the Norwegian preparedness, and the improved focus 
on centralisation and vertical coordination have made it more challenging for organisations to 
take use of their flexibilities in a crisis situation. In the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
the contextual principles was to a lesser degree used in the crisis management (Per, 2020, p. 
35), as centralised, standardised government regulations became more important than the 
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decentralised local flexibilities (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020b, p. 718). Chapter 3 
demonstrated that it is possible to observe that horizontal coordination is an important aspect 
of good crisis management, especially in complex emergencies where actors and 
organisations have the possibility to cooperate with other organisations at the same level. The 
best way to manage a crisis of a national concern is by applying vertical coordination, whilst 
smaller disasters and complex emergencies are better managed horizontally. This approach 
was decided to be the most effective approach during the Covid-19 pandemic, as this crisis 
would require a common understanding of the situation in addition to common measures 
across the country. 
Knowing the nature of the event and describing it in a way so that all involved actors 
understand the situation, is a crucial aspect of the overall crisis management. Using a common 
terminology could greatly improve collaboration and coordination efforts in the early stages 
of a crisis, where the information is scarce and the understanding of the situation is still 
unclear. However, as the terminology and crisis management strategies varies between 
different local actors, organisations, and government branches, it can create a system of 
overlapping and confusing preparedness strategies. The preparedness plans offer no attempts 
to provide a common terminology, and there is no commonly used guideline on the 
terminology, which is to be used across all areas of societal security and preparedness. In 
order to improve the understanding of the seriousness of the event, establishing a common 
terminology is central.  
As it is impossible to predict the future, the best path forward would be to prepare for 
different future possibilities or outcomes. For that, Norwegian organisations and actors would 
require a wider scope of analysis of possible threats. Pandemics are inherently wicked, and as 
such, the aim should not be to seek out a solution to the problem, but rather create measures 
that reduce the risk and consequences of the infection. As of now, it is impossible to remove a 
pathogen from circulating through the population. However, it is possible to reduce the spread 
and lower the infection rate. Similarly as pandemics, terrorist attacks pose a wide range of 
challenges, as it is impossible to determine the source of origin, where the event is to take 
place, or the size, scope, and consequences of the attack. Yet, there is a host of strategies and 
structures in place for early detection and reducing risks if a terrorist attack were to take place 
in the future. Training and exercises events are held on a regular basis – both within 
organisations, sectors, and cross-sectoral.  
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For pandemics, Norway relies on international collaboration for early detection, 
prevention, and collaboration to for risk reducing systems. Yet, preparedness plans, exercises, 
and training events are mostly the responsibility of organisations and actors on the local level, 
and efforts taken on a national level have, as the corona pandemic have proven, been 
inadequate (NOU 2021: 6, 2021). Additionally, though the probability for a pandemic to 
originate in Norway is close to null it remains a possibility, and there is no measures or 
strategies in place to prevent a communicable disease to go from a local infectious outbreak to 
an epidemic, or in a worst-case scenario, a pandemic. Cross-sectoral training events have 
historically focussed more on terrorist attacks, war, or other types of hostile attacks, rather 
than on other crises, like environment or health crises. The increased threat of a possible new 
pandemic was not viewed as an urgent issue before the Covis-19 pandemic, as pandemics 
seems to have not been viewed as a possible imminent threat that would require an immediate 
response. There appear to be a minimal amount of uncertainty about the ability of the then 
current measures and strategies to manage, or have the capability to manage, possible future 
pandemic outbreaks, as the plans have shown.  
 One perspective that is important to bear in mind when discussing the creation of 
pandemic preparedness plans or preparedness plans in general, is that the process of creating 
the plans can provide opportunities for learning and reflection. Though Norway was not well 
prepared to face a pandemic crisis (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020a, pp. 776-778), and 
mistakes were made in the early phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, the overall trust in the 
government’s ability to manage the crisis and the low number of conflict surrounding the 
implemented strategies and measures would provide crucial for the somewhat successful 
Norwegian response. Restrictions in Norway was gradually lifted, altered, or strengthened 
based on learning-experiences made throughout the pandemic (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2020b), and this flexibility and improvisation was essential for how the crisis have been 
managed. By simply creating the documents, the Norwegian organisations and actors might 
have improved, even if the plans themselves were unable to guide specific measures in a 
specific situation. 
 
7.2 ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
As discussed in the analysis, learning points and experiences made from previous pandemics 
are not the sole contributor in shaping the pandemic preparedness and crisis management in 
Norway – other crisis and complex emergencies have influenced the content and structure of 
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the plans as well. So, in order to answer the research question – “How have previous large-
scale pandemic or epidemic outbreaks contributed to shaping the current crisis management 
and pandemic preparedness plans in Norway?” – additional types of crises would need to be 
included in the explanation.  
The most notable pandemics that have contributed in shaping the pandemic 
preparedness are the 1918/19 H1N1 and the 2009 H1N1 pandemics, and the Ebola patient in 
2014. The 1918/19 pandemic is often used as a worst-case scenario of a pandemic, though 
noted that there is a small likelihood that a future pandemic will be as lethal due to increased 
sanitary conditions, availability of medical equipment and medicines, and international 
collaboration to develop vaccines. The 2009 pandemic provided a real-life test for the then 
current pandemic preparedness, and the vaccination strategy was regarded as the most 
successful vaccination effort in Norway of all times. These learning point have affected how 
possible solutions to end pandemic influenzas would come to be viewed, in addition to being 
how possible future pandemics were assumed to look like. However, it is not only pandemics 
that have affected how preparedness plans and crisis management strategies are structured and 
organised. Other path-breaking events that have affected the health and care preparedness, 
and by extent the pandemic preparedness, was the 2004 tsunami, the terrorist attack on the 
22nd July 2011, and the 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA in 2001. These events changed the 
way in which preparedness and crisis management were viewed, and have as a result, affected 
the strategies of how Norwegian organisations prepare for future pandemic outbreaks. Such 
events have for instance increased the top-down vertical coordination efforts, introduced the 
contextual principles, and further strengthened the silos built by strong sector-ministries.   
In the first sub-question, it is possible to conclude that when faced with path-breaking 
crisis such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the terrorist attack on the 22nd July 2011, 
preparedness plans have had the possibility to change, as weaknesses in the strategies and 
preparedness are exposed during the crisis management. The development of new 
technologies and updates in international plans and frameworks also have an impact on the 
domestic preparedness and crisis management, e.g. the updated pandemic phases provided by 
the WHO were included in the 2014 edition of the PPI.  
Additional aspects that could have been included in the Norwegian preparedness plans 
are climate changes and changing social structures, in addition to a better explanation for 
coordination and collaboration efforts. These issues could have contributed to creating and 
providing a better understanding of the overall preparedness in a contemporary context and 
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pointed to new areas of risk and uncertainty. A perspective on climate change would be a 
particularly important aspect to include in these plans, as the changing climatic conditions 
could affect the shape, size, and severity of the next pandemic. 
Our second sub-question allows for the detection of a path dependent decision making 
in the creation of the pandemic preparedness in Norway. The pandemic preparedness is based 
on experiences made from centuries of preventative measured to counteract communicable 
and non-communicable diseases. Measures such as quarantine and isolation of the infected 
have been used and implemented in all new strategies to combat infection. Newer measures 
include improved sanitary measures and vaccines, along with medical treatments that use 
antivirals and antibiotics to reduce the severity of the infection. All these measures remain a 
part of the pandemic crisis management to this day.  
 As the preparedness plans are changed after a crisis has occurred, or the threat of a 
possible new crisis have emerged, they still follow the previously created path though new 
measures and strategies are added. Vaccines and quarantine of the sick are two paths that have 
shown to be working in the past, and it would be impossible to imagine a future strategy that 
did not include these two measures. There could be a more efficient way to stop the spread of 
the pathogen, but researching possible new strategies to prevent the infection rate from 
increasing, seems to be a futile exercise, particularly when the existing measures are known to 
work.    
The last sub-question informs the ability to view the preparedness plans in a more 
structural perspective. The Norwegian crisis management is based on a framework that is 
applied throughout the different sectors and their management of societal security and crises. 
The management strategies are structured around the idea of a vertical, top-down 
coordination, and on the four contextual principles that have become increasingly more 
important in the overall preparedness. The different actors and organisations have some room 
for agency in their decision making in the management of a pandemic crisis, though the 
overall framework remains fixed, e.g. municipalities are tasked to create their own RoS-
analysis, which still have to follow national guidelines to ensure a good, overall preparedness 
on the local level. As the preparedness is developed in a top-down manner, there is little room 
to improvise for local actors without going against the government implemented measures or 




7.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
This thesis is intended to be a contribution on the field of preparedness and crisis 
management, and the underlying path dependency in which management strategies find 
themselves, so to fully understand the basis for why certain decisions were made. In my 
opinion, the area of crisis management, crisis understanding, and preparedness would benefit 
from including a larger emphasis on historical processes, as it would further contribute to 
inform how crisis have been managed in the past, and how that has contributed to shaping the 
contemporary management strategies and measures. Previous events are influencing how 
security and crises are viewed and prepared for, as is the case for risk analyses, risk-reducing 
measures, in the creation of new infrastructure such as buildings or tunnels, or on strategies 
and legislation that increase the overall preparedness. Dedicating more attention on the longer 
lines of the historical aspects of crises would allow for more comprehensive analysis of 
possible risk factors that stretches beyond events that occurred in the recent past.  
With the experience of using a result-explanatory process-tracing analysis, I would 
argue for the usefulness of analysing the connection between a combined political and historic 
perspective on crisis management and preparedness. Such a perspective can be fruitful in 
order to gain an understanding of the processes behind an event or phenomena – in this case, 
the creation of the pandemic preparedness plans, as it provides some insight on how processes 
are connected. The political perspective has been limited to the creation of political 
documents or policy, as mentioned in chapter 4.2, and has not been on party politics. The 
historical perspective is based on the historical lines of the Norwegian preparedness against 
communicable diseases, in addition to how the plans have changed and been developed over 
the last two decades. By implementing these two perspectives, it has been possible to draw 
longer lines in order to examine the path dependency of the preparedness measures, and to 
examine how critical junctures have caused lock-ins in the crisis management strategies. This 
could in turn provide more information on how the Norwegian preparedness is structured, and 
whether it is established in a way that allows it to manage future crises of unknown 
unknowns.  
As mentioned in chapter 3, a second possibility for this process-tracing study would 
have been to perform a theory developing process-analysis, which aims at developing new 
theoretical perspectives. As the aim of this thesis was to analyse how preparedness came to 
be, and if and how previous pandemic and epidemic events had shaped the preparedness and 
crisis management, a larger emphasis could be made on the multi-level governance 
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perspective. This thesis includes some aspects of the multi-level governance perspective, such 
as horizontal and vertical coordination challenges and cross-sectoral collaboration, which 
implies that this perspective could be further emphasised without difficulty, as crisis are 
border-crossing events that can affect several sectors at once.  
 This thesis has revealed some issues with the Norwegian pandemic preparedness, as 
the framework for crisis management is based on several non-related previous crisis such as 
terrorism and natural disasters. By using path dependency as part of the theoretical 
framework, it has been possible to trace the preparedness strategies historically in order to 
observe how small situational changes in the crisis management have led to changes to the 
overall preparedness. An analysis of how one pandemic crisis like the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
led to changes in for example the PPI, could also have further emphasised a crisis 
management perspective, in addition to implementing a perspective that focussed on actors 
and decision-making. In another study, the five leadership tasks presented in Boin et al. 
(2017, p. 15) could have been utilised to generate an analysis on how decisions made in the 
early phase of the Covid-19 pandemic shows signs of management flexibility and 
improvisation.  
 
7.4 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The focus on societal security have increased after the 22nd July 2011 terrorist attack, as it 
became apparent how unprepared the Norwegian government and the different sectors were to 
manage such a devastating crisis. Research on the field of societal security was in demand 
after the attack, as it has been revealed that there is a lack of studies on how government 
manage and learn from a crisis, and even more importantly, how they prepare for one. It has 
already been established that no crisis is alike and would therefore require organisational 
improvisation and flexibility to manage the crisis properly. In the case of a pandemic, which 
is a slow creeping crisis, cross-sectoral preparedness and training exercises are at the upmost 
importance, as they provide the only real support in order to manage the situation of unknown 
unknown and wicked problems.  
 By using path dependency-perspectives to explain how the preparedness plans were 
created and point to the events that influenced the measures and strategies in the plans, it 
would be possible to make informed choices on the path ahead, when the preparedness plans 
are to be updated again. It would also increase the understanding of how the specific measures 
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came to gain acceptance in the crisis management, in addition to why the specific measures 
were either continued or discarded based on their efficiency in previous crises. Perhaps this 
could allow for a discussion of the path the preparedness finds itself on and whether it is the 
most optimal path in order to face future challenges.  
 This thesis has only analysed five preparedness plans due to its limitation, but I will 
argue that it should still be a sufficient number in order to gain an overview of the overall 
preparedness in Norway. However, as the local government and organisations are tasked to 
create their own preparedness, the number of plans that were left out of this thesis is not that 
high – only a few other preparedness plans on a government level have suggested 
management strategies for pandemics, and most of those are risk analyses. On the other side, 
there are many plans that tackle specified strategies, like plans that guide domestic and 
international detection and response strategies, vaccination strategies, and strategies to ensure 
enough PPE and healthcare personnel. These plans were not included in this thesis, as they are 
unable to disclose information about the overall preparedness and the principles that guide it.  
 If there is an understanding of how the pandemic preparedness is structured, and on 
which principles the measures and strategies are based on, it is possible to create awareness of 
aspects that could change in order to improve the overall preparedness on the field. Due to the 
limitations of this thesis, several perspectives and theoretical explanation models were 
excluded, even though they could have informed an analysis of the research question and 
theme. The focus has mainly been on the national level, while some examples of crisis 
management on a local level have been included. Consequently, there has been a limited 
analysis of the horizontal coordination of crisis management, and local RoS-analysis and 
preparedness strategies, which could have furthered an analysis of the overall preparedness.  
Second, by including crisis communication as a perspective in thesis, it would have been 
possible to analyse how communication between the different actors take shape during a 
crisis, which would further highlight the form of coordination – if it happens horizontally or 
vertically. It would have been possible to include the learning and evaluation phases, where it 
would be possible to analyse when the critical junctures appeared, and trace the process to the 
early phase of the path creation. Political processes and policy entrepreneurs could also have 
an explanatory power in providing a broader understanding of ‘who learned what’ and how 
those learning points would be used in future preparedness.  
Third, the use of organisational theory could have been further emphasised, in addition to 
instrumental and institutional perspectives. The former focuses on the formal structures of an 
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organisation, while the latter focuses on the culture and the informal norms in organisations. 
These perspectives, though oftentimes overlapping, could have various explanatory powers 
within the study of crises. If the organisations were unable to change in the aftermath of the 
crisis, could they have the flexibility to adapt to a new crisis? By including the organisational 
culture, it could have shown whether there is a work environment that easily accepts change 
and constructive criticism, or if the organisation and actors are unable to make changes or 
discard their own work.  
 
7.5 FURTHER RESEARCH  
I have attempted to explain the processes of which the Norwegian preparedness and crisis 
management came to be and point to the factors that have shaped the measures and strategies 
throughout this thesis. As I have analysed the general, overarching pandemic preparedness, 
more research on the specific strategies i.e. vaccination strategies, would have provided a 
deeper understanding of the field of pandemic preparedness. As the Covid-19 pandemic 
appears to have reached its conclusion, a guess would be that the field of crisis management 
and decision-making during crisis will be dedicated a lot more time in the years to follow, as 
to increase learning on the field.  
 Further research on the area could be dedicated to the political aspects in the creation 
of the preparedness plans. As before mentioned, the preparedness plans have all been updated 
or created while the Conservative Party and its collaborators have been in charge of the policy 
in the government. A different possible other approach could have been on how the different 
political parties have influenced the specific measures in the plans: have the relationship 
between the parties affected the strategies, or have the main responsibility of creating the 
plans been placed on one party? 
 The division between larger and smaller municipalities would additionally be an 
interesting field for further research, as the geographical conditions of Norway could have 
affected whether the measures were mainly intended for larger cities like Oslo and Bergen, 
and whether this could have resulted in a poorer preparedness in smaller cities or towns. 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, it have become clear that national measures have not fully 
recognized the different infection rates throughout the country, and the measures each region 
would prefer to adapt to protect its citizens – like the quarantine requirement the northern 
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municipalities in Norway wanted to adapt in the beginning of the pandemic (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2020b).  
Even though there has been a low level of controversy in the early phases of the 
pandemic crisis management, there might have been political disagreements that never 
reached the public. In order to successfully manage a crisis, it is vital that the government is 
allowed to implement policy without too much political disagreement, especially in the early 
phases where there is a low accessibility to information (Boin et al., 2017), as it could further 
divide the population and reduce the overall willingness to follow the implemented measures. 
The other political parties did not interfere in the early phases of the pandemic and they did 
not criticise measures that were deemed necessary to reduce the risk of infection. However, at 
some point, they started to criticise some of the measures, and this point could be interesting 
to analyse for further research, as the conditions of the pandemic or the crisis management 
might have changed, or the motivation to defend the invasive measures could have been lost.  
Other political controversies during the Covid-19 pandemic might also have 
influenced the measures and strategies during the pandemic, whether it be the legality of the 
measures or the usefulness of the strict strategies. Another aspect that would be interesting for 
further analysis would be if the health and care preparedness framework were equipped to 
manage the Covid-19 pandemic, as the preparedness was based around the assumption that 
the next pandemic would be of an influenza pathogen, and not an unknown pathogen like the 
Corona virus. By doing a quantitative analysis of the preparedness, it would be possible to 
create an overview of the different suggested measures and strategies, include more plans and 
risk analyses, and be able to compare them and draw generalizable conclusions on a bigger 
scale. Likewise, I have created an overview of how the plans came to be, and which factors 
influenced them, and I hope this may encourage future studies. 
Such aspects would allow for the possibility that this thesis could be used as a framework 
for future discussions and research on the corona pandemic, alternatively on other pandemics. 
By this, it is my hope that I have provided a contribution to the field of preparedness planning, 
crisis management, and societal security in the health and care sector, with a particular focus 
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